The Prussians in 1806
Dispelling the Myths

Part Vb - Jena :
Deciphering the Events

by James Gaite, UK

Deciphering the Events

To do an analysis on any topic, one needs a clear and concise run of events. If the events are unclear or questioned and their chronology is doubtful, any analysis will be disputed in its content and authority. Hence, to attempt to analyse the events between 10am and noon on the 14th October 1806, we need to clear up the series of events related by different historians into one clear dialogue and then justify the reasons for doing thus. This is what I will attempt to do, while attempting to keep such arguments that are necessary in as precise a format as possible.

The first assumption on my part is to assume that all the above versions of events are correct, at least in part. On this basis, it is safe to assume that, at around 10am, the following facts are true:

    1. Lannes was approaching Vierzehnheiligen and Krippendorf.

    2. Tauenzien was falling back past these villages to re-join the main Prussian force.

    3. The advancing columns of Soult’s advanced guard had finished dealing with Holtzendorf’s threat from the north.

    4. Augereau was finally coming into contact with the Saxon troops around Isserstedt.

    5. Ney’s advanced guard was nearing the field of battle.

    6. Hohenlohe had finally stirred himself into action and was advancing Grawert’s Division towards what had now become the front line, with Grawert’s cavalry thrown forward in a covering screen.

Therefore, everything was lining up for a confrontation around the villages of Vierzehnheiligen and Krippendorf and the ridge of which they formed a part.

The next assumption on my part is that Ney reached the area around Vierzehnheiligen prior to the deployments of Grawert’s extended squadrons. The reasoning for this is that, if Maude’s description of events concerning the clash of Ney’s and Grawert’s cavalry is correct, Ney would hardly have needed rescuing. Why? Well, if Grawert’s cavalry were dispatched from the field in disarray, it would have fallen back onto Grawert’s infantry forming close to their rear, with Ney’s cavalry in close pursuit. This, in turn, would have led to massive confusion in the Prussian lines, with French cavalry milling around half-formed Prussian battalions, themselves disrupted by the passage of their retreating cavalry screen. Therefore, with the bulk of the Prussian force in chaos, however temporary this may have been, Ney would have not been in any peril and thus, in contrary to all accounts, including Maude’s, Napoleon would not have been forced to extricate him from a dangerous position.

The third assumption on my part is that Napoleon did order Ney to march to fill the gap between Lannes and Augereau – he did not, however, command him to carry out his rash attack that followed. Despite the fog, it seems inconceivable that Napoleon would have been unaware of a mass of infantry and cavalry passing quite close to his central position where, according to some historians, he was organising a “Grand Battery” from the artillery of the Guard and Lannes’s batteries.

Hence, by about 10.30, we have Ney’s advanced forces appearing to the left of Lannes’ reforming line – keep in mind that Lannes had been ordered to halt temporarily around 9.30 due to the commotion caused by Holtzendorf’s skirmish with Soult. At the same time, we have Grawert’s cavalry advancing from behind the ridge in extended line, screening the advance of that General’s infantry.

If these assumptions are correct, we can safely assume that at this point, Ney made his ill-advised advance to Vierzehnheiligen to be met by the Prussian cavalry advancing from the other direction. The Prussian cavalry, seeing such a prime target, then attacked, forcing Ney’s infantry to form square to repel them. It is conceivable that Maude’s relation of events regarding the clash of cavalry could have been gleaned from a clash on the right of the Prussian line – however, it seems quite incredible that a few squadrons of French cavalry could have succeeded in turning 45 squadrons of fresh Prussian cavalry, although it is credible to believe that they disconcerted a number of these squadrons on the extreme right of the Prussian line. However, more likely it relates to Napoleon’s apparently desperate attempt to free Ney from his perilous position so advanced of the French line.

With 45 squadrons of Prussian cavalry swarming in front of Lannes and around Ney, Grawert’s massed battalions advancing from behind Vierheiligen, Tauenzien’s battered units rejoining the main Prussian line and two unscathed infantry formations of Holtzendorf’s command appearing on the French right, it seems unlikely that Ney’s position was remedied simply by a charge of Murat’s available cavalry reserves or by a barrage from Napoleon’s hastily formed Grand Battery (which comprised, according to numerous sources, from between ten to fifteen pieces), unless, of course, Ney’s predicament was not as serious as historians have been wont to make out.

