The Prussians in 1806
Dispelling the Myths

Part III: Logistics and Organization

Reconnaissance

by James Gaite, UK

One of the most important elements in preparing and executing any campaign is ascertaining the movements and dispositions of the enemy, whether at a tactical or strategical level. To aid them in this field of warfare, the Prussians of 1806 possessed arguably some of the best light cavalry in Europe at that time, as Peter Hofschröer relates below. “So great was its reputation in the Seven Years’ War that Napoleon made a special point of warning his men at the beginning of the 1806 campaign to beware of the Prussian cavalry.” [M162. 3] Although this quote refers to the Prussian cavalry as a whole, it gives some idea of the reputation of the standard of their performance in all areas. However, to the surprise of many historians, the Duke of Brunswick remained at Erfurt throughout September 1806, totally oblivious to the whereabouts and actions of the French forces in Franconia. Even when it came to his attention, on 4 th October, that Napoleon was in Ascaffenburg and busily organising his army, it was only after the inconclusive Conference of Erfurt the next day, and at the apparent insistence of Baron von Müffling, that a reconnaissance of any type was undertaken. Clausewitz writes: “Then at length the decision was arrived at…to send out reconnaissances from all three armies, and reconnoitre in detail the proposed positions [for deployment] at Craula-Erfurt and near Blakenhaym (about 10 miles south of Weimar).” [Quoted in TJC. 77] Not a reconnaissance in depth, but finally some action upon this front. However, even this initiative did not survive the machinations of the Prussian hierarchy for long. “The King, however, condemned the reconnaisances, and only Captain Müffling was sent (presumably with an escort) towards the Upper Saale. His information could be in by the 8 th , and then, if still advisable, the original movement could be commenced on October 9.” [Quoted in TJC. 77] Hence, what little effort was made in this field was half-hearted and curtailed by interference. What information that was actually gleaned by von Müffling’s single reconnaissance appears to have been disregarded by the rival parties within the Prussian camp, as they each stuck to their guns and continued their deployments as was their whim. However, while the High Command remained passive, formulating strategies without any knowledge or apparent care as to the enemy’s intentions, the individual formations appear to have been more alert and aware of the unfolding events of early October 1806. Although some historians claim that Tauentzien was surprised and defeated by Bernadotte’s unexpected eruption from the Thuringian forests - a view expounded by Marshal Bernadotte himself in his report to Napoleon - the combat at Schleiz between the French 1 st Corps and the Saxon Advanced Guard appears to be more of a rearguard action with very few units involved. It is Petre’s opinion that, far from being the element of surprise, it was a badly worded order sending a unit in totally the wrong direction that resulted in any confrontation at Schleiz at all, as Tauentzien had already withdrawn the remainder of his forces out of harm’s way. Similarly, it appears that Prince Louis Ferdinand was fully aware of Marshal Lannes’ Corps approaching his position at Saalfeld, as Maude outlines below. “The news of Tauentzien’s defeat at Schleiz…at length compelled Hohenlohe to make up his mind… “In the evening he despatched a Staff Officer, Capt. Von Valentini, to Prince Louis, who with the main body of the advance guard occupied Rudolstadt.” [TJC. 88] Although some historians claim that von Valentini was also issued with an order for Louis-Ferdinand to hold fast and await the approach of Hohenlohe’s forces, other writers disagree; Maude writes that Louis-Ferdinand deployed at Saalfeld to protect Hohenlohe’s movements behind the Saale. Whatever the causes of Louis Ferdinand’s disastrous decision to give battle at Saalfeld, lack of reconnaissance by the Prussians and thus, any chance of his subsequent defeat being attributed to him being caught by surprise by the French, does not appear to be one of them. The only occurrence of faulty reconnaissance by the forces of the Prussian army, being in any way from to blame for its defeat in the autumn of 1806, was prior to the calamitous confrontation at Auerstädt. The Duke of Brunswick, having decided upon his line of retreat, appears to have neglected to send forth patrols in front of his withdrawing forces, possible in the erroneous belief that no French forces could have attained any position further north than Jena. This led to his toiling regiments marching straight into the path of Marshal Davout’s III Corps in the defile east of Auerstädt. Even when contact had been made, it appears that an insufficient reconnaissance was made to ascertain the size of the French force confronting him - yet, even if it had been made, would the Duke have seriously believed that such an inferior French force could have defeated the cream of the Prussian army? The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part III [FE63] Introduction Supply Reconnaissance Higher Organization Logistical Conclusion Other Parts Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part Vb: Jena [FE68] Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part Va: Tactics [FE66] The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part IV [FE65] Introduction Infantry Cavalry Artillery The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part II [FE61] Strategy and Prussian Leadership The Duke of Peace Prussian Despair French Superiority Strategic Summary The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part I [FE60] Prologue Introduction A Discussion on Strategy The Traditional Theories The Prussian Commanders Footnotes and Bibliographical Notes Related 1806: A Precis [FE59] Introduction The Collapse of the Third Coalition Napoleon, France and the Building of an Empire The Turning of the Tide The Lightning Campaign Prussian Defiance at the End of the Year Back to Table of Contents -- First Empire #63 Back to First Empire List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 2002 by First Empire. 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