The Prussians in 1806
Dispelling the Myths
Part Vb - Jena
by James Gaite, UK
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The Traditionalists state that the Battle of Jena was a series of debacles that led to the defeat of Prince Hohenlohe and his forces; the Revisionists claim that it was a foregone conclusion. Whatever the case, Jena is certainly rife with “key moments”, the first of which occurred the day before the battle on the 13th October.
The Night Before
The building of the Grand Battery of Landgrafenberg was a great achievement, although the effect it had on the battle itself has been questioned by a number of historians. What is criticised more, however, is Napoleon’s positioning of his troops so densely packed around the Landgrafenberg heights in preparation for the big push over the Saale in the morning.
Maude, believes that this move was injudicious, especially with Napoleon supervising the work personally. “From the Prussian position to the centre of the mass [the V and Guard Corps] was barely 1,200 yards, and what its fate must have been had the Prussian Artillery opened upon it, it is difficult to conceive.
Not even Napoleon’s strategy, which had so far worked without apparent hindrance, could well have averted disaster, for had Napoleon been swept away in the debacle which must have ensued, his Marshals were in no position to carry out his design, the essence of which they were so far from apprehending.” [TJC 147-8]
This view is upheld by one of the few eye-witnesses of the scene to put his experiences on to paper, General Count de Ségur. He writes: “The remainder of the night passed quietly. Napoleon had reached his tent about midnight, and slept soundly. Our position, however, was such a perilous one that it was whispered amongst us that the enemy could have thrown a cannon ball by hand which would have passed through our entire ranks. So true was this that the first cannon shot the next day went over
our heads, and killed a cook at his canteen quite a long way behind us!” [ADC 239-80]
As to Napoleon’s safety, de Ségur describes how, after working late in to the night making reconnaissance towards the enemy’s positions and writing copious orders for the following day, the Emperor set off on one last reconnaissance before allowing himself to rest. “During this last hazardous recognizance he got so far out of our lines,
that on coming back, one of our outposts, knowing that the Prussians were only a little distance off, took him for one and fired upon him!” [ADC 239] Could this have been a key moment? What might have happened if Prince Hohenlohe had decided to make an incursion into Jena at night? Maybe, knowing the Prussian military thinking of the time, a night attack may well have been out of the question. But would a bombardment against the works on the Landgrafenburg be beyond Prussian military thinking? And, in the chaos that would have most surely ensued if any or all of these acts had been perpetrated, what if Napoleon had been either killed or incapacitated?
David Gates asserts that: “Expected to screen the other Prussian contingents, Hohenlohe had considered falling on the French debouching from Jena, but was enjoined to stay on the defensive, both strategically and tactically…The chance to deliver a spoiling attack against the incipient French concentration was thus allowed to slip, and the assembling of Napoleon’s forces continued unimpeded.” [TNW 59]
However, whether this was likely or not is refuted by Gates himself. “In any case, he [Hohenlohe] dismissed the enemy’s activity here as insignificant, being more concerned by reports of French troops at Dornberg.” [TNW 59]
What is certain is that Napoleon risked a lot, both personally and tactically, by packing his advance elements into such a small area. However, as events were to prove, the risk was more than worth taking.
8.30am and The Battle Already Won?
At around 6 am on the morning of the 14th October, Napoleon launched Lannes’ V Corps, supported by the Guard, against the forward Prussian positions held by General Tauenzien. “Before 8.30 am Lutzeroda and Closewitz were already in French hands, and shortly afterwards the crest running south from the Dornburg towards the
Isserstedter Forest (the key of the whole position) was also occupied by them.
Thus by resolutely turning to account the temporary advantage which the fog had afforded him, Napoleon had already won the cardinal point of the whole battle. Not only had he gained space for deployment, but the advantage of concealment for the massing of his reserves had also become his, and no one knew better how to profit by it.” [TJC 149-50]
Hence, as is quite clear by the above quote, Maude considers the Battle of Jena to have been decided by Napoleon’s first bold stroke, set up by his bold risk taken the night before.
