The Prussians in 1806

Part II: The Duke of Peace

by James Gaite, UK

“He had accepted the command in order to prevent war,” claims Baron von Müffling: “I can assert this with confidence, because I heard it more than once from his own lips, when his subordinates had been aggravating the difficulties of his position, or did things behind his back to which he was by no means party.” Müffling continues that Brunswick saw his subordinate officers “in a mass, [as] mere men of routine without talent” and declared on one occasion; “‘and it is with such men we are to encounter a Napoleon? No, the greatest service I can render the King will be to preserve peace for him if I can.’” [All quotes from MBM. 14] History supports such a theory - the Duke of Brunswick had been a prominent member of the ‘peace party’ - and some historians claim it was for this reason that the peace-loving Frederick William III had endorsed the septuagenarian general with overall command of the army. Müffling continues his theory: “The Duke’s hope was centred in Lucchesinni and Haugwitz, because these men made him believe that war might still be avoided. The answer of Lucchesinni still sounds in my ears, when after his arrival from Paris at the royal headquarters at Naumburg, in reply to the Duke’s question as to Napoleon’s intentions, he answered: ‘Sir, he will never become the aggressor: never! never!’ “A gleam of inward satisfaction overspread the Duke’s face at these words.He paid formal court to both ministers, Lucchesinni and Haugwitz, because he considered them the peace party.” [MBM. 14-15] This theory seems to fit in well with Maude’s belief that Prussia had simply mobilised as a demonstration, not as a first step towards open conflict, and justification for Lucchesinni’s appraisal of Napoleon’s thoughts on a Prussian war is widespread. On 10th September, Napoleon himself commented: “The idea that Prussia could take the field against me by herself seems to me so ridiculous that it does not merit discussion” [Quoted in NME. 185] and only six days before, he had written to Marshal Berthier stating: “You may grant to Marshal Davout a leave of absence for twenty days.” [Quoted in TIM. 118] If he was allowing one of his most senior Marshals to leave his army to return home, then it is natural to assume that Napoleon had no immediate plans for a military operation, either defensive or offensive. To round this theory off, it would appear that the Duke of Brunswick was fully prepared to allow his subordinates to compile plans and counter-plans, thus keeping them occupied while he awaited the overtures for peace from France. In this light, the Prussian ultimatum issued to Napoleon in late September could be seen as a prompt to the French Emperor, who had, up until then, seemed to ignore Prussia’s military posturing. Furthermore, when Napoleon’s troops appeared suddenly on the Duke’s left flank, he ordered a withdrawal rather than provoke an engagement. It would appear that even at that late point, he was still hoping to avoid crossing the boundary into.irreconcilable hostilities - maybe if the Prussian army showed an unwillingness to fight, Napoleon, after occupying the territories west of the River Elbe, would settle for peace rather than persecuting an unremitting war on the Prussian nation? The Interfering Monarchy “From above Brunswick was hampered by the presence of the king, whose confirmation was required for all important orders.” [NCP. 29] Petre is not the only historian who appears to support this theory. Haythornthwaite opines: “[The Duke of Brunswick] remained in the army in 1793, but finding his actions confounded by the wishes of the King of Prussia [2] - whose presence in 1792 seems to have placed great constraints upon Brunswick’s freedom of action - he resigned…at the personal request of Queen Louisa of Prussia [he] came out of retirement [in 1806], though again the presence of the king [3] and his advisors was not beneficial.” [NSB. 332] So was it King Frederick William III, and not the Duke of Brunswick, who is to be held responsible for the disunity of command? How could the Duke of Brunswick formulate a comprehensive strategy when he was not in true overall command? This arrangement - with the king having a veto on all operations - put the Duke at an even greater disadvantage: as seen above, it allowed the quarrelsome duo of Hohenlohe and Massenbach to bypass the Duke of Brunswick’s authority and submit their ideas directly to the King, as it was he who had the final say. The King however, has many apologists. Petre claims: “Frederick William himself often saw more clearly than his generals, but, being young and new to war, he was naturally unwilling to overrule men of much greater age and experience. Besides, he was never able to make up his mind definitely to any course of action until he was forced into it by some one else.” [NCP. 28-29] Maude too finds time to excuse the Prussian monarch and instead attacks his military advisors, the so-called “disciples of Frederick the Great”. “It is at all times a difficult task to emancipate oneself from