The Prussians in 1806:
Dispelling the Myths

The Traditional Theories

by James Gaite, UK

To summarise the arguments so far, it would seem that, instead of pursuing a strategy that would have included the Russians in the conflict at an early stage, the Prussians, with no far-reaching plan of action and purely through a sense of injured pride and of their own invincibility, mobilised in close proximity to the French army and allowed themselves to be defeated in detail before their Russian allies arrived. However, here is where the traditionalists intercede. Clausewitz states that, far from blundering blindly to disaster, the Prussian commander-in-chief had formulated a strategy; moreover, he believes that, if it were not for the fractiousness of the Duke of Brunswick’s subordinate officers, a campaign executed along the lines laid down in this plan of action could have resulted in a severe defeat for the French forces in Southern Germany. In his work, On War, he lists the following routes of advance for the Prussian army in Thuringia: (1) Leave the Thuringian Forest on the right and advance by Hof and its vicinity on Bamberg, (2) Leave it to the left, and move along the Frankfort road, or (3) Cross the forest and strike at Wurzburg, or (4) Separate and move in two, if not in three, columns in all three directions. [Quoted in TJC. 70] He then expounds Brunswick’s plans further by stating the following strategical necessities behind any proposed action. (a) To keep together as much as possible, because concentration on the battlefield was the principal point. (b) To strike an important fraction of the enemy’s forces and destroy it - a victory over an inconsiderable portion of his Army would only give him time to concentrate the remainder and thus ensure a numerical preponderance. [Quoted in TJC. 70] Finally, he combines the options with the strategical necessities and arrives at the following conclusions: “Point a effectually excluded the idea of marching in more than one direction with the main Army. “Point b eliminated a move on Frankfurt, since in this district there lay only Augereau’s Corps, which might probably evade the blow by joining the bulk of the Army in Thuringia. “There remained thus only the choice between the advance across the Thuringian Forest, or by Hof on Bayreuth. “If Magdeburg and Wittenburg were taken as the principal lines of retreat, then one’s communications would be best covered by the former, if Dresden were selected for retreat, then the latter was preferable. Undoubtedly, Magdeburg and Wittenburg were the better points on which to retreat, since they covered Berlin more directly, and the Elbe between these towns formed a more serious obstacle than about Dresden, whilst Silesia, with its numerous fortresses and sheltered position behind the Bohemian Mountains, could be safely left to take care of itself. These considerations should have sufficed for the choice of the advance through Thuringia, and besides on this line one was more in the centre of events and could meet a turning movement against the right better than from the line Hof to Bayreuth. “Lastly, an offensive through the Forest District was most likely to disconnect the enemy, since owing to its relative roadlessness, this was the last direction likely to be selected (by an Army cumbered with heavy impedimenta understood).” [Quoted in TJC. 70-1] These were, as claimed by Clausewitz, the options available to the Prussian High Command on the eve of the forthcoming campaign and also the precepts that had determined the Prussian Army’s deployment in Thuringia. However, would either of these proposed plans have met with success? Before proceeding any further, I feel the need to make, what I consider, is a very important point. Analysis in hindsight can never be conclusive - it relies heavily upon numerous ‘ifs’, ‘buts’ and ‘maybes’ without being able to anticipate the vagaries of fate and the blessings of fortune that can irrevocably change the course of any military adventure. With this said, I shall now continue. The revisionists claim that the Prussian Army was ill suited to an offensive campaign against a force as flexible and non-reliant upon supply lines as the Grand Armée. However, the traditionalists believe that the French forces scattered about in their cantonments in Southern Germany would be easy prey for the unified Prussian Army. An advance against the French forces in late September, along the routes and principles outlined by the Duke of Brunswick, with the French Emperor still treating any suggestion of Prussian aggression with scorn and with Marshal Berthier botching what few preparations were being made to concentrate the French Corps, would have.placed the Prussian forces in a perfect strategical position to destroy the Grand Armée piecemeal. They go one step further and argue that it was not the failing of the initial strategy of the Prussian Army but the inefficiency and indecisiveness of the Prussian generals that resulted in them being caught scattered and vulnerable in Thuringia in October 1806. To conclude this discussion of the Prussian strategy in autumn 1806, it strikes me as necessary to make a point missed by many historians of both schools. While they concentrate upon Prussia’s obsession to follow the tactical doctrines of Frederick the Great, many fail to recognise that, by deploying in a forward position and preparing to make a pre-emptive strike, the Prussian hierarchy were faithfully re-enacting that great man’s strategical manoeuvres during his two great conflicts: the Silesian Wars of the 1740’s and the Seven Years War. However, in copying his grand strategical design, if this is what they were actually doing, the Prussians of 1806 failed to heed Frederick the Great’s written instructions to his successors: “imitations of a masterpiece invariably fall flat.” [Quoted in FTG. 123] More Prussians in 1806 Prologue Introduction A Discussion on Strategy The Traditional Theories The Prussian Commanders Footnotes and Bibliographical Notes Other Parts The Prussians in 1806 Part II Strategy and Prussian Leadership The Duke of Peace Prussian Despair French Superiority Strategic Summary The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part III [FE63] Introduction Supply Reconnaissance Higher Organization Logistical Conclusion The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part IV [FE65] Introduction Infantry Cavalry Artillery Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part Va: Tactics [FE66] Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part Vb: Jena [FE68] Related 1806: A Precis Introduction The Collapse of the Third Coalition Napoleon, France and the Building of an Empire The Turning of the Tide The Lightning Campaign Prussian Defiance at the End of the Year Back to Table of Contents -- First Empire #60 Back to First Empire List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 2001 by First Empire. 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