The Prussians in 1806

Part II: Strategic Summary

by James Gaite, UK

With such a wealth of arguments and counter-arguments, any discussion concerning what should have been and what actually transpired during the campaign of 1806 will leave some readers in a state of confusion; hence the inclusion of this short summary.

General Strategy

In the consideration of the general strategy employed by the Prussians during 1806, the main theories of the two opposing views are espoused by the following descriptions:

  • the revisionist historians believe that the plan of operations pursued by the Prussian leadership, in their offensive deployment in Thuringia, was a major mistake, citing a defensive position in central or eastern Prussia.as a more suitable option;

  • the traditionalists believe that the choice of Thuringia for their arena of mobilisation was correct strategically, considering Prussia’s political situation in 1806 - they place the blame for the failure of such an action on the ineptitude of the Prussian leadership. Within these two opposing arguments, there are also numerous sub-plots:
    • Some revisionists historians claim that Prussia found herself rushed into a conflict with no clear strategy;
    • some cite their lack of effective allies as a contributory factor to Prussia’s downfall;
    • others assert that Prussian military thinking was so dominated by the dogma and reputation of Frederick the Great that the Prussian army was led to disaster by narrow-minded generals convinced of their own invincibility.

    On the side of the traditionalists, there is also conflict:

    • Clausewitz believes that the Prussian strategy was well planned, that the army’s dispositions in Thuringia were well suited for both offensive and defensive operations, and despite the fractious nature of the Prussian command, that position could still have been held successfully;
    • Maude, amongst others, claims that, although the Prussian position was well suited for military operations and Prussia’s initial strategy was excellent, they mobilised with the true intention of bringing Napoleon to the peace table and were caught totally unawares by the French Emperor’s hostile reaction.

    The Prussian Generals

    As befits the leadership of any army suffering such an unholy catastrophe, the Prussian generals have received much criticism, some of it well deserved.

  • The Duke of Brunswick is criticised about his age, his indecision, his total inability to take control of his fractious subordinates and his last minute decision to withdraw in the face of the advancing French;

  • Prince Hohenlohe is cited as the most insubordinate of Brunswick’s commanders and, led by the ‘evil genius’ of Colonel Massenbach, for creating confusion and disorganisation within the Prussian army which left it scattered and vulnerable upon the arrival of Napoleon’s Grand Armée.

  • General Rüchel is described as unimaginative, slow witted and a Frederickian to the core, the latter being considered justification enough by historians and contemporaries alike for his dismissal from the Prussian army in 1807.

  • Queen Louise of Mecklenburg-Stretlitz has also suffered from the sharp edge of the pens of many historians. She is accused of inciting the conflict, of heading factions opposed to the views of her husband and of fleeing the field of Auerstädt leaving the defeated army to fend for itself.

  • Von Phull is criticised, along with Colonel Massenbach, for producing hair-brained schemes that had no likelihood of success and that only served to clutter and confuse the string of councils of war that preceded the fateful 14th October.

  • Finally, the assemblage of advisors who surrounded the King are slated for their incessant and petulant squabbling and their unending and insidious scheming.

    Rather surprisingly, the only person amongst the senior Prussian dignitaries to escape severe criticism was the head of the Prussian State and, by inference, the head of the Prussian Army, King Frederick William III. Nevertheless, he too should share some of the blame for the confused and complex state of the command structure that existed in the Prussian army in 1806. The many glaring deficiencies of the leading Prussian generals, the uncertain chain of command and the propensity of the Prussian Staff to reduce successive councils of war into inconclusive talking-shops has led a host of historians to raise the question: Why were these men in command in the first place?

    Surprising as it may seem, there are a few historical commentators who have attempted to excuse their selection to lead the Prussian army in 1806. Petre writes:

      “Baron von der Goltz, as well as Prince Kraft, has taken up the cudgels in defence of the Prussian generals of 1806, and of the propriety of their selection. As usual in such cases, hasty critics, judging after the disastrous result of the campaign, have condemned wholesale the Prussian leaders as incompetent. Baron von der Goltz shows that before the campaign these men enjoyed and deserved the highest military reputation. No one then could have been found to condemn their selection. Their misfortune was that they were pitted against a general whose abilities as far transcended those of all his contemporaries as the genius of Frederick overshadowed the mediocrity or incompetence of Soubise or Daun. Many of them were amongst those who, a few years later, bore a distinguished part in the operations which ended in the downfall of Napoleon’s power.

      It is absurd to characterise as imbeciles men like Blücher, Scharnhorst, Müffling or the younger Kleist. Hohenlohe, who was in command on some of the most disastrous occasions in 1806, had been highly valued by Frederick, and had greatly distinguished himself in the wars against the French Republic. Brunswick, if old, was still full of vigour. Kalkreuth had distinguished himself at the siege of Mayence [Mainz] in 1793, and was again to show himself full of vigour and resource in the defence of Danzig in 1807.” [NCP. 42-43]

    Petre thus concludes: