The Prussians in 1806
Dispelling the Myths

Part III: Logistics and Organization

Supply

by James Gaite, UK

Like most elements of the Prussian military establishment of 1806, the supply and depot system had its origins in Frederick the Great’s armies of the Silesian and Seven Years War. It was devised out of necessity, as Alan Palmer describes below:

    “[Frederick] relied, for purposes of morale, on regional loyalty and on the professional pride of a soldiery who already considered itself superior to any other army in the world. But he was a realist: when the fighting began his army numbered slightly more than 154,000 men, over half of whom had been born outside Prussia. With mercenaries predominating in the supply services and second-line detachments, it was essential for him to see that his troops were well cared for if he wished to check desertions. He therefore paid especial attention to the basic welfare of the rank and file, insisting that they received a regular ration of one pound of beef each week, that every day bread wagons were despatched from the nearest military depot to an army on the march, and that the baggage-train of each regiment contained a sufficient number of pack-horses to carry tents which would protect every single man against the rigours of the weather.

    What his armies lost in mobility by these regulations, they gained in discipline and the orderly concentration of manpower at decisive strategic points in the theatre of war. It was only by harbouring his limited resources that Frederick could hope to survive the tempest his invasion of Saxony had raised.” [FTG. 130-1]

Another advantage of such a system of self-supply was that it negated the need for forced requisitions from the population in the area in which the war was being fought, thus avoiding any difficulties a hostile peasantry can provoke. History records how this system, along with other developments, many unique for their time, allowed Frederick to conserve his manpower and survive what became a war of attrition against three much larger European powers for seven long years. So why should it not work for the Prussians of 1806?

One reason is that this system was only designed to cope with the 25-30,000 men in a typical Frederickian campaigning army, not the 120,000 strong Prussian force under the command of the Duke of Brunswick. The meager logistical staff had a nightmare of a task keeping the individual units supplied so that they received all that they required.

Inevitably, under strains the system was not created to cope with, cracks started to appear and after the defeat of Tauentzien at Schleiz and the Saxo-Prussian Advanced Guard at Saalfeld, the inadequacies became glaringly obvious; on both occasions, large amounts of supplies were forcibly deserted as the Prussians retreated and, as both contingents rejoined Hohenlohe’s main army around Jena, there were no facilities in place to re-victual them.

Another problem with this system occurred when it was not available or, as in October 1806, when it started to fall apart through the strain of numbers requiring support. Why should it fall apart? The logistical personnel’s incapability to function was mainly due to their limited numbers, sometimes through pure ineptitude, bloody-mindedness or xenophobia and, after the 11th , lack of training, preparation and resources to keep up with the rapidly changing situation in the military arena. On this most historians agree.

Maude highlights one glaring instance of pure incompetence. On October 11 th , the survivors of Saalfeld reached Hohenlohe’s position, they were disheveled, in low spirits and many were ill..

“The march to the intended camp resumed; but it was never reached, as darkness soon closed down, and the worn-out men, now constantly under arms for three days and two nights, fell away by the roadside and slept when and where they could. This was perhaps fortunate, as Massenbach, in his efforts to perform Scharnhorst’s duties as well as his own, [1] had entirely forgotten to see to the laying out of the camp, his first duty as Quarter-Master General!” [TJC. 93]

Maude continues that, on October 12th , with army morale having suffered from the defeat at Saalfeld and the loss of Prince Louis-Ferdinand, “the issue of fresh provisions, and of fire wood in particular, would have gone further to steady the growing unrest in the troops than perhaps any other measures, but nothing so practical seems to have entered the minds of the Prussian Commanders.” [TJC. 94-5]

When the system did collapse, the Prussian soldier seemed incapable of fending for himself, in stark contrast to his French counterpart. Petre claims:

    “The Prussian soldier, accustomed to look to [magazines] for his food, was, when occasionally required to find his own supplies, unable to do so. [Alternatively,] Napoleon openly preached that war must be made to support war, and, though he was careful to collect great depots of stores as a reserve at central points, his armies, as a rule, lived by requisitions. When they had to pass through a poor tract, deficient in population and supplies, the Emperor insisted on them bearing on their backs a sufficient store of food to carry them beyond it. Thus the French soldier was an adept at systematically extracting from the country every atom of available food, without regard to the sufferings of the inhabitants. A village, which had failed to yield much to the perfunctory requisitions of a Prussian force, would often, in the hands of a French regiment a few hours later, be found able to provide ample stores.” [NCP. 20]

Maude hints at a different reason for the apparent ineptitude of the Prussian soldier to forage. On the night of the 13th October he describes the Prussians “lying shivering through the cold night … without greatcoats, and not daring to touch the fuel and food the villagers in the vicinity most amply afforded them.” [TJC. 147] He claims that “this is the received tradition and applies to the bulk of the Prussian troops.” [TJC. 147n]

So, although it does not appear to be mentioned by many critics of the Prussian army, it does seem that there was either an unspoken code or a firmly enforced regulation forbidding foraging; however, whether this was just from their own people or applied to any country in which they operated, is uncertain. As mentioned above, Frederick the Great took this matter very seriously as it upset the local peasantry and landowners, and it is possible that this tradition, like many others, had carried itself through to the Prussian army of 1806.

However, whether through the lack of skills or through military regulations, the Prussian reliance upon regular re-supply from their logistical system caused another problem.

    “The Prussian, burdened with two or three days supply of food, would, relying upon his commissariat, throw it away to lighten his load; the Frenchman, on the other hand, would carefully preserve it for an emergency.” [NCP. 20-1]

Hence, if a French force found itself bereft of its supply source, it would be a number of days before this loss seriously effected the performance of it soldiers, whereas, in a similar situation, the removal of an active re-victualling service, compounded by their inability to forage effectively and their wanton ejection of their existing supplies would leave a Prussian force in a very dire situation. Morale was usually the first casualty and this factor, in addition to the lack of nourishment, rapidly deteriorated their combat effectiveness as well as causing the rate of desertion and illness to rise at a dramatic rate.

Even without the inherent problems listed above, the Prussian supply system had a dramatic influence on yet another area of the army’s performance - their rate of march.

    “ ‘The Prussian army’ says de Fezansac, “the heir of the traditions of the Seven Years War, manoeuvred well, but slowly and methodically, with an infinite quantity of baggage; 5 or 6 leagues (14 to 15 miles) seemed to it a long day’s march.” [Comparatively,] for six days on end, in the second week of October, the French Guard averaged over 18 miles a day, Davout’s corps 16, and Lannes’ 14, besides two days of fighting; yet, after these marches, all were able to go through a long day of fighting.” [NCP. 21]

It is interesting to note that, in relating the same figures in his work, Maude states that “except Augereau’s Corps, [2] none were therefore overworked, as generally supposed.” [TJC. 146] Maude then instructs the reader to compare these figures with the extraordinary distances covered by Colonel (or Lord) Lake during his 1803-4 campaign against the Mahrattas. Nevertheless, Petre’s point is well made - compared to the sluggish rate of march achieved by the Prussian forces, the French Corps’ were superior, giving them the advantage of greater manoeuvrability. This deficiency on the part of the Prussians, Petre claims, became glaringly apparent during the subsequent pursuit, a subject that will be covered in more detail later.

The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part III [FE63]

Other Parts

Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part Vb: Jena [FE68]

Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part Va: Tactics [FE66]

The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part IV [FE65]

The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part II [FE61]

The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part I [FE60]

Related

1806: A Precis [FE59]

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