The Prussians in 1806
Dispelling the Myths

Part IV Tactics

Infantry

by James Gaite, UK

The traditional view of the Prussian Infantry is competently espoused by Petre in his work on the period. He wrote:

“In the infantry of the two armies there was the most complete contrast: that of Prussia was an admirable, but rigid and slow-moving machine; that of Napoleon was flexible, quick, intelligent… On the battlefield the difference in tactics was equally marked. The army of Frederick… generally found it possible to move in the closest formations, to deploy slowly into line, and correct distances and dressings before opening fire. The enemy, like themselves, was in line, and the zone of effective fire was entered by both only when completely prepared. Yet it will be remembered how, when the Austrians, at Kolin, harassed the Prussians by light troops thrown out against their flank, the result was a premature attack and a disaster.” [NCP 21-22]

Skirmishers

The issue of the Prussian lack of light infantry and skirmishers is a theme echoed by many historians of the period. Petre, himself, continues that:

“When, in 1806, the precise linear tactics of Frederick came into contact with the more mobile system of the French, they failed absolutely. The Prussians to some extent employed light troops as skirmishers, but they were rarely strong enough to hold back the clouds of skirmishers, constantly relieved and supported by small handy columns, which formed Napoleon’s fighting line.

Again and again it was proved how impossible it was to carry out, under the fire of skirmishers adept in the art of utilising cover, the solemn deployment and preparation of Frederick’s days. The men, incessantly harassed by fire which they could not return with effect during their deployment, were already half defeated before they were ready to fight.” [NCP 22]

Maude also is of this opinion. He claims that:

“A further weakness lay in the fact that up to the close of the Seven Years’ War, Line troops had been kept for Line fighting only. All skirmishing and outpost duties had been performed by irregular troops called “Freischaaren”, enlisted for the duration of the War… These men had unwritten Light Infantry traditions of their own, which disappeared on their disbandment, and though all troops picked up hints from their experience… these points were forgotten as the war-seasoned men passed away.” [TJC ??]

Maude claims that, after British experiences on the North American continent against the American rebels, some effort was made to redress the deficiency in Light troops in the Prussian army and some units utilised their third rank as skirmishers or “Fusiliers”. However, due to the backward views of the Prussian command and the continued belief in the omnipotence of the main firing line, these reforms were not carried out with the thoroughness that was maybe required.

However, contrary to this oft-repeated denigration of the Prussian Infantry’s military preparedness, Hofschröer claims that:

“Historians and popular writers alike in the English-speaking world tend, as a whole, to misunderstand all aspects of the armed forces of Brandenburg-Prussia. Of all the myths they have created, perhaps those on the subject of the light infantry of the Napoleonic Wars have gained the most acceptance, even if they are as unfounded as all the others …. It is a commonly held view that it was the experience of the French Revolution, and especially the campaign of 1806, which forced the Brandenburg-Prussian army rather reluctantly to adopt skirmisher tactics in order to counter the French army.” [M149 3]

Hofschröer claims that it was actually Frederick the Great, through his experiences against the light troops of Austria in the Seven Years War and the Bavarian War of Succession, who was responsible for the formation of an irregular light infantry force that was later transformed into a regular force of three battalions of Fusiliers.

He agrees with the concurrent view that there was a certain reluctance amongst the Prussian military hierarchy to the development of such a force, but claims this was because “the ‘Free Battalions’ of the Seven Years War had been regarded as ill-disciplined rogues prone to looting and desertion” [M149 3] rather than any short-sightedness amongst the Generals as to their effectiveness in combat.

However, by 1806: “The Fusiliers formed from them came to be regarded as elite formations, being well-trained, disciplined and carefully selected men led by young, fit and intelligent officers. The rifle-armed light troops, the Jäger, were always a crack formation, their professionalism being rewarded with generosity and privileges which the Line did not enjoy.” [M149 3]

Hofschröer also goes on to claim that both the Duke of Brunswick and Prince Hohenlohe were instrumental in bringing round the reforms that advanced the use of the infamous ‘Third Rank’ as a skirmishing screen and that, by 1806, the Prussian army were not deficient in the Light Infantry arm, simply the experience of their use in war.

Another view can be assumed from David Gates portrayal of the Battle of Jena. “The ongoing exchange of fire was proving far more destructive for Hohenlohe’s troops than for their adversaries. Ordered to deploy within musket range of the latter [the French], the former [Prussian infantry] dutifully went through the intricate manoeuvres of the Frederician drill while being riddled with sniper fire… Many a French officer must have been astounded to see his Prussian counterparts pointlessly expose their soldiers to this destructive skirmisher fire for so long. Seeking neither to retire nor to advance, they stood stoically before the French positions for perhaps 90 minutes…

As Clausewitz was to observe: ‘It was not just a case of a style which had outlived its usefulness but the most extreme poverty of the imagination to which routine has ever led’. [TNW 64]

From this can be assumed that it was the leadership of the Prussian army, rather than their deficiency in the Light Infantry arm, that was largely to blame for the dominance of the French tirailleurs. Rather than manoeuvre in such a way as to discomfort the opposing French Light troops, the Prussian officers seemed to simply rely upon the rule book; that is, stand fast and fire continuous and highly ineffective volleys at their scattered adversaries. The British Army in the Peninsula often found themselves in a similar situation where their light infantry formations were outnumbered and hard pressed by their opposite numbers. However, unlike the Prussians at Jena, the British adapted their drill in an attempt to counter the punishing fire of the snipers. On some occasions, a line would suddenly advance at quick pace, close the gap on their scattered opponents, and fire a devastating volley at close range, before withdrawing in good order to their original position.