Petre concurs. “The crucial period for Napoleon at Jena was the commencement, when he had to gain room for the deployment of his corps as they advanced. Once he had gained this, there was no longer any doubt. Here, had Hohenlohe been alive to the situation, the Prussians had their best chance. A position of which the centre is the Dornberg, the right the Isserstadt wood, and the left beyond the Rauthal, with Cospeda and Closewitz occupied as advanced posts, is by far the strongest on the battlefield.” [NCP 176]
What is more, Petre speculates that: “Had Napoleon found the whole of Hohenlohe’s army so posted instead of only Tauenzien, his deployment would have been much more difficult than it was.” [NCP 176]
Hence, it would appear that Napoleon’s risk of grouping his meagre advanced troops around the Landgrafenburg and then marching them headlong into the face of Hohenlohe’s force was greater than Maude seemed to appreciate. If only one of the following events -- a night time bombardment, a brief night time sortie into Jena or a forward concentration of Hohenlohe’s forces -- had occurred, the outcome of the Battle of Jena could have been very different, at least at its beginning.
However, Hohenlohe had not concentrated his forces, but dispersed them over a large area. Why? According to Petre, on the 13th October… “…Towards 3 P.M. Hohenlohe received intelligence which led him to believe that the enemy was advancing to the plateau from Camburg and Dornburg. Taking a brigade of 4 battalions, 21 squadrons, and 2 batteries, he marched for Dornburg, only to find that it was as yet unoccupied, though large quantities of supplies had been ordered for Bernadotte. These he took or destroyed, and leaving a cavalry outpost in Dornburg, ordered the rest of the force, under Holtzendorf, to occupy the villages on the plateau above, so as to be
ready to meet the enemy should he de-bouch from either Dornburg or Camburg.” [NCP 124-5]
In addition, some historians state that the Prussians expected the main French threat to come from the south on the west bank of the Saale, around Weimar. This, they state, is the reason that Hohenlohe placed so many troops in the vicinity of the latter town.
Hence, it would appear that one reason for Hohenlohe’s dispersal of his troops was his uncertainty as to from which direction the French may be coming. Some historians may argue that this was unwise and that a central concentration of his forces by Prince Hohenlohe would have been more advantageous and, if this force had been positioned equidistant from Jena, the crossing of the Dornberg and the town of Weimar, the Prince could have contested every possible avenue of attack with his whole force concentrated in one place.
On the other hand, other historians may argue that, taking into consideration the speed of movement that could be expected from a Prussian formation in 1806 – Ruchel’s march later in the day is a classic example – a policy of massed reserves would be wasteful and useless; the French could have gained the strategic positions and deployed to face the oncoming enemy before the Prussians could have arrived on the scene.
Slow on the Uptake
Another reason proffered to explain the ease with which Napoleon successfully snatched the initiative is expounded by David Gates. “Despite the approaching thunder
of battle and several frantic messages from Tauenzien, Hohenlohe remained reluctant to believe that anything serious was afoot and became quite irritated when one subordinate started moving his cavalry towards the sound of gunfire.” [TNW 63]
Petre reinforces this argument and writes: “It was not till 9 or 10 P.M. that Hohenlohe returned to Capellendorf [from Weimar]. Tauenzien had been left with 13 battalions, 8 squadrons, and 11/2 batteries to hold the line Closewitz— Lutzeroda against Lannes, whom Hohenlohe persisted in considering as a mere advance guard. The
Prince was persuaded that nothing serious, especially in Tauenzien’s direction, would occur on the 14th…Hohenlohe…had for some time after the sound of the fight at Closewitz reached his ears refused to believe in its importance. He was annoyed with Gravert, who had begun to move to his left into a position about Gr. Romstadt, facing the direction of Tauenzien. As message after message reached Hohenlohe from Tauenzien describing the severity of the attack, the Prince at last realised that his left was being seriously menaced. He sent orders to Tauenzien to fall back into second line towards Klein Romstadt, whilst Gravert’s cavalry covered his retreat.” [NCP 125 & 132]
And yet to be fair to Prince Hohenlohe, until 10.00 am, no major fighting seems to have taken place, only what could be mistaken as an exploratory attack from Jena by what Hohenlohe may have believed was simply either an advanced and flank guard of the Grand Army. Even more possible, Hohenlohe may well have believed that Lannes’ advance against Closewitz and Lutzeroda was a diversion to draw Prussian forces away from another point of attack – maybe through Dornberg or from the south.
