The Prussians in 1806:
Dispelling the Myths
A Discussion on Strategy
by James Gaite, UK
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The Correct StrategySo, what was the strategy of the Prussian Army? Put simply, they assigned Thuringia as their base of mobilisation, coerced the unwilling Saxons into massing with them and, by mid-September 1806, had some 120,000 men assembled to take on the might of Napoleon’s Grand Armée. Then, all action seemed to stop - the positions of the Prussian army differed little over the next month, allowing Napoleon to respond to the threat and pre-empt any action they might have considered undertaking. The Revisionist Theories“But why assemble in Thuringia?” ask the revisionists. By deploying in Thuringia, Barnett claims that the Prussians “repeated Mack’s mistake in the Ulm campaign [2] by deciding on a forward strategy instead of waiting for Bonaparte behind the Elbe, where they would be in touch with their Russian ally.” [Bon. 123]
Alistair Horne concurs with this option: “What the Prussians should have done . . . was to have retired behind the broad Elbe and ‘to have disputed its passage until
joined by the Russians’.” [3] [NME. 186]
However, some revisionist historians do not agree with Barnett’s hypothesis quoted above; they believe that, by deploying behind the Elbe, the Prussian army, inferior to their French opponents in both manoeuvrability and marching speed, would have simply delayed their own destruction. The sluggishness of Russian mobilisation and their notoriously slow rate of deployment decreed that they would not be ready to operate in the western reaches of Prussia until the end of the year - in fact, as events transpired, the last detachments of the Russian army only crossed into Eastern Prussia in January 1807. With this in mind the revisionist historians cite a total abandonment of western Prussia and the deployment of the Prussian army along the River Oder, or even the Vistula, each with its own array of formidable fortresses, as being the only strategic option that would allow the juncture of the Prussian forces with those of Tsar Alexander I before Napoleon could bring them to battle.
This option had other advantages too - Napoleon would be forced to march half way across Prussia to confront his opponents and, with the harsh northern
winter only weeks away, would be forced to rely on lengthy supply lines to succour the Grand Armée.
Yet, despite the differing opinion on which strategic option the Prussians should have employed, the revisionist historians are in complete agreement on one main point -the Prussian decision to deploy in a forward area, close to the cantonments of the Grand Armée, was their biggest mistake and the main cause of their downfall.
The above options make a certain amount of strategic sense; but how practical were they in the prevailing political conditions of autumn 1806? Clausewitz
claims they were totally impractical; he argues that the whole cause of the war had been France’s growing accumulation of influence and territory from the tatters of the Holy Roman Empire and that the forced secession of the historic Hohenzollern [4] homelands of Ansbach and Bayreuth, through
the Treaty of Paris, had been almost more than Prussian pride could bear. In these circumstances, the surrender of further Prussian territory to the French by a strategic mobilisation in a nether region of the country would not have been acceptable. Maude also has opinions on this issue.
He claims that the Prussians were “firmly convinced that the order for mobilisation would suffice to cause the French to withdraw their pretensions.” [TJC. 63]
Despite the failure of such an action the year before, it was still a firm belief in the cabinet that a Prussian mobilisation had the power to strike terror into the hearts of their enemies, as it had done for the past fifty years. Although some historians sneer at this belief, in 1806 there was still good reason to believe that it was so; the legend of the invincibility of Frederick the Great’s army was still unchallenged and even Napoleon, upon visiting Frederick the Great’s grave under the Potsdam Garrison Church, stated that if that great man had still been alive he would not have been allowed to march his army through the gates of Berlin.
Petre takes this argument one step further. He argues that, even if the threat of mobilisation failed to deter Napoleon, Prussia “neither hoped nor wished to
overrun and destroy France; the object would be attained by a victory which should curb the ambition of the Emperor [Napoleon], compelling him to confine his rule to reasonable limits, and to abandon his schemes for the subjugation of central and eastern Europe.” [NCP. 63]
The best method to achieve this, according to the political theories of Frederick the Great, was to strike first and strike hard. To this end, it was necessary to mobilise in a forward area. There was another good reason for the employment of a forward strategy: resources. Prussia had a standing army of 185,000 men, but had no reserve of manpower. There were 29,000 troops in the “Third Battalions” and another 3,000 in the “Pension Companies”, but these had been assigned to garrison and depot duties; behind this cadre of second-line troops, there were no more. Additionally, there was no machinery in place for rapidly bringing extra troops into the field; there were no effective militia system; and recruitment and training procedures were too rigid and prolonged for the rapid introduction of conscription.
Hence, faced by a Napoleonic Empire that could turn out raw recruits, fully equipped and adequately trained, in only four weeks, Prussia needed to secure a quick victory; any war of attrition could only be won by the French. To deploy behind the River Elbe, or any other defensive line, it is argued, would have been to invite a
lengthier war and, with winter fast approaching, any conflict would have most likely spilled over into the next year. Therefore, to gain their rapid victory, they
needed to deploy near their frontiers with the French Empire and close with the enemy at the first possible opportunity.