Therefore, my fourth assumption is that Napoleon ordered a massed advanced to extricate Ney’s imperilled command. This would have involved an advance of the Corps of Lannes and Augereau, as well as possibly Soult’s advanced division, a furious barrage from his own improvised central battery, as well as a Murat-style charge by the newly arrived advanced detachments of the French Reserve Cavalry.

What All This Means

So where does that leave us with the two concurrent arguments of the Traditionalists and Revisionists? Well, with an assumed itinerary of events, it is now possible to put some of the arguments proffered by both sides into context.

Attack! Attack!

With confusion rife in the French ranks, many historians believe that… “…This was as good an opportunity as the cautious Prince Hohenlohe had to break through the French line. Instead he foolishly ordered General Grawert to halt in unprotected country, abruptly ending his successful advance, to await Ruchel’s Corps to reinforce him.” [Nap 428]

The options available to Hohenlohe at this crucial part of the battle are given by Petre in his conclusion. “What, then, was Hohenlohe to do when he found his infantry line holding, with ever-increasing difficulty, its position behind the Isserstadt— Vierzehnheiligen line? Some counselled retreat; Gravert was for doggedly holding on as they were. Once more Massenbach gave his opinion; this time it was perhaps wiser than usual. To wait passively in the present position was, he said, fatal. The only thing to be done was to make a supreme effort with the entire strength of the still powerful cavalry, supported by the other arms, to drive back the enemy, and thus gain time for Ruchel to arrive. His advice was not taken, or at any rate not acted on, and the line remained in its position, suffering more than the best troops could be expected to bear for long.” [NCP 139]

So, for once, the mass of historians concur with the advice given by Massenbach – Prince Hohenlohe should have attacked Napoleon while his troops were in turmoil. There are a number of points in favour of such an advance at this stage of proceedings. The most prominent of these is the fact that the French appeared to have reached the limit of their ability to advance and had over extended their position in their effort to rescue Ney’s beleaguered advanced guard.

As Ian Castle writes… “As Lannes’s men stormed through Vierzehnheiligen to Ney’s aid and emerged on the other side they were met by a massed volley from the main Prussian line. Taking heavy casualties they were forced to fall back on the village. Had the Prussians followed up, the outcome might have been. But Hohenlohe kept the line in position awaiting Ruchel’s support. From the safety of the village the French opened a devastating fire on the exposed Prussians who could do little in reply. An attempt by Lannes to break the deadlock failed, but again Hohenlohe refused to follow up.” [NFV 63]

In other words, without further reinforcements, Napoleon and his Mar-shals seemed incapable of breaching the Prussian line. Yet, how plausible would such an attack have been? Would the gains established outweigh the added danger into which such an advance would place his troops?

What is certain is that Hohenlohe was in an unenviable position. By 11.00am, he would have received intel-ligence of Holtzendorf’s rebuff to the north. Furthermore, it should be remembered, although it is not mentioned anywhere in the texts I have read, that the sounds of battle from the environs of Auerstadt would have been quite audible at this time.

These two facts, combined with the intelligence gained the previous night of the advance of Marshal Bernadotte’s Corps on Dornberg must have caused him great concern for the security of his left flank. His left flank was his most important. It held both the key to his line of withdrawal and to his communications with the main Prussian army under the Duke of Brunswick. Hence, by attacking Napoleon and, quite possibly, forcing the French to give ground, he may have relieved the pressure to his right and centre, but at the same time he would have done nothing to remedy what he may have construed to have been a dire threat to his left.

Furthermore, by advancing his position, he would have placed his main line further from General Ruchel’s reinforcements, further from his supply formations in Weimar and made any outflanking manoeuvre by the French around his left flank more tempting and, from his position, more threatening. Two other thoughts should be considered before moving away from this theoretical discussion about the pros and cons of an advance by Hohenlohe at this time.