Another fact to be considered is the reasoning behind the Duke of Brunswick’s decision to withdraw his forces to the Elbe – it was believed that Napoleon was attempting to outflank the main Prussian army concentrated around Weimar and cut it off from its supply sources at Leipzig and Magdeburg. This theory would have gained much greater credibility from the aging Prussian High Command who were much more used to campaigns of manoeuvre, where to strand an opponent from his
re-victualling points was only one step away from a complete strategic victory, than Napoleon’s actual strategy to draw his opponent’s forces into a decisive battle, a concept that was alien to men who knew the cost and value of a standing professional army and were unwilling to risk its loss unless victory was almost guaranteed, or battle inevitable. Hence, Hohenlohe may have had good reason to believe that Napoleon was simply feinting in his direction while continuing his march with the main part of his force on to Leipzig and beyond.
Maybe, if the fog had not been so thick and obscured the vision of the Prussian staff in these early stages, Hohenlohe’s reaction may well have been different. It is necessary to remember that it was well past 9.30 when Holtzendorf was dispatched from the field, and even later when the stray units of that command neared the vicinity of the Prussian main force. Tauenzien did not reach Vierzehnheiligen until this time and all Hohenlohe had to go on was reports of gunfire, which may have been heavily distorted by the fog and seemed to have come from different directions than the arena of combat, and frantic messages from Tauenzien who, it was rumoured amongst the Prussian Staff, had shown cowardice in his retreat from Schleiz and a total inability to hold his troops together during their retreat to the Saale.
Certainly, the panic amongst the Saxon troops under his command as they threaded their way through Jena on the 12th had done little to boost Hohenlohe’s confidence in Tauenzien’s abilities to command.
Another factor that may have contributed to Hohenlohe’s indecision or apparent lethargy is that Augereau had not yet come into contact with the Saxon troops stationed around Isserstedt. “Augereau, apparently misunderstanding his orders, had crammed his whole Corps into the Cospede ravine. It was 0930 before his leading division struggled onto the plateau and formed up beyond Lutzeroder.” [MHA 64]
If Augereau had been quicker, maybe reports coming from Hohenlohe’s southern flank of the increasing presence of French troops may have stirred that Prussian general earlier than he did. Maude, however, has a different opinion on why Hohenlohe was so slow to act to the French threat to his position. “Prince Hohenlohe, however, was in no frame of mind to heed the warning [from Tauenzien].
As a consequence of the unfortunate interruption of his projected offensive on the previous afternoon, he had settled down into that most dangerous frame of mind, in which a man refuses to accept anything beyond the responsibility for the execution of direct orders.” [TJC 148]
Nevertheless, whatever the reason for Hohenlohe’s lack of activity in the opening hours of the battle, this was soon to change.
