The Prussians in 1806
Dispelling the Myths
Part Va - Tactics
by James Gaite, UK
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The outcome of any tactical confrontation between two opposing armies hinges upon a few key moments during the battle. Sometimes it will be an error by one or other of the opposing generals; other times an order gone astray; maybe it is the unforeseen initiative or bravery of a junior commander or band of men that provides a decisive edge to one of the armies; on occasions the sloth, cowardice or insubordination of officers or men will have a directly opposite effect. Whatever the occurrence and whoever the perpetrator, these key moments will have a disproportionate effect on the progress of the conflict as a whole. Hence, in this brief tactical examination of the battles and clashes of the Jena campaign of 1806, it is the historian’s analysis of these key seconds and decisions on which the prose will be concentrated. Saalfeld The Battle of Saalfeld was more of a clash between the Advanced Guard of Prince Hohenlohe’s Prusso-Saxon army, under the command of Prince Louis-Ferdinand, and the Vth French Corps under the command of Marshal Lannes. It was a short, swift combat which saw the Prussians overwhelmed by superior numbers, their commander killed and the remnants of the Prussian Advanced Guard sent fleeing northwards to seek refuge with the main force around Jena. There are a number of key elements, decisions and actions that determined the outcome of this struggle, all of which will be analysed separately below. Should the battle have even been fought? Prince Louis Ferdinand has been much criticised for his defeat at Saalfeld, his first true command in a military situation. Maude even claims that the battle was needless as the following passage illustrates:
There was therefore no occasion for him to trouble about Hohenlohe’s movement at all - distance alone was sufficient protection for it. However, he took the opposite view, with consequences most disastrous both for himself and the whole Army. He marched to Saalfeld with every available battalion… and meeting Lannes at the head of the V Corps, was completely outfought by the French veterans.” [TJC 88-9] What is interesting in this statement is that Maude goes so far to say that, by his actions at Saalfeld, Prince Louis must share the blame for the eventual defeat of the Prussian army as a whole. To emphasise this point, he concludes his commentary on the battle by stating:
Chandler is another historian who follows the same line.
However, in marked contrast to Maude, Chandler does not make Prince Louis the scapegoat for the defeat and its effect on the Prussian morale. Another point of view, never fully broached by historians but certainly hinted at, is that the Battle at Saalfeld, while unnecessary from a strategic and logistic point of view, was a direct result of the tension and rivalries amongst the Prussian royal family. To explain this point, it is necessary to explain the causes of the rivalry between Prince Louis and Frederick William III. The Prince was the son of Prince Ferdinand, a brother of Frederick the Great and grandfather to the present Frederick William III, and who was currently out of favour with the monarchy as a result of his outspoken views on royal policy. Prince Louis, while marked by his father’s ostracism, had, through his charisma and personal magnetism, enjoyed a remarkable influence with the Prussian military, junior royal administrators and especially the King’s consort, Queen Louise. However, when the disadvantageous terms of the Convention of Vienna in December 1805 were ratified and expanded upon by the Treaty of Paris in 1806, Prince Louis became an outspoken critic of the king and his “peace” party and soon found himself pushed away from the political hub in Berlin. In retaliation, he wrote in a letter to Queen Louise that, until the humiliation experienced by Prussia at the hands of Napoleonic France has been avenged in the field of battle, he would retreat from public life and have nothing further to do with his monarch. Hence, it is suggested that to prove the superiority of Prussian arms over their French counterparts, a point vigorously argued by the “war” party of which he and his father were prominent members, and to illustrate quite clearly that the King’s path of negotiation at all costs, that had led to Prussia’s supposed humiliation, had been totally unnecessary, Prince Louis set forth to stem the flow of French troops at Saalfeld. However, through his inexperience, poor judgment and inadequate knowledge of the enemy forces streaming out of the Thuringian woodlands, this was to prove a fatal decision. However, other historians would consider such opinions either extreme or simply untrue. Many state that it was the inefficient Staff of the Prussian army, the inaccurate and paltry reconnaissance and a near universal panic amongst the top Prussian generals that directly led to the conflict at Saalfeld, and not the impetuosity or flawed tactical and strategic ability of the young prince. One of these is David Gates who writes:
Chandler comes to a similar conclusion and, in his Campaigns of Napoleon, includes no criticism of either Louis Ferdinand’s actions or tactics and, instead, lays much of the blame at the feet of the incompetent Prussian Staff for placing him in an impossible position to begin with, not supporting him as he expected and not ensuring that he received the order to withdraw before he became enmeshed with the advanced elements of Napoleon’s army. The Initial Dispositions Prince Louis Ferdinand’s critics do not end with his decision to confront the French in such an advanced an isolated position as Saalfeld. Petre claims that by positioning his troops on the forward facing slopes of his position, he left his force vulnerable to the increasingly superior French artillery; also, the French success in carrying out a flanking manoeuvre around the right flank illustrated the weakness of his dispositions. Here we find the second key decision in this clash of arms. It is possible that Louis expected to be confronted by the French Avant-garde, comparable in size to his own forces, and not an entire French Corps. This is certainly claimed by Petre, who writes:
If this were the case, then positioning his troops on the front slope of a hill in full sight of the approaching enemy force would have caused the French commander of the Advanced Guard to face a dilemma. Firstly, he could embark upon an injudicious assault on an enemy of similar numbers in a defensive position in an attempt to displace the Prussians and continue the momentum of the French advance, a course of action that would have strongly favoured Prince Louis and quite possibly led to a rebuff of the attackers and a nominal victory for the Prussians; or he could have halted his march and awaited support from the main force to his rear until he was confident enough to force the Prussian position. However, an entire corps, not a small advanced guard, faced Prince Louis across the field of Saalfeld, an enemy force, under excellent leadership, that was able to deploy its advantage in numbers to such an effect as to sweep the 8,300 Prussians of Prince Louis’ command out of the way in a matter of hours. It is possible that poor Prussian reconnaissance was responsible for this miscalculation, or maybe it was the belief that the French would fight as they would have done under eighteenth century generals. Alternatively, it may well have been Louis’ stubbornness not to cede another inch of Prussian soil to the invaders that contributed to his valiant stand. An Order Disobeyed Whatever the reason for Louis’ decision to stand and fight, it was still possible that he could have survived most of the day without engagement. Chandler states:
However, when Suchet’s division came in to contact with Louis’ Prusso-Saxon force, Lannes…
Hence, if Lannes had followed his orders to the letter or if a less impetuous general than Lannes had faced Louis, it is quite possible that the action of Saalfeld would have been delayed for some hours. This in turn would have meant that the crux of the battle, that in fact occurred at around 1.00 pm, would have occurred nearer five or six in the evening and, in October in southern Germany, would have seen gathering darkness and an opportunity for Louis to make an orderly withdrawal. However, Lannes’ decision to attack immediately, typical of his rash impetuosity, combined with Louis’ decision to deploy in an exposed position against an army of overwhelming size for whatever reason, were two more key instances that were to lead to the humiliating rout of Louis’ forces. The Chance to Withdraw And yet, one more factor could have had a significant effect upon the course of this combat - the order from the Prussian High Command for Louis to withdraw his forces from their position at Saalfeld and hold Rudolstadt without confronting Lannes. This order was received, according to numerous accounts, around 11.00 am. Chandler believes that the orders were received too late to be of any use and Maude pursues a similar theme. Their arguments centre around the theory that, due to the inefficiency of the Prussian Staff and the late arrival of the orders mentioned above, Louis Ferdinand had become too involved in the battle to extricate himself. However, Petre has a completely different view:
If it was too late to draw in the extreme left, it could have fallen back across the Saale by the bridge at Saalfeld, and have reached Rudolstadt by the right bank, as part of it actually did after the defeat. The objections to such a separation of his forces on the part of the Prince are obvious; but it would have been a possible remedy in a desperate situation. On these grounds it seems difficult to accept as convincing Prince Kraft’s vindication of the Prince’s continuation of the action after eleven o’clock. At that time he was not irretrievably committed to it as regards his centre and right. It is almost impossible to defend his decision to fight on such a hopelessly bad tactical position against superior numbers.” [NCP 101-2] So the question remains - could Louis have extricated himself from the combat at Saalfeld upon the arrival of his new orders and thus lessened the effect of his defeat upon Prussian morale? Or was he too involved in the ensuing conflict to execute a coordinated withdrawal without running the great risk of his army disintegrating and leaving, as he might have believed, Hohenlohe’s flank open to exploitation by the French army? Death or Glory! Once the opportunity to retreat had been missed, if it had even existed, the fate of the Prussian forces under the command of Prince Louis was sealed. With the increasing number of French troops approaching and appearing upon the battlefield, it was only a matter of time until the brave Prusso-Saxon defenders would be overrun by sheer weight of numbers. However, one event in the late stages of the contest has caused concern and censure. The point of censure: Should Prince Louis have personally led this attack and placed his own life in danger? Petre writes:
The Prince, bravely fighting against these terrible odds, was attacked by Guindet, a quartermaster of the 10th Hussars. Wounded in several places, he still refused to surrender. At last a sword thrust through the body ended his life. He was killed close to where the roadside railway station of Woelsdorf now stands... The death of this fine young prince, the hope and pride of the military party in Prussia, drew from Napoleon the remark that his conduct in promoting the war had earned him his fate; but he had the decency to write a letter of condolence to the King.” [NCP 97] Along with Chandler’s conviction that with Louis’ death “so perished potentially the best soldier of Prussia” [CON 471] and Maude’s earlier description of the effect the Prince’s demise had upon the rest of the Prussian army, it must be asked whether Prince Louis was acting responsibly in his forlorn attempt to salvage such a poor situation? Chandler continues: “With Prince Louis’ death, the action was lost.” [CON 471] This phrase, by itself, speaks volumes. At one o’clock, the only thing that appeared to be keeping the Saxon-Prussian force on the field of battle was the personal magnetism of the young Prussian prince. With his death, the force collapsed and fled Surely, when all seemed lost, his influence and life would have been better used in attempting to coerce his forces to make an orderly withdrawal along their still vacant line of withdrawal. Petre is a strong critic of Louis’, claiming that his insistence in holding such a position against a French force twice his size showed his total failure to grasp a proper understanding of his force’s ability and, more importantly, the basic concepts of military tactics. In fact, it is difficult to find a historian who will defend the actions of the young prince in his last minutes. His stubborn holding of the ridge against ever-increasing numbers of French troops, his lost opportunity to withdraw his forces in an orderly fashion at eleven in the morning and, when all appeared lost, his defiant but futile and fatal attempt to continue the combat further by leading a cavalry charge across uneven ground in the face of a greater force of horse has led some historians to believe that this last gasp charge was typical of the Prince’s actions and attitude throughout the day. He would either suffer death or appear victorious. From the author - I feel I must apologise for the long, drawn-out nature of this article that has dragged on over the course of a year. I can only offer the excuse of ever-increasing work and personal commitments which are taking up too much of my time. I am planning some well-earned holiday in the next two months in an attempt to finish the article so, with fingers and other bodily parts crossed, the next issue of FE should see the last installment of this work. Finally, I would like to say thank you for your patience and your comments on this work. Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part Vb: Jena [FE68] Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part Va: Tactics [FE66] The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part IV [FE65] Other PartsThe Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part III [FE63] The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part II [FE61]
The Duke of Peace Prussian Despair French Superiority Strategic Summary The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part I [FE60]
Introduction A Discussion on Strategy The Traditional Theories The Prussian Commanders Footnotes and Bibliographical Notes Related1806: A Precis [FE59]
The Collapse of the Third Coalition Napoleon, France and the Building of an Empire The Turning of the Tide The Lightning Campaign Prussian Defiance at the End of the Year Back to Table of Contents -- First Empire #66 Back to First Empire List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 2002 by First Empire. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com |
The Battles