The Prussians in 1806

Part II: Strategy and the Prussian Leadership

by James Gaite, UK

Strategy and the Prussian Leadership With such diverse characters and divergent opinions existing at Prussian headquarters from August to October 1806, the scene was set for a debacle; all that was required was a catalyst, and this was found in the Duke of Brunswick’s inability - or unwillingness - to stamp his authority over his subordinate officers. The Endless Councils of War The direct result of the Duke of Brunswick’s lethargy was the holding of numerous Councils of War at Prussian headquarters. The Duke, prior to any military operations, proposed the original strategical blueprint outlined above by Clausewitz. However: “Scarcely were the orders issued, when the Prussian headquarters embarked on a series of councils to deliberate on the plan of campaign. At the best a council of war is a poor expedient, the favourite resource of a weak commander. These Charlottenburg councils were peculiarly bad, for every one of any note was encouraged to expound his views; memoranda begat memoranda and plans of operations; worst of all, the course eventually adopted was generally a compromise, which still left each of the advising members in the belief that his pet scheme had not been finally rejected, and might eventually be adopted. Some remarkable schemes were put forward, the most extravagant of which, perhaps, was that of Colonel von Massenbach, an officer with a high scientific reputation, who throughout played the part of the evil genius of Prince Hohenlohe. This extraordinary plan, which Prince Kraft remarks would nowadays be called the utterance of a madman, contemplated an advance with the Silesian army, entirely independent of the rest, through Saxony to Hof, thence to the Danube, and back again by Bohemia to Saxony. How he proposed to effect this promenade militaire in the face of Napoleon, the apostle of concentration, is beyond comprehension. “Hohenlohe put forward a scheme scarcely less contrary to all the principles of good strategy. One army was to advance on Fulda, through Gotha, another on Hof, a third through the Thuringian Forest from Erfurt, with yet a fourth in reserve about Naumburg. Three weak armies with a front of ninety miles, and a reserve far behind it! Neither of these plans took any account of the enemy, or allowed for any action on his part.” [NCP. 64-65] When the headquarters reassembled in Thuringia, the councils continued. The Duke of Brunswick appeared to be sticking to his original plan of concentration but his subordinates, undeterred by any show of authority or determined direction from their commander-in-chief, continued to compile and propose their own plans for the upcoming campaign. Chief amongst these schemers were Prince Hohenlohe and his Quartermaster General, Massenbach. Having altered their plan from that offered at Charlottenburg, Clausewitz claims that the proposed “plan of the Duke’s…threw Hohenlohe and Massenbach into a perfect frenzy.” He continues: “They had already submitted their plans of campaign, (unsolicited, however well-intentioned) to the King, (a step which reveals the spirit and tone of the two men), in accordance with which the Prince’s Command was to be raised to six Divisions and to picket the passes and defiles of Saalfeld, Saalburg, Hof and Adorf, whilst the main Army was to move along the great road to Eisenach and Vach, and so, in continuation of its offensive, with two great masses, like wing bastions, to turn the Thuringian Forest, whilst 10,000 men held it occupied, and General von Rüchel on the right flank (presumably, therefore, in Hesse or in Eichsfeld) carried out an active defensive.” [Quoted in TJC. 73] However, Hohenlohe and Massenbach were not the only parties to dispute the Duke’s proposal. “All of [the King’s] advisors had acquired a kind of prescriptive right of submitting plans of campaign for the consideration of the whole Council on the smallest provocation” and one of the worst was Colonel von Phull who “had acquired notoriety by the invention of systems of strategy based on the topography of the Theatre of War, but not on the enemy’s operations.” [TJC. 68] The culmination of the string of councils appeared to come at Erfurt on 5th October. Once again, the Prussian commanders congregated while their armies stayed immobile. However, what was supposed to be a final meeting to compile a definitive strategy that would be mutually acceptable to all parties, was a disaster. Müffling gives a short commentary on the proceedings: “In the celebrated conference at Erfurt…Massenbach read a long memoir to prove that the army should march off to the left, by Hof and Bayreuth, and there establish a communication with Austria. “There was not a particle of sound sense in this idea. Saxony, encircled by the Erzgebirge, and the Thuringian Forest as far as the Hartz, forms a tête de pon [1] for the Elbe from Dresden to Magdeburg. We occupied this tête de pont; we had resolved not to begin hostilities, and Massenbach wanted to lead us out of this tête de pont through a needle’s eye to Franconia. For what purpose? “It was not difficult to foresee that Napoleon would permit us to draw quietly towards Nurnberg, and penetrate from the west without opposition, into Saxony. What.then? Helter-skelter back we should have to go again, not to lose the pass at Hof and the passage across the Elbe! The whole proposition did not merit an answer. “However, the Duke got into a parley with Massenbach, and on the latter answering him warmly, he asked Scharnhorst: ‘Colonel, what say you to it?’ Scharnhorst had hitherto made every effort to put the army in motion, not to await the commencement of hostilities with Napoleon, but to break through his armies marching from the borders of Bohemia to form a junction at Frankfort, and force them to a retrograde concentration; but he had always been put off, and referred to this conference. He now rose and declared: ‘I certainly cannot agree to the proposition of Colonel von Massenbach; however, that is of no consequence now; in war, to act for the best is the main thing; and one thing is certain, it is best to do something; and in default of anything better, this may pass.” [MBM. 16-17] The other generals gave little better advice, but none was willing to concur with the opinions of the others and so a collective agreement was reached to dispatch patrols into Franconia to ascertain the French dispositions. However, by 7th October, the divisions in the Prussian High Command had again reappeared and despite the fact that Baron von Müffling’s reconnaissance mission had yet to return, the different Prussian commanders were each settling back upon their own original schemes. The situation was so bad that Scharnhorst commented: “What we ought to do I know right well, what we shall do only the gods know” [Quoted in NME. 186] while even von Phull commented: “What good can arise out of such a cursed medley of opinions?” [Quoted in MBM. 16] On 8th October, von Müffling returned with news of the French advance through the Thuringian Forest. All potential movement ceased in the Prussian camps and yet another Council of War was called. The result, after many hours of squabbling, was threefold: von Müffling recommended another reconnaissance, this time in force, to provide definitive information on the intentions of the French Emperor; Brunswick, although publicly supporting von Müffling’s suggestion, began secretly planning for a general withdrawal behind the Elbe; while Hohenlohe and Massenbach decided to implement their own defensive strategy (yet another scheme!) regardless of the actions of their fellow commanders. However, the time for planning was fast coming to an end. On 7th October, General Tauenzien’s Saxon advance guard had been caught by the French I Corps under Marshal Bernadotte at Schleiz and was forced to withdraw in much disorder; on the 10th, with the Prussians still undecided upon a collective strategy, Marshal Lannes and the French V Corps destroyed another Prusso-Saxon force under the command of Prince Louis Ferdinand at Saalfeld, the latter being killed in the dying minutes of the battle. News of these two encounters reached Hohenlohe’s headquarters on the 11th and by the 12th refugees from Saalfeld had begun to flood his camp. Morale amongst the Prussian staff plummeted - the death of the charismatic Louis Ferdinand and the sudden appearance of the French Grand Armée seemed to sap their will to fight. Finally, on the 13th, the Duke of Brunswick asserted his authority for the first time and issued orders for a general withdrawal to the River Elbe; however, the decision had come too late. On the 14th, Hohenlohe’s command was caught by Napoleon’s echelons and defeated, while the Duke of Brunswick was first halted and then routed by the initiative and dogged perseverance of Marshal Davout and his III Corps. What had started out in August as an enterprise full of hope and great expectations was cruelly destroyed upon the battlefields of Jena and Auerstädt. The only course of action left open to the Prussian commanders was to attempt to extricate their shattered forces from the debacle created by their own indecision and by the failure of the Duke of Brunswick to take full command. Historians argue that one thing could have averted the catastrophe of 14th October 1806: a united command under a strong and authoritative commander-in-chief. The reasons why this did not come about have, like many other elements of the 1806 campaign, been expounded by numerous historical and contemporary writers and a number of theories have arisen. The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part II Strategy and Prussian Leadership The Duke of Peace Prussian Despair French Superiority Strategic Summary Other Parts Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part Vb: Jena [FE68] Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part Va: Tactics [FE66] The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part IV [FE65] Introduction Infantry Cavalry Artillery The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part III [FE63] Introduction Supply Reconnaissance Higher Organization Logistical Conclusion The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part I Prologue Introduction A Discussion on Strategy The Traditional Theories The Prussian Commanders Footnotes and Bibliographical Notes Related 1806: A Precis Introduction The Collapse of the Third Coalition Napoleon, France and the Building of an Empire The Turning of the Tide The Lightning Campaign Prussian Defiance at the End of the Year Back to Table of Contents -- First Empire #61 Back to First Empire List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 2001 by First Empire. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com