Firstly, all through the day, Napoleon’s force was steadily increasing as more and more troops flooded onto the field. An advance may well have disconcerted the French advancing columns and constricted the space available for their deployment but, as the day drew on, Hohenlohe would have inevitably found himself confronted by a greater number of French troops who would have slowly pushed him from his advanced position. The second point is one ignored by most writers on this subject – that is that, with the advance of Grawert’s division of infantry and cavalry, Hohenlohe had committed the last reserves available to him, prior to the expected arrival of Ruchel.

Napoleon, however, had the elements of the Guard in reserve, a formidable formation at any time, and one that could have been used to forestall any Prussian advance, as well as being quite capable, in conjunction with the other French Corps, of throwing any attack back in total confusion.

Maude, one of the few historians to note this, comments: “Unfortunately, as credible testimony records, Grawert had formed no second line at all…Hence about 1 pm every available soldier of Hohenlohe’s command, except Tauenzien’s shattered contingent, stood in a single line, no fresh troops in reserve within sight or call.” [TJC 156-7]

The Arrival of General Ruchel

At last, about between 1330 hrs and 1430 hrs, depending upon which account you read, came the moment of decision. Like a pane of glass that is subjected to ever-increasing stress, the Prussian line did not just break, it shattered. The signal for this rout was, ironically, the eventual acknowledgement by Prince Hohenlohe that his army could no longer hold back the steadily reinforced French army before him. “At last, Prince Hohenlohe yielded to the inevitable and commenced an orderly withdrawal. The men, however, were too utterly spent to respond, and under the pursuit of the French skirmishers, and the charges of the Divisional Cavalry, practically every formation was broken, except the square of the Saxon battalion, “von Winkel”, in which Hohenlohe himself had taken shelter.” [TJC 157-8]

The Saxo-Prussian forces were broken and streaming from the field when, from the direction of Weimar, came the plodding columns of General Ruchel’s reinforcement. Much has been written condemning this general for his tardy arrival upon the field of Jena. Most historians agree that Hohenlohe had dispatched his order for Ruchel to join him at between 0830 hrs and 0900 hrs in the morning and yet it was now 1430 hrs and Ruchel had only just made his appearance. Maude describes this march as follows: “Ruchel had been left at Weimar to rally the Duke of Weimar’s command dispatched into the Thuringian Forest. He had received Hohenlohe’s request for such troops as he could spare about 9 a.m., to which, like Blucher on a later occasion, he had replied that he would come with his whole command. “This command was considerably scattered, but a little after 10 a.m. the head of his column was on the march. Near Umpferstadt he received a second note from the Prince, to whom again he notified the approach of his whole little Army, and in answer he immediately gave orders to hasten the march.” [TJC 158-9]

However, after setting off at, apparently, 10 am, something apparently went wrong. “Ruchel…had marched for the battlefield at 1000…His good intentions and courage were beyond question, but it took him, for reasons still unknown, four hours to march those six miles.” [MHA 65]

As mentioned by Esposito and Elting, something held up Ruchel’s march between Umpferstadt and the field of Jena. What it was has never been ascertained, even to this day, although it was enough of an excuse for the Prussians of the day, after their eventual capitulation in 1807, to cashier this brave but dogmatic General.

The only explanation this author can surmise for Ruchel’s tardiness can be gleaned from the earlier quote, extracted from David Gates’ dialogue, referring to the march of Holtzendorf. In this quote, it should be remembered, it was noted that it had taken Holtzendorf an incredible three hours to collect his command. Hence, deduction necessitates at least a similar amount of time for Ruchel to effectively gather his own scattered and more numerous command. However, as Maude’s quote above makes quite clear, Ruchel had begun moving out his troops at 10 in the morning, only an hour after he would have received the first missive, and had reached Umpferstadt by the time he received Hohenlohe’s second, more ur-gent request. This, however, is the last established fact until around 1400 hrs when Ruchel finally appeared on the battlefield.

It is thus my guess that Ruchel had initially set out with only a limited number of troops on receipt of the first missive, while leaving instructions for his remaining regiments to follow him as soon as they had either assembled or arrived from their distant outposts.

