The Prussians in 1806:
Dispelling the Myths
Introduction
by James Gaite, UK
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The Campaign of 1806Before launching into a discussion on the differing theories and the procrastinations of an assortment of learned historians, it is necessary to have a brief understanding of the events of the actual campaign.
The reasons for the war of 1806 are beyond the scope of this article and so will not be entered into - the important point is this: by August 1806, the Prussian monarch, Frederick William III, had decided that war with Napoleonic France could no longer be avoided and ordered the mobilisation of his army in Thuringia. By mid-September, the Prussians, along with their unwilling Saxon allies, had assembled a force of roughly 120,000 men in this region of Southern Germany, with another 80,000 troops garrisoning the fortresses dotted about the Prussian plains, the latter including a small force under General L’Estocq in East Prussia. In addition to the gathering Prussian forces, a Russian army was assembling upon Prussia’s eastern frontier, the first detachments of which would be ready for the fray by November 1806.
The commander-in-chief of the Prussian army was the 71-year old Duke of Brunswick, [1] a hero of the Seven Years War and commander of the main Prussian force. His subordinates were also veterans of the Frederickian Era - Prince Hohenlohe received command of a combined force of 50,000 Saxons and Prussians, while General Rüchel was placed at the head of the 15,000 strong Prussian Reserve.
Arrayed against the Prussians was the French Grand Armée, scattered in its cantonments in the Southern German states of Bavaria, Württemberg and Baden. Whilst the Prussians prepared for war, Napoleon remained strangely inactive - he did not believe that Prussia would dare attack him unilaterally - and it was only in late
September that the French Emperor sent hurried instructions to Marshal Berthier to assemble his dispersed units around Bamberg. However, even then, there was confusion - Marshal Berthier, an exceptional Chief of Staff, was not a great leader of men and was not up to the task ascribed to him by Napoleon. Hence, it was only upon the arrival of the Emperor himself on 1st October that the Grand Armée was properly organised and ready to meet the Prussian threat.
The Prussian Army thus had a two-week advantage over their enemies, but they too remained strangely inactive - they seemed paralysed by endless councils of war that failed to produce a universally accepted plan of action. This delay in their operations was all the time Napoleon required; rapidly congregating his forces, he launched a pre-emptive strike on the Prussian positions. His advance was swift and caught his enemy in limbo. Panic-struck, the Prussians finally agreed upon a retreat towards Magdeburg and the River Elbe; but this decision came too late. Sweeping aside a small force under the command of Prince Louis Ferdinand at Saalfeld on 10th October, Napoleon struck at the Prussian forces under Prince Hohenlohe at Jena on 14th and comprehensively defeated them. At the same time, Marshal Davout, sent
on a flanking march to take the enemy in the rear, discovered the main Prussian army in the environs of Auerstädt and, despite being heavily out-numbered, inflicted a hefty defeat on the Duke of Brunswick’s forces, the valiant Duke being mortally wounded in the contest.
Marshal Davout’s victory at Auerstädt was amazing and what followed equalled his achievements; the Marshalate, under Napoleon’s guidance, embarked on a
harrowing pursuit of the enemy. Cajoling their weary troops onwards, they dogged the withdrawal of the defeated Prussian forces, allowing them neither respite nor solace and by mid-November, all the Prussian forces in western Prussia were either dead or had laid down their arms to the victorious French army. Even the hardy General Blücher, who conducted his withdrawal with such skill and tenacity that it would have been lauded as an outstanding success in any other campaign, was forced to capitulate near Lübeck on 7th November.
These are the events as recorded by history - but the question raised by so many historians and contemporary writers is how such a well-reputed army such as that of the Prussian nation, could have been annihilated in such a short space of time.
The “traditional” view of the cause of the Prussian Army’s demise in 1806 is well elucidated by the following quote:
To make matters worse, this antiquated force was commanded by an aging cadre of generals and led by the indecisive and uninspiring septuagenarian Duke of
Brunswick.
However, although many historians, both old and new, have loyally adhered to this depiction of antiquity and inefficiency, there is a growing school of thought that refutes the reasoning behind its arguments. Yet, unlike many revisionist theories that diverge enormously from their traditional forebears, this new line of thinking recognises a number of conclusions advanced by the time-honoured theory, while attributing different causes to them.
To simplify the two opposing arguments: the “traditional” theories lay the blame for the Prussian defeat firmly on “tactical” considerations - their lack of
manoeuvrability; their slow and methodical method of attack; their poor and substandard weaponry; and the inefficiency and orthodoxy of their Frederickian general-ship. The “revisionist” theory concentrates on the “strategical” and “logistical” elements of the campaign. While it agrees with the traditionalists about the ineptitude of
Prussia’s leading generals, it refutes all arguments above the performance of the Prussian troops and training and asserts that the reason for defeat lay in the lack of overall planning and co-ordination, and the rigidity of the Prussian supply system. Yet, who is right? Alternatively, is there merit in both arguments?
More Prussians in 1806
The Prussians in 1806 Part II
The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part III [FE63]
The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part IV [FE65]
Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part Va: Tactics [FE66]
Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part Vb: Jena [FE68]
1806: A Precis
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