the intellectual control of one’s teachers, and it is immeasurably harder for a man without war-experience to override the mature conclusions of those who have lived in the face of the enemy for years. It is only by degrees that one learns that in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred, the value of War teaching ends with the man’s rank at the time he underwent its lesson.” [TJC. 67] So the King, inexperienced in matters of war and strategy, turned to his advisors, the majority of whom had learnt their trades as junior officers under Frederick the Great. To make matters worse, these advisors were more than willing to put forward their own alternative theories, as has already been seen, many of which were contrary to the dictates of the Duke of Brunswick. Hence, even if the King cannot be faulted for his lack of knowledge of all things military, he must, in the eyes of some historians, take the blame for creating confusion and uncertainty into the chain of command, leaving Petre to state: “It is scarcely to be wondered at that Brunswick seemed to abandon the struggle in despair, leaving matters to be settled by the entourage of the king…” [NCP. 28] and he concludes: “It seems almost impossible to say who was the Prussian commander-in-chief…there was no absolute commander who could say, as Berthier wrote of Napoleon to Ney in 1807, that he ‘in his general projects requires neither advice nor plans of campaign; no one also knows his designs, and it is our duty to obey.’” [NCP. 28 & 29] Von Möllendorf - The Real Commander-in-Chief? “The Prussian army was commanded by the old Duke of Brunswick, with an even more ancient Frederickian warrior, Field Marshal Richard Möllendorf, in nominal senior command.” [NSB. 27] This is an interesting statement and leads to another point of conjecture - who was actually in command of the Prussian army? Many historians write that the king - and some say Queen Louise - gave the leadership of the Prussian forces to the septuagenarian Duke Carl of Brunswick. However, it appears that the king may well have originally given that command to von Möllendorf but, due to old age, the octogenarian Field Marshal felt that he was “no longer equal to the fatigues inseparable from an active command” [TJC. 66]; only then was the post of Commander-in-Chief passed to the Duke of Brunswick. Speculation along these lines appears to be supported by the unusual command structure of the Prussian forces in 1806. Petre writes: “The Duke of Brunswick nominally held the position [of Commander-in-Chief] , but he was also commander of a separate body, the so-called main army.” [NCP. 29] This was an almost unique position for a supreme commander during the Napoleonic Wars; even in armies of much smaller composition, the commander-in-chief was usually separated from the administrative responsibilities of commanding individual regiments or divisions. Hence, the Duke of Brunswick found himself faced with a logistical nightmare, being responsible for both the ‘main army’ and the overall command of the Prussian forces; his struggle to actually fill both positions may well go some way to explain his apparent lethargy. It may also go some way to explaining why his subordinate officers, Prince Hohenlohe in particular, were so blasé in flouting his authority - if the Duke of Brunswick had originally been just another army commander, his impromptu promotion may have inspired a degree of resentment amongst his erstwhile equals, some of whom may well have believed that they were better suited for the post. Additionally, if this was the case, and it should be remembered that this is my own personal speculation, the Duke of Brunswick can only have found fulfilling the duties of Commander-in-Chief all the harder with his former superior present at the Prussian headquarters throughout the campaign and numbered amongst the king’s most trusted personal advisers. The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part II Strategy and Prussian Leadership The Duke of Peace Prussian Despair French Superiority Strategic Summary Other Parts Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part Vb: Jena [FE68] Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part Va: Tactics [FE66] The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part IV [FE65] Introduction Infantry Cavalry Artillery The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part III [FE63] Introduction Supply Reconnaissance Higher Organization Logistical Conclusion The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part I Prologue Introduction A Discussion on Strategy The Traditional Theories The Prussian Commanders Footnotes and Bibliographical Notes Related 1806: A Precis Introduction The Collapse of the Third Coalition Napoleon, France and the Building of an Empire The Turning of the Tide The Lightning Campaign Prussian Defiance at the End of the Year Back to Table of Contents -- First Empire #61 Back to First Empire List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 2001 by First Empire. 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