Sebastian Haffnel views the events of 1806 in a slightly different light. He claims that:
“Neither side had any clear plans about what it wanted to achieve by this war: on the Prussian side, moreover, there had been absolutely no assessment of it’s prospects. Without allies and without political objectives Prussia conducted the war of an affronted man of honour: one might almost say that
Prussian in 1806 was still defending its long lost neutrality. What a contrast to the Prussian wars of the Eighteenth Century!” [RFP. 79]
Koch also views Prussia’s decision for war as a means of lodging a protest against Napoleon’s increased domination of Germany and in this, agrees with Clausewitz’s view of the political climate, referred to above. Koch goes on to argue that, although the timing of the operation was inappropriate and Prussia’s
lack of allies deplorable, the “one redeeming feature” of this policy of war through aggrievement was “that she had refused to humble herself in the manner of the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine.” [HOP. 159]
Another follower of this line of thinking is Alastair Horne - he claims the Prussian move to war was purely the “consequences of a mortally wounded pride which Napoleon had grossly underestimated” and, through indignation, “the Prussian ‘hawks’ based their miscalculation on precisely the same error that had brought Austria low at Ulm - that the plodding Russians would reach them before Napoleon.” [NME. 183]
The reference by Haffner to Prussia’s lack of allies is an important one. Maude writes that “though both England and Russia had immediately abandoned any idea of hostilities against Prussia...[the Prussians] allowed their precious period of respite, during the months of August and September, to elapse without completing any definitive treaties of alliance with either nation.” [TJC. 63]. This is an odd statement, considering a secret Russo-Prussian treaty had been signed on 12th July: however it’s reference to a lack of entreaties to England, the “paymaster of Europe” is an important one. Why? The answer is simple: in 1794, Prussia had received £1,200,000 in subsidies from Britain to aid their war effort against Revolutionary France and, in 1805, Austria had been paid £1,500,000 and Russia £350,000 to conduct their campaigns against Napoleon.
Britain’s flexible financial system allowed her to raise such substantial sums to support her allies and it was claimed, especially by Napoleon, that many of the
coalitions formed against France during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars were assembled and kept together by the promise of such aid. Hence, Britain was a useful ally to have.
Yet, there are historians who claim that, no matter how much the Prussians had entreated William Grenville’s Whig Government in Britain, they would have received little or no aid. Christopher Hall claims that Grenville’s administration, or “The Ministry of All Talents” as it became known, had decided upon a policy of
isolationism concerning Europe, concentrating instead on retaining and enlarging their overseas dominions. To support his argument, he cites an occasion when, upon being asked by Grenville for an estimated cost of transporting for 10,000 cavalry from England’s shores to the Prussian coast, his Minister for War, William Windham returned a staggering figure of £2,400,000. This was an obvious and disingenuous attempt to dissuade his premier from pursuing such an action, and typical of the time - “Many battalions of infantry could have been sent to Europe, as they were to be sent to South America, for a fraction of the cost that Windham quoted.” [BSN. 136]
Other historians argue along the same lines, but for a different reason; they claim that any attempts to embroil Britain in this new European conflict would be wasted due to the British army’s commitments elsewhere. By December 1806, Britain had over 20,000 troops in the Mediterranean, another 15,000 occupied in an attempt to subjugate the inhabitants of Buenos Aires and Montevideo, some 5,000 occupying the recently retaken Cape of Good Hope, while forces in Britain
were either being readied to support the assault on Egypt, planned for early 1807, or were deemed necessary for Home Defence. [5]
Considering the small size of the British army, compared to her European contemporaries, any force that Britain might have been able to provide for participation in
the Prussian conflict would have been meagre and totally incapable of stemming the torrent of the Grand Armée’s pursuit of the shattered Prussian Army. [6]
In respect to monetary aid, Prussian entreaties, it is argued, were also likely to be ignored. Compared to over £2,000,000 paid out to support the conflict in 1805, the level of subsidies in 1806 only just exceeded £500,000, with the majority of this being forwarded to Britain’s Swedish and Sicilian allies, and the remainder being sent to aid Britain’s fellow subjects in Hanover. Even in 1807, when the British government once again took an interest in European affairs, only a combined sum of £300,000 was paid out to abet the Russians and Prussians. Hence, it is debatable whether a request for an alliance with Britain would have strengthened Prussia’s strategic position in late 1806.
The matter is not as clear-cut as Colonel Maude depicts though - some historians claim that Prussia was very active on the diplomatic front with her erstwhile British enemy. “Through his relatives of the House of Orange, he [Frederick William III] tried to come to a secret understanding with England, immediate restoration of Hanover being offered for subsidies and a British invasion of the Continent.” [QLP. 109]
Certain revisionist historians claim that, if Prussia had mobilised behind the Elbe River, been reinforced by the Russians and managed to halt or slow the advance of the Grand Armée, Britain may have been more inclined to provide monetary and military aid than they would have been with Prussia standing defiantly alone and the Russians nowhere in sight. Constance Wright concedes that Frederick William’s entreaties were “all too tardy” [QLP. 109] but Christopher Hall claims, “Prussia . . . was not regarded as a power of importance” by Britain [BSN. 137] and so any aid, whatever the circumstances, was unlikely.
There was also the slumbering giant of Austria along Prussia’s southern border who would prove a useful ally in a war against France. With Napoleon marching through northern Germany and into Prussia, the Austrian army would have been perfectly placed to threaten his possessions in Italy, his southern German allies and, eventually, Napoleon’s communications with France itself. It seems that an Austrian alliance had been strongly urged by Frederick William’s cousin, the enigmatic Louis Ferdinand, but no diplomatic efforts seem to have been made in that direction.
Much criticism is aimed at King Frederick William III and his advisors for neglecting such a potent ally. Moreover, Rothenberg claims that “during the late
summer and early autumn there was a great amount of agitation for Austria to join in the new war against Napoleon.” [NGA. 137]
Even after news of the Prussian defeats at Jena and Auerstädt reached the Austrian capital, there were still calls for Austria to side with her German ally.
With such a willing ally in such a great strategic position and with the power to totally alter the course of any forthcoming campaign, it beggars belief that an
opportunity of such magnitude could be overlooked. However, in the defence of the Prussian monarch and his advisors, there does appear to be grounds in their favour to explain such an omission.
Firstly, there was the historical enmity between the two nation states of Austria and Prussia; throughout the eighteenth century, Prussia’s greatest adversary on the continent of Europe had been the multinational megalith of the Austro-Hungarian Empire..The two Silesian Wars of the 1740’s had been fought over the disputed ownership of the province after which the conflicts were named; the hegemony of certain regions within the disputed province had been ceded to Prussia by age-old pacts but these treaties had been annulled by the Austrian King, who also held the position of Holy Roman Emperor, who claimed Silesia for his own nation. Moreover, the alliance confronting Frederick the Great during the Seven Years War of 1756-63 came about solely through the machinations of the Austrian Empress, Maria Theresa. Despite a brief détente between the two nations during the reign of Frederick William II, which had seen combined Austro-Prussian operations against
the newly created French Republic, Prussian foreign policy had been dominated by the threat posed by her southern neighbour to her very existence as a major power.
Secondly, Archduke Charles, Generalissimus of the Austrian army and the most potent figure in that nation’s Court at that time - barring the newly crowned Emperor Francis I - had set his mind against such a course of action. He believed that his army, which had suffered greatly during its contest with France the year before and had lost many of its leading generals through ‘retirement’ due to their perceived incompetence and poor performance in the field, was not up to a renewed conflict with the superior resources of Napoleon’s Empire. Furthermore, Rothenberg claims that the desire expressed by many senior Austrian statesmen and generals for renewed war was, at least, partly fuelled by a growing jealousy amongst their ranks to Charles’ supreme position. There is certainly much evidence that, with Charles’ determination to maintain a neutralist stance towards France, his main rivals for control of the army, the Austrian Hofkreigsrat, opted for a hostile policy simply to gain support from the wealth of public and court opinion seeking revenge for Austria’s humiliation in the wars of the past decade.
To confuse the issue further, it appears that the Austrian Foreign Minister, Count Stadion, was actually deliberating over a proposed alliance with France!
Therefore, as with the question of a British alliance, the arguments for an offensive pact with Austria are not as clear-cut as some historians suggest. Moreover, to muddy the waters further, it appears that the Prussian ambassador to Vienna actively pursued a campaign to buy over members of Archduke Charles’ retinue, with the aim that they might exert pressure on their Generalissimus to alter his policy. In addition to Prussia’s failure to attain alliances with Europe’s major powers, historians berate the Prussian monarch for not even approaching the smaller states of Germany for aid and alliance. The only gestures seem to have been made to Saxony and Hesse-Cassel: Saxony reluctantly provided 20,000 troops while the Elector of Hesse-Cassel decided to sit on the fence until he was sure which side was gaining the upper hand in the forthcoming conflict. Many historians and political commentators, both then and now, comment on Prussia’s lost opportunity to inspire rebellion
amongst many of the German states. Recently allied to Napoleon but traditionally looking towards Prussia for military protection, they might, if entreaties had been made, have looked to support their erstwhile benefactor.
More Prussians in 1806
The Prussians in 1806 Part II
The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part III [FE63]
The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part IV [FE65]
Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part Va: Tactics [FE66]
Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part Vb: Jena [FE68]
1806: A Precis
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