The Prussians in 1806
Dispelling the Myths

Part III: Logistics and Organization

Logistical Conclusion

by James Gaite, UK

So how does all this fit in with the two differing arguments proffered by historians for the unholy catastrophe that overtook the Prussian army in 1806. The Revisionists Firstly, it should be recognised that it is the Revisionists who present the poor Prussian logistic, reconnaissance and command structures as a key element to their downfall. The main points of their argument are simple and outlined below: The supply system and command structure of the Prussian Army were designed for a force of only a quarter of the size present in the Thuringian theatre in 1806. The entire organizational structure was designed to be led from the top - Frederick the Great was a prolific and adept organizer and always insisted on overseeing the operation of every element of his military machine - Frederick William III, however, was too inexperienced and, perhaps, incompetent, to fill his Great-Uncle’s shoes and the Duke of Brunswick, for whatever reason, seemed loath to take full responsibility either. The men who occupied the key positions in the Prussian Army of 1806 were inferior in both skills and experience to those who competently carried out the supply, reconnaissance and organizational roles in the days of Frederick the Great. All this leads some historians to claim that, with such poor support, the Prussian soldier was half defeated by the time he actually confronted the French forces for the following reasons: With the breakdown in the Prussian commissariat, morale amongst certain units of the Prussian army plummeted and it has been put forward as one of the reasons for the poor performance of the Saxon troops on the field of Jena. The disjointed and inefficient command structure within the Prussian army prevented the flow of up-to-date information and commands which would have otherwise allowed the Prussian forces to better coordinate their actions against the approaching French forces - it has been suggested that Prince Louis-Ferdinand held his ground at Saalfeld because the Prussian High Command were a long time in being made aware of his perilous situation and, due to the exhaustive process of compiling orders, the gallant Prince was not informed of their intention for him to withdraw upon Prince Hohenlohe’s main body until it was too late. It is certainly true that orders compiled for execution on the 10 th October took so long to write and distribute and were received so late by the individual army commanders that their implementation had to be delayed until the following morning. The lack of reconnaissance, due to an apparent atmosphere of arrogance that pervaded the Prussian camp, allowed Napoleon’s forces to surprise the Prussian positions which in turn allowed the insufficient and overloaded logistical system of the Prussian army no time to react to their sudden appearance. This, in turn, caused undue panic amongst the High Command which permeated through to the more junior officers and eventually to the rank and file themselves. The Traditionalists However, the Traditionalists pay little or no attention to the deficiencies of the Prussian logistical system. It could certainly be argued that if, as Clausewitz argued, the Prussians adopted a defensive attitude in their position on the Saale, many of the problems incurred by the inefficient logistical system would be nullified. Firstly, the Prussian supply system relied on slow, ponderous wagons to transport the necessary food and equipment to the troops in the field, a major handicap when that army was employed in an offensive role but surely a lesser problem if the Prussians had occupied a static defence line or even a mobile defensive formation around a fixed point. Hence the Prussian troops would be free to manoeuvre at a greater speed without the forced encumbrance of their supply train. Secondly, reconnaissance is an essential tool for any army on the offensive, but of less importance to an army that is on home territory and holding key positions. It could be argued that if the Prussians had fortified their positions behind the Saale and ignored Napoleon’s feint into Saxony, the French, who could only exist for a short period of time without their lines of communications, would have been forced to attack them. Hence, if you occupy a position your enemy must take, there is little reason for reconnaissance as you know the eventual destination of your foe. Finally, there is the question of the poor command structure. Although any defect in the High Command of any army, whether on the offensive or defensive, is sure to undermine its effectiveness, it could still be argued that the influence of these defects would more muted for an army employed defensively, primarily because the only mobile force would be a strategic reserve, such as that under General Ruchel, whose task it would be to plug any gaps created by the enemy and whose size was more in line with what the Prussian Command structure was designed to cope with. However, due to the lack of source material available on this particular subject, the above arguments are purely conjectural. Footnotes [1] It appears that Scharnhorst was relieved of his duties as part of the political power play in the upper ranks of the Prussian staff. [2] Who marched 43 miles on 10-11th October and 24 miles on the 12th. [3] Literally “War College” but in reality a body of military advisors to King Frederick III. This should in no way be translated as “General Staff” as, in the sense this title was applied to the Prussian armies of 1870, there was no such organisation existing in the army in 1806. The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part III [FE63] Introduction Supply Reconnaissance Higher Organization Logistical Conclusion Other Parts Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part Vb: Jena [FE68] Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part Va: Tactics [FE66] The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part IV [FE65] Introduction Infantry Cavalry Artillery The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part III [FE63] Introduction Supply Reconnaissance Higher Organization Logistical Conclusion The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part II [FE61] Strategy and Prussian Leadership The Duke of Peace Prussian Despair French Superiority Strategic Summary The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part I [FE60] Prologue Introduction A Discussion on Strategy The Traditional Theories The Prussian Commanders Footnotes and Bibliographical Notes Related 1806: A Precis [FE59] Introduction The Collapse of the Third Coalition Napoleon, France and the Building of an Empire The Turning of the Tide The Lightning Campaign Prussian Defiance at the End of the Year Back to Table of Contents -- First Empire #63 Back to First Empire List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 2002 by First Empire. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com