Holtzendorf’s Foray
Despite Maude’s claims of Napoleon snatching a victory as early as 8.30, Napoleon’s position between nine and ten o’clock was still tenuous. “Holtzendorf, cantoned in the villages above Dornburg, when he heard the commencement of Tauenzien’s action, issued orders for the assembly of his force about Rodigen. As they gradually
came up he found himself, at about 9 A.M., some three miles from the left of Tauenzien (now on a level with Vierzehnheiligen) and separated from it by the interposition of Suchet’s division. It was open to him either to cut his way through direct to the main line, or to join it by a circuitous route through Stobra and Hermstadt. He chose the bolder, but, as it happened, impracticable course.” [NCP 133]
Maude carries on the narrative. “In the first encounter, Holtzendorf’s men proved fully equal in individual fighting force to the French, and without much difficulty drove the latter out of Heiligenholtz. Covered by their skirmishers and guided only by the bullets and the sounds of the firing, Holtzendorf deployed his command into line and moved to attack in echelon, right in front with the regularity of the parade ground. So far, indeed, the Prussian drill-ground training had not failed them, but now began a succession of disasters. The Cavalry Brigade of Soult’s Corps (8th Hussars, 11th and 16th Chasseurs) emerging suddenly upon the Saxon Light Horse, covering the left of the Prussian line, and catching them in the fog at a disadvantage, fairly rode over them. “Pursuers and pursued then dashed down upon the following Infantry, who did not see them until too late to avoid the encounter, with the result that a couple of battalions were completely demoralized.” [TJC 150]
Once more, the fog came to the aid of the French, although Holtzendorf’s attack certainly caused great consternation in the French camp. Maude claims that, on hearing the musket and cannon fire off to his right (the clash between Soult and Holtzendorf), Napoleon called a temporary halt to Lannes’ advance until he was sure that any threat from that direction was not serious enough to jeopardize his overall strategy.
In addition, two units of Holtzendorf’s command did slip past the French in the enveloping fog and joined the extreme left of Hohenlohe’s main line. These units are reported to have fought with great courage and distinction throughout the combat, leading Maude to comment that this showed “…what Holtzendorf’s men might have done had they but started half an hour earlier.” [TJC 151]
It is certainly interesting to surmise what might have occurred if the cavalry of Soult’s Corps had not erupted from the fog so close to the deploying Prussian battalions, or indeed if Holtzendorf had moved half an hour earlier and caught the French deploying around Closewitz. Certainly, a well-formed column of Prussian troops appearing out
of the fog on the French right wing would have caused a number of problems for Napoleon and his advancing troops, as well as possibly aiding Tauenzien in his attempt to hold Closewitz and Lutzeroda against Lannes’ attacking infantry.
To expand further on the possibilities abounding with such an occurrence, one only has to look a year previously at the effect of Davout’s incursion on the Austro-Russian flank at Austerlitz (this was planned, admittedly) or the dramatic consequences of L’Estocq’s small detachment turning up at the key point of the Battle of Eylau some four months later.
And yet, was Holtzedorf’s south-ward movement as decisive and courageous as the picture Petre and Maude paint? David Gates gives a significantly different version of events, which hints at dithering and inefficiency on the behalf of the Prussians, and a more planned execution of movement against the threat they posed by Marshal Soult. “A new threat emerged on their [the French] right-rear in the form of Holtzendorf’s contingent, which, alerted by firing to the south, had spent the previous three hours concentrating and marching to join Tauenzien. Finding the V Corps across his path, Holtzendorf was tempted into assailing the exposed French flank, but had still to complete his preparations when his own troops came under fire from the woods on their left. This was the work of Soult’s Corps as it sought to come abreast of Lannes’s
formations. Holtzendorf instantly aborted his attack. He was too close to disengage easily, though, and was soon beset by a swarm of hussars and chasseurs.
Several units were overthrown, and the rest had to flee to Apolda, from where, menaced by Bernadotte’s corps as it approached from Dornburg, they headed for the Ilm at Ulrichshalben.” [TNW 63]
It sounds all a bit chaotic – three hours to decamp and march, hesitating to attack and then deciding against it and then being swept away by a few squadrons of French cavalry whom Holtzendorf should have guarded against. Then, after being forced to retire, the Prussian commander moves back to his original positions which he then immediately quits on the news that further French troops are approaching and marches off, not on circuitous route to rejoin Hohenlohe, but to a position well to the rear of the Prussian lines.
Whatever your views on the leadership qualities of Holtzendorf and the fighting ability of his troops, however, it is still hard to believe that a force of approximately 5,000 infantry and cavalry and twenty cannon, emerging out of the fog to the right-rear of the French lines, would not have caused considerable consternation, confusion and hesitation on the part of the French commanders, especially as the true number of Holtzendorf’s command could not have been established due to the fog that was still clinging to the battlefield. Therefore, it is difficult on most grounds to argue with the fact that Soult’s repulse of Holtzendorf’s march, whether partly through good fortune as
Maude seems to believe, or through the efficiency of Napoleon’s strategy of support, as is hinted at by Gates, was not a key moment in the Battle of Jena.
The Prussians Attack
“Determined to carry out his orders and protect the withdrawal of Brunswick’s main army, Hohenlohe ordered forward his remaining troops while an urgent message was sent to General Ruchel to bring his men forward from Weimar in support.” [NFV 62]
Dragged out of his lethargy or indecision, Hohenlohe now set the Prussian rear detachments in motion to confront, contain and repel the French. Grawert’s division and the Prussian cavalry was marched towards the front, which was now situated about the town of Vierzehnheiligen.
However, many historians believe this forward movement was too little, too late. Maude, as already noted, states that the battle was already won by the French in the opening attack and defeat of Tauenzien and Petre, while apparently agreeing with this theory, rather confusingly claims that, if Hohenlohe had attacked when Napoleon had halted his advance to deal with Holtzendorf’s approach on his right flank, the Prussian Prince could have swept the French back into Jena, and possibly beyond. And yet, as will be seen, there were to be further opportunities, sported by historians, which may have proved to be Hohenlohe’s best chance of victory or staving off defeat as the battle reached its most vehement and most confusing stage.
Vierzehnheiligen
Before embarking on the events that succeeded 10 am, one other point of interest, or key moment, occurred – the failure of either side to realise the significance and thus occupy the tactically important village of Vierxehnheiligen, at least at first.
“In the confusion of this [Tauenzien’s] retreat, no one thought of leaving garrisons in the villages of Krip-pendorf and Vierzehnheiligen, a most unfortunate oversight.” [TJC 151] However, it was not just the Prussians who neglected to occupy this village. “Behind the advancing screen of skirmishers Lannes’s Corps was executing a change of position, which brought its right wing on to the village of Krippendorf, but left Vierzehnheiligen for the moment unoccupied.” [TJC 151]
Then again, when Grawert’s cavalry advanced, they positioned themselves on either side of the village, once more leaving Vierzehnheiligen unoccupied.
It was only upon Ney’s arrival upon the field of battle that the French finally garrisoned this key point; though whether this was by Ney or Lannes is a matter of dispute, as is whether such a move was intentional on behalf of the French command, or the product of the over-enthusiasm on the part of the hot-headed Ney.
Although the import of this tactical omission will be dealt with later, this seems a good time to investigate the possible reasons why, on at least two occasions, the Prussians failed to garrison Vierzehnheiligen.
A reason is proferred by Hourtoulle, when, while detailing Vierzehnheiligen’s capture by the French, he claims it “was occupied without problem, because the Prussians were not interested in villages and preferred operating in open country.” [J&A 46] Esposito and Elting also concur with this view stating, “Prussian infantry,
however, had no training in street fighting.” [MHA 64]
Maude claims that Prussian Line troops were trained for combat in the open, not in built up areas. “This [task] had been reserved in Frederick’s day for the “Freisehaaren”, which no longer existed, and the Fusiliers intended to taken their place were already employed elsewhere.” [TJC 155]
However, Hohenlohe had apparently seen the possibilities of Vierzehn-heiligen, as well as the consequences if it were to fall into the hands of the French. Hence, according to Hourtoulle, he ordered the village put to the torch in an effort to make such a position unusable for his enemy.
