The Prussians in 1806

Part II: Prussian Despair

by James Gaite, UK

“The position of the Prussian Army on October 6th was neither involved nor even dangerous.” [Quoted in TJC. 78] Unlike many historians, Clausewitz does not believe that the internecine quarrelling of the Prussian High Command was the direct cause of the defeat of the Prussian army in 1806. He argues that a defence of the left bank of the Saale River, a position that could have been attained with ease by the scattered Prussian forces before Napoleon’s arrival, would have provided significant advantages for the Prussians. “here we had the whole of North Germany behind us, and in case of necessity could retreat in any direction…As.long as we remained in uncertainty as to whether the enemy was coming by Eisenach, the Thuringian Forest or by Hof, the position on the left bank of the Saale was most central and, therefore, preferable.” [Quoted in TJC. 80] Hence, he concludes that with the Prussian army in such a position: “The enemy would therefore be compelled to fight with his back against a precipitous ravine with no room for deployment and the Bohemian Mountains in his rear, whilst his communications ran out sideways along the river. In fact, in all history there is scarcely an instance to be found of a similarly advantageous position for an Army compelled to assume the defensive… …Certainly these advantages of our position…depended for their realisation on an Army which knew how to fight and on leaders with determination enough to seize their opportunities, and at the time these qualities were all believed to be abundantly present both in the troops and our principal commanders. Had it been possible to forecast the want of skill shown in action, the indecision and lack of council of our leaders, the mass of insubordination, the confusion and contradiction which events actually disclosed, then the only rational course to have pursued would have been to take up a position square across the Leipzig road so as at least to have retained the possibility of running away.” [Quoted in TJC. 81 & 84] Maude argues that Clausewitz failed to grasp the “inherent strength of the Napoleonic conception” [TJC. 81n] but concurs with the spirit of his conclusions. “It was only the moral of the Staff that suffered from these interminable discussions” [TJC. 84] and if the Duke of Brunswick, von Möllendorf or king William III had actually grasped control of the bickering parties within the High Command and exerted even a rudimentary command of their fractious subordinates, the events of October 1806 may well have been very different. However: “…the nerves of the directing organ were in no condition to stand the shock of the news of the French invasion when at length it arrived, and instead of coolly and deliberately occupying the flanking position of unusual strength which the defile of the Saale supplied, the various detachments swarmed like bees from a hive, and only drifted into the positions they eventually occupied on the day before the battle, as the result of a succession of orders, counterorders, and disorder, and of two partial engagements which, taken altogether, produced profound demoralisation and drove the Saxons to the very verge of mutiny.” [TJC. 85] Le Battalion Carré To conclude this discussion on strategy without making some reference to the plans and operations of the French would be to commit the same error as the Prussian strategists von Phull and von Massenbach - that is to ignore other combatants when discussing strategy. A war is fought by at least two sides and the actions of either side will have definite effects on the behaviour, movement and strategy of the other; however due to the subject of this article being “The Prussians in 1806”, I shall make this section as brief as possible. The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part II Strategy and Prussian Leadership The Duke of Peace Prussian Despair French Superiority Strategic Summary Other Parts Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part Vb: Jena [FE68] Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part Va: Tactics [FE66] The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part IV [FE65] Introduction Infantry Cavalry Artillery The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part III [FE63] Introduction Supply Reconnaissance Higher Organization Logistical Conclusion The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part I Prologue Introduction A Discussion on Strategy The Traditional Theories The Prussian Commanders Footnotes and Bibliographical Notes Related 1806: A Precis Introduction The Collapse of the Third Coalition Napoleon, France and the Building of an Empire The Turning of the Tide The Lightning Campaign Prussian Defiance at the End of the Year Back to Table of Contents -- First Empire #61 Back to First Empire List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 2001 by First Empire. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com