Although the casualties amongst the French skirmisher were never high from such a manoeuvre, they were forced to hurriedly withdraw upon their supports before reforming and advancing once more to continue their sniping fire. This, at least, gave the British infantry a short respite from their niggling fire, disrupted the deployment of any troops forming behind the skirmisher line and, importantly for morale, allowed them to vent their frustration on their elusive adversaries.

The Third Rank

It was not just the Prussian Light Infantry who have received criticism from numerous authors over the years. The Prussian Line infantry have also come in for their fair share of censure, especially over the retention of the now infamous ‘Third Rank’. Maude writes:

“The Prussians, like all other European races, had retained the three ranks for Line formations long after all need for the third one had disappeared… Actually all experienced men in every Army had condemned it as both useless and even dangerous.” [TJC. 24]

However, there do appear to have been construed advantages to such a formation. Haythornthwaite, in his work Napoleonic Infantry, states that it was believed that the third rank gave a line more stability in combat than a two rank line, and this was stressed in Dundas’ Regulations for the British Army.

“Another system, included in the 1791 French regulations, was for the third-rank men to assist those in the second rank with their loading, with all ranks remaining standing.” [NAI 89]

Yet another benefit of such a formation was that it gave the infantry greater security against a cavalry charge. With the first line kneeling with fixed bayonets, the other two ranks, both standing, were then able fire over their heads, doubling the volley fire that could be achieved by a two-rank line. At Waterloo, the British battalions formed four-rank lines, making it easier to form a square at short notice.

Furthermore, there was also the problem of the amount of frontage for the formation. Battalions formed in a two-rank line had a frontage almost half as long again as a three-rank formation. With the limited effective range of the musket, this would mean that the fire from outer companies of a two-rank formation would be less effective as well as meaning that, as the enemy closed, these outermost companies would have to stand at an angle of up to forty-five degrees in relation to the centre companies - as in any line the infantry were already closely packed together, this would compress them further, causing possible confusion amongst the two ranks.

Finally, it was believed that, in a three-rank formation, any casualties in the front two ranks could be replaced from the third-rank, allowing the unit to retain its full frontage - in a two-rank formation, as the casualties mounted, they were forced to contract the frontage of their formation thus opening up dangerous gaps on their flanks that could be exploited by the enemy’s cavalry.

Haythornthwaite, in a well-balanced argument, also lists contemporary criticisms of this standard three-rank line deployment.

“There was also a very real danger that men in the front rank would be shot accidentally by the men behind, especially if the troops involved were inexperienced. It was stated that as many as a quarter of casualties were wounded in this way… Remarking especially on British practice, Marmont supported the two-rank line, claiming that the difference in solidity between two and three was negligible, that firing with three ranks was impracticable, and that in any case in combat the three ranks very soon resolved themselves spontaneously into two. The idea that the third-rank men should load for those in front he disclaimed as totally impracticable under battlefield conditions.

Furthermore, others were concerned that the third-rank could make no use of their bayonets. ” [NAI 89-90]

Petre concurs entirely with above sentiments and adds that, in combat, it was almost impossible to persuade the front rank to kneel in a passive role, as they were the main recipients of any incoming fire and their natural instinct in that situation was to return fire.

However, one point seems to be forgotten in many accounts when referring to the use of the third rank by the Prussians in 1806; the French used exactly the same formation. In fact, it was only in 1813 that Napoleon decreed a change to two ranks and other armies, such as that of Austria, retained the three-rank formation throughout the Napoleonic period.

Additionally, the British, famous as the first exponents of the two-rank line, only included such a practice in their regulations in 1824. Hence, despite the many argued problems with the three-rank formation, it seems rather odd that, as both sets of combatants employed the same formation, it has been included as a reason why the Prussian Infantry was inferior to that of the French.

The Prussian Muskets

Another problem with the Prussian infantry seems to have been their equipment. Petre claims that “in 1806 Hoepfner considers that it was the worst infantry arm in Europe.” [NCP. 22] However, Maude claims that the looseness of the bore of the Prussian musket allowed faster loading and, as accuracy was not important in the mass volley fire of the Napoleonic era, this made it an effective weapon; in addition, Haythornthwaite makes note of the Prussian boast that their infantry could fire up to five volleys a minute.

However, most historians concur that the continued issue of wooden ramrods, instead of the more sturdy and durable metal ones, put the Prussian infantry at a distinct disadvantage. To complicate matter further, however, some historians actually claim that the Prussian had metal ramrods! More confusion is implicit with historians differing over the age of muskets used by the Prussian army.

Some claim it was the 1757 model and that many muskets issued to the Prussians in 1806 were old and unreliable - others claim that the musket employed by the Prussian infantry, both light and line, was actually the 1782 model and Scharnhorst had even developed a musket butt that facilitated and improved aiming. Maybe both models were in use, as it was common for any new model of firearm to be introduced slowly due to the excessive cost of re-equipping the entire army - or maybe not.

The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part IV [FE65]

Other Parts

Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part Vb: Jena [FE68]

Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part Va: Tactics [FE66]

The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part III [FE63]

The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part II [FE61]

The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part I [FE60]

Related

1806: A Precis [FE59]

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