Ney, Cavalry and all that
Returning to the events on the main field of battle, we are faced with something of a quandary. Whichever text you read concerning the Battle of Jena, you will be confronted by slight differences in the chronology of the events that transpired between 10 am and midday.
Firstly, Maude claims that Grawert’s main advance was preceded by his cavalry…
“…45 squadrons in all, or twelve more than Seydlitz commanded at Rossbach; but there was, unfortunately, no worthy successor of that immortal leader at hand to guide them. “Arrived at the village of Vierzehnheiligen, this imposing array split into two equal wings and was preparing to charge the few Light guns and the swarms of skirmishers…when a sudden interruption on their right brought the whole to a more or less disorderly halt.” [TJC 153]
This interruption, Maude claims, was the impromptu arrival out of the fog of Ney’s advanced cavalry elements who, through a succession of squadron charges, forced the extended Prussian cavalry line to withdraw. Petre and Gates, however, simply describe the cavalry line as a screen to cover the advance and deployment of Grawert’s main body of infantry and artillery.
Another point in dispute is Ney’s time and method of arrival and whether he was acting upon orders from Napoleon or not. Quite contrary to the claims made by Maude above, Gates retells events as follows:
“As the advanced guard of Ney’s Crops arrived on the field…[it] surged towards the Prussian positions around Vierzehnheiligen. This route, unsanctioned by Napoleon, provoked an immediate response from the Prussian cavalry…Forty-five squadrons swept down on Ney’s panting men, forcing them into squares and cutting them off
from the rest of the French line.” [TNW 63]
Alan Schom states that Lannes’ advance… “…was suddenly jeopardized at eleven o’clock by the unexpected appearance of Ney leading a small number of troops, dashing between Augereau’s and Lannes’ Corps. As usual Ney had acted without orders…” [Nap 428]
While Frank McLynn writes… “Once Ney’s VI Corps arrived, Napoleon sent him and Lannes in a two corps attack on the Prussians. An outnumbered Hohenlohe fought back fiercely and called up reinforcements. The headstrong Ney attacked furiously but allowed himself to be cut off from Lannes and Augereau.” [Na1 356]
To add to the confusion in these literary account, it is uncertain also which French troops actually occupied the tactically important village of Vierzehnheiligen. Esposito and Elting describe events as:
“Ney reached the plateau with his advance guard to find that St Hilaire had closed on Lannes’ right, but that Lannes’ left was open. He therefore crossed behind Lannes and came into action on his left…Attacking immediately, Ney recovered the village and the south end of the Dornberg. Prussian artillery fire forced him back, but some of his infantry clung to the blazing village.” [MHA 64]
In complete contradiction, Ian Castle awards the accolades of occupation to Lannes’ troops who he claims advanced into the village in a move to aid Ney’s struggling troops who, possibly, were stranded in their square formations, forced upon by the circling Prussian cavalry.
Finally, as if we, as readers, were not totally confused already, the authors all disagree as to the method in which Napoleon managed to extricate the rash Marshal Ney. Some advance the opinion that he brought forward a ten gun battery he had been preparing towards the rear, some that he sent his only two spare cavalry squadrons (or regiments) to the gallant Marshal’s aid, while, possibly more realistically,
Gates relates that: “To extricate them, Napoleon had to commit the few cavalry reserves he had to hand – Murat’s troopers had only just reached the battlefield – and to implore Lannes to renew his advance. Augereau was also enjoined to intensify the pressure on Isserstedt.” [TNW 63]
More of Part Vb
Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part Vb: Jena [FE68]
Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part Va: Tactics [FE66]
The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part IV [FE65]
The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part III [FE63]
The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part II [FE61]
The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part I [FE60]
1806: A Precis [FE59]
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