The Prussians in 1806
Dispelling the Myths

Part IV Tactics

Artillery

by James Gaite, UK

Unlike the two other arms, the Prussian artillery has not been the focus of obsessive criticism from historians. However, it does appear that there were problems in both performance and organisation of this “third military arm”. “In artillery, again, the French were vastly superior. The Prussian leaders had stood still at the stage of artillery tactics reached by Frederick, whose battles were rarely decided by the fire of guns. The idea of massing batteries was entirely beyond them.” [NCP. 23] Rothenberg, however, does not agree with this point. He writes: “Frederick’s combat tactics combined the use of all arms. Cavalry and artillery played a major part in almost all the battles, disrupting the enemy’s deployment and supporting the infantry’s advance.” [AOW 17] The pertinent question should really be, did the Prussian pay such adherent lip service to the military teachings of their Soldier King as many historians claim or had they regressed or forgotten the more important lessons learnt through the bloody Seven Years War. That is, however, something for the reader to determine. In addition, it appears that is was not in the number of guns present within the Prussian ranks that was the problem - the ratio of artillery pieces to infantry was greater in the Prussian army than in the French - simply how they were distributed and used. In his Introduction, Petre writes: “The history of the campaign will show instances where superior artillery tactics and fire enabled the French to overcome a vastly superior number of guns. At Halle, for example, Bernadotte had but twelve guns against fifty-eight, and the deficiency was not made up for by any marked superiority of the other arms.” [NCP 24] Many historians have condemned the Prussian habit of deploying artillery detachments at regimental level. It certainly took useful weapons from the main firing line but whether this was a harmful practice or not is also disputed. Napoleon, himself, adopted the system in 1809, although there is certain evidence that he was undecided as to its effectiveness. Another problem with the Prussian artillery is highlighted by Gunther Rothenberg. “Frederick also realized that heavier shot was more effective because of its greater hitting power…In 1763 he ordered the production of a medium 10-pound howitzer and assembled an artillery reserve of 70 pieces. “Prussia, however, could not afford the expense of introducing an entire new system [and] it continued to employ a wide variety of types and calibres.” [AOW 25] Consequently, despite the large number of guns available to the Prussians in 1806, few were of ‘modern’ design in a stark comparison to their French counterparts. But why should this be a disadvantage? Firstly, it would create a logistic nightmare for the Prussian commissariat - many different calibres of many different designs would necessitate the supply of numerous different types of ammunition. However, as there seem to be no occasions where the performance of the Prussian artillery suffered through lack of rounds, this point may well be mute as far as this discussion is concerned. Secondly, and possibly, more pertinently, was the difference in performance of the ‘older’ pre-Gribeauval cannon and the ‘newer’, lighter and more compatibly designed replacements. There are three major differences that may have had an influence on the fighting of 1806: The ‘newer’ cannon were designed with lighter carriages and thinner barrels making them more manoeuvrable once upon the field of battle. The ‘older’ types were more bulky and cumbersome and, once positioned at the outset of any pitched conflict, usually remained in place as moving them was a great chore and extremely time consuming. The ‘older’ calibres were, quite literally, older, and were thus more likely to burst during firing. The ‘newer’ calibres were designed to be compatible - different calibres shared similar components allowing them to exchange spare parts. If a wheel of a ‘newer’ cannon was smashed in action, most of the ‘spare’ wheels in the reserve gunpark or attached to a different battery could be used to repair it, quickly bringing that gun back into action- if this happened to an ‘older’ calibre piece, it is quite possible that a replacement would be hard or impossible to find, thus permanently disabling the cannon for the remainder of the battle and, if the combat was lost, so was the artillery piece. At the time, the French had not absorbed large numbers of Austrian and Prussian pieces in an attempt to make up their deficit in artillery - this was chiefly enacted in 1809 following the Battle of Aspern-Essling - so this area of discussion, broached by a few historians, is something to consider in any comparison between the differing performance of the French and Prussian artillery arms in 1806. The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part IV [FE65] Introduction Infantry Cavalry Artillery Other Parts Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part Vb: Jena [FE68] Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part Va: Tactics [FE66] The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part IV [FE65] Introduction Infantry Cavalry Artillery The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part III [FE63] Introduction Supply Reconnaissance Higher Organization Logistical Conclusion The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part II [FE61] Strategy and Prussian Leadership The Duke of Peace Prussian Despair French Superiority Strategic Summary The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part I [FE60] Prologue Introduction A Discussion on Strategy The Traditional Theories The Prussian Commanders Footnotes and Bibliographical Notes Related 1806: A Precis [FE59] Introduction The Collapse of the Third Coalition Napoleon, France and the Building of an Empire The Turning of the Tide The Lightning Campaign Prussian Defiance at the End of the Year Back to Table of Contents -- First Empire #65 Back to First Empire List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 2002 by First Empire. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com