The Prussians in 1806

Part II: French Superiority

by James Gaite, UK

Not all historians lay the blame for the Prussians’ dramatic loss of the strategical phases of the campaign at the feet of their generals; some claim that the outcome of the military contest of 1806 was a foregone conclusion, no matter how they had acted. Sebastian Haffnel writes: “One single day brought the military decision. On 14 October 1806 the two Prussian armies, marching separately, were separately defeated in the battles of Jena and Auerstädt…That was not really a surprise: at that time Napoleon had won every battle against any opponent.” [RFP. 80] Such thinking was prevalent throughout Europe at that time - after the defeat of the Austro-Russian forces at Austerlitz, William Pitt “whispered to his niece, Lady Hester Stanhope, to roll up a large map of Europe hanging on the wall, saying it would not be wanted for ten years” [YOV. 188] - and many historians since then, such as Haffnel, have reproduced this theme in their works on this period. …Or Not? Yet Napoleon had not won every campaign - the Egyptian campaign of 1798-1801 was, despite early successes, an unmitigated disaster, as was his first attempt at a coup in his native Corsica some years before that and many historians have highlighted this deficiency. Of these, Correlli Barnett is especially vehement in his criticism of Napoleon’s operations in September and October 1806. “So the pattern of 1805 repeated itself - an unlooked-for war to redeem the consequences of a cavalier disregard for other countries’ rights and feelings. The pattern of 1805 repeated itself militarily as well, for Bonaparte again awoke to danger so late that the logistics had to be organized and the army concentrated in a driving hurry - a breach of his recent dictum that ‘loss of time is irreparable in war; the reasons given to justify it are always bad.’” [Bon. 122-3] Barnett goes on to opine that it was more the inefficiency of the Prussians than Napoleon’s genius that won the Jena campaign for the French, labelling the Prussians as “formidable in reputation but little else.” [Bon. 123] Barnett’s comment regarding Napoleon’s tardy reaction to the build up of Prussian forces in August and September 1806 is worth noting at this point. “It was not until 5 September, nearly a month after Prussia began to mobilize, that [Napoleon] issued a warning order to Berthier; not until 15 September that he decided where to concentrate the army; not until the 19th that he evolved his final plan of campaign.” [Bon. 123] Was this the mark of a genius? To make the similar errors in successive campaigns and totally misjudge the intentions and actions of a belligerent state, leaving his scattered army open to and unprepared for a pre-emptive strike? It would certainly appear that, far from being invincible as many of his contemporaries believed, Napoleon was as capable as any other general of making serious errors of judgement. While Napoleon wrote to his closest confidants scorning any thought of the Prussians unilaterally declaring war upon him, those very Prussians were poised just sixty miles from his scattered forces - if the Prussian high command had acted in concert and sooner, the story of 1806 may have been very different. However, to be fair, it is too easy to mock people for their mistakes and to ignore their efforts to remedy them. The Duke of Wellington once said of war: “It is not how many mistakes you make, but how few”, and it should also be remembered that even though Napoleon is now almost universally toasted as a military genius, he was still human. It should also be noted that is not the unanimous opinion of historians that Napoleon was completely oblivious to the intentions of the Prussian military in early September, despite a mass of historical evidence to the contrary. Frank McLynn opines: “There was something comical…about the way the Prussian leadership dithered.about their intentions, unable to decide between three different strategies…So spectacular was Prussian incompetence that Napoleon spent nearly a month devising counter-strategies on the assumption Berlin must have some masterplan up its sleeve. Finally convinced that he confronted merely bumbledon and that Austria would not intervene, Napoleon set out for Mainz on 24 September.” [Nap. 355] As with Barnett’s appraisal of events noted above, there are factors such as Napoleon’s own correspondence that show, despite his apparent inactivity, he was assessing the potential danger of the mobilising Prussian army and drawing up plans to counter it. Unfortunately, it is not within the scope of this article to investigate this point further. Napoleon’s Strategy So what was the great man’s strategy? In his own words: “It is my intention to concentrate all my forces on my right, leaving the space between the Rhine and Bamberg entirely open, so as to be able to unite about 200,000 men on the same field of battle…With this immense superiority of force united in a space so narrow, you will feel that I am determined to leave nothing to chance, and can attack the enemy wherever he chooses to stand with nearly double his numbers.” [Quoted in TJC. 119 & 156-7] Petre elaborates further: “On the present occasion he laid down as his objective two geographical points, Dresden and Berlin; not that he committed the error of believing that the mere occupation of geographical points was the object of war, but he saw that Dresden and Berlin were the best places to aim at in order to sever the Saxons from the Prussian alliance, to interpose between the Prussian army and that advancing from Russia, and to draw towards himself the former, whose defeat and destruction was his real objective.” [NCP. 52-3] Correlli Barnett is another who succinctly captures the spirit of the forthcoming campaign. In his words, it was to be… “…another bold sweep round the enemy on to his derrieres, with the usual object of forcing an early decisive battle and then returning in triumph to Paris. He concentrated the Grande Armee on the extreme right of the front between the Rhine and the Bohemian frontier, in the region round Bamberg, hoping thereby to tempt the Prussians into seeking to outflank his left and cut his apparently exposed communications with France. Once they had committed this false move, he would cut their communications instead, lunging swiftly north on a narrow front through the mountains of the Franconian Forest, past the Prussian left flank, and then wheeling westwards on Jena.” [Bon. 123] In attempting to achieve such a plan, which was fraught with potential disaster, Napoleon adopted a formation inaccurately termed as ‘Le Battalion Carré’. Petre describes the principle of this deployment as follows: “True to his general principle of concentration on a single subject, the Emperor was about to advance with his army in three columns in the smallest area compatible with the nature of the country and the communications in front of him. Thus, if attacked in any direction, he would be able to concentrate for battle in the shortest possible time.” [NCP. 54-5] Whether this formation was the invention of Napoleon or a carbon copy of the tactics employed by Carnot some years earlier, as some historians have argued, is irrelevant as far as this particular article is concerned. What is important, however, is that, with insecure lines of communication whilst operating in hostile territory, Napoleon’s strategy relied upon catching the enemy quickly and with the full force of numbers available to him, a risky, yet brilliant, conception. The French Leadership Despite references to the French command structure prior to this point, I feel it necessary to occupy a few lines discussing this matter as a counterpoint to the narrative on the deficiencies of the Prussian military hierarchy. In direct contrast to the Prussian High Command, the French were despotically led by Napoleon alone; the French Emperor organised everything, working through the dependable and quite unique capabilities of his trusty Major General, Marshal Berthier. Also, he kept the finer details of any operations to himself - it has, in fact, been claimed by some that he never actually formulated these details until the very last moment - and demanded complete compliance from his subordinate officers. Despite the tendency of some staff officers to dispatch duplicitous missives on occasions - a fact Maude spends some time debating - the system appears to have worked far more efficiently, was quicker and more definite than the disparate apparatus employed in the decision making processes of the Prussian army. However, despite its many advantages, historians have highlighted two major flaws in this process. The first: “Not even Napoleon’s strategy…could have averted disaster, for had Napoleon been swept away…his Marshals were in no position to carry out his design, the essence of which, they were so far from apprehending.” [TJC. 148] Hence, if the ‘guiding light’ of the French army had been taken ill or struck down by a stray musket ball at any time during the campaign, the French manoeuvres would have ground to a halt as no one, not even the trusted Berthier, was privy to the true designs of the French Emperor. Additionally, if, as some historians claim, Napoleon constantly adapted his strategy to suit the prevailing circumstances, none of his subordinates, with the possible exceptions of Marshals Lannes and Davout, had the strategic talent and ability to continue his work. Secondly, Napoleon’s system relied heavily on the uncompromising compliance of his subordinates, an assumption that almost brought disaster for Davout at Auerstädt. Although it is argued that badly worded orders were responsible for Bernadotte’s non-appearance on either field of battle on 14th October, this truculent Marshal, whose adverse opinions of the French Emperor were well known, flagrantly disobeyed a major rule de guerre by not marching to the sound of the guns. Fortunately for the French, Davout was more than up to the task and the Battle of Auerstädt, so close to being a calamity, transpired to be one of the most astounding victories of the entire Napoleonic period. The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part II Strategy and Prussian Leadership The Duke of Peace Prussian Despair French Superiority Strategic Summary Other Parts Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part Vb: Jena [FE68] Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part Va: Tactics [FE66] The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part IV [FE65] Introduction Infantry Cavalry Artillery The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part III [FE63] Introduction Supply Reconnaissance Higher Organization Logistical Conclusion The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part I Prologue Introduction A Discussion on Strategy The Traditional Theories The Prussian Commanders Footnotes and Bibliographical Notes Related 1806: A Precis Introduction The Collapse of the Third Coalition Napoleon, France and the Building of an Empire The Turning of the Tide The Lightning Campaign Prussian Defiance at the End of the Year Back to Table of Contents -- First Empire #61 Back to First Empire List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 2001 by First Empire. 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