However, on receipt of the second dispatch, Ruchel may well have reasoned from its tenor that his whole command was required or needed on the field. Therefore, it is possible that this General decided to halt his forward elements until those following had caught up and, only then, continued his advance to the aid of Hohenlohe. Why? Well, it may well have been his reasoning that, if the threat was great, the arrival of his force in dribs and drabs would have been ineffectual – the arrival of his command at full strength, however, could have had a decided effect upon the battle being fought only a few miles away. Following through this possibility, if it had taken Holtzendorf three hours to collect his command earlier that morning, it is quite likely that it took at least an equal amount of time for Ruchel’s troops to form and reach him at Umpferstadt. Only then would Ruchel have continued his advance over the remaining five or six miles which, at the Prussian rate of march, would have taken up to two hours. This time allowance would then coincide with Ruchel’s actual appearance at the rear of Hohenlohe’s position at around 1400hrs.

One further fact that should be remembered when considering this surmise is the inefficiency and inexperience of the staff attached to each of the separate Prussian Armies, commented on in a previous chapter. Without an efficient staff, the collection and advance of Ruchel’s detachment would have been considerably retarded, especially when compared with the far more reliable staff arrangements in the French armies of that time.

What Was The Man To Do?

The arrival of Ruchel’s command could not have been timed worse – the army he had come to reinforce was, upon his advent, streaming past him in complete disorganisation. Could Ruchel have prevented the debacle that overtook the Prussian army in the next few weeks? Could he have stemmed the French pursuit long enough for the Prussian Generals to rally enough of their routing troops to form a still formidable threat to the French forces in the weeks to come? The answer to these questions will never be known.

However, what is certain, according to the historians, is that the action he did take was disastrous and foolish in the extreme, and their favourite culprit, the “evil genius” Massenbach, has the blame placed squarely on his shoulders.

“To complete the catastrophe [of the Prussian rout], only one further misfortune was needed, and at this moment Massenbach…was on his way to ensure its happening. He had remained with Prince Hohenlohe almost to the last minute…and had been despatched to hasten Ruchel’s arrival. He met the latter somewhere in the vicinity of Frankendorf, and in reply to the query in what direction help could best be rendered, he replied ‘now only through Cappellendorf’; whereas, in the state of affairs actually existing, all further offensive action was foredoomed to failure.” [TJC 158]

Petre weighs in with Maude in his condemnation of the “evil” Massenbach. “Then came Massenbach with the tidings that Hohenlohe’s battle was as good as lost. To Ruchel, inquiring in which direction he could best help, Massenbach replied, “Now only through Capellendorf.” Fatal advice! for it was hopeless to expect victory for this puny force, moving up the slope of the valley against the great line of victorious French, now rapidly nearing Gross Romstadt.” [NCP 141-2]

In contrast, Esposito and Elting appear to place the blame at the feet of Ruchel himself.

“By 1430, Hohenlohe’s army was reduced to a horde of fugitives, only one or two battalions holding together in squares. But now Ruchel came tramping onto the lost battlefield, plowing his way with difficulty through the rout. Stout of heart and arm (if thick of head), certain that Frederick the Great’s teaching encompassed the whole art of war, highly disdainful of French fighting qualities, he did not seek merely to cover Hohenlohe’s retreat. Instead, dropping a small reserve at Frankendorf, he threw his little army into a wedge-shaped formation and marched on Gross Romstadt to win his own battle. He repulsed the initial attacks of the French cavalry, which fell back on the leading French infantry, throwing them into some disorder. Seizing this opportunity, Ruchel pushed ahead and secured a footing on the plateau, though battered savagely by French horse artillery. Once there, however, he halted and began the traditional Prussian volley fire. Within a half-hour, Soult’s and Lannes’ skirmishers had riddled his line. Wounded, but clinging to his saddle, Ruchel tried to fight back, until Hilaire and Vedel scattered his men with a final bayonet charge.” [MHA 65]

Whoever was responsible for the actual events of this fatal last half hour of the battle, what resulted was the complete rout of both Hohenlohe’s and Ruchel’s commands and the total victory of the French.

Maude claims that Ruchel could have acted differently. He believes a holding action for a limited time by Ruchel’s force against the pursuing French could have delayed any French pursuit until the following morning, sunset in that part of the country at that time of year being about five o’clock. However, it is believed by many historians that Ruchel’s position, when he arrived late upon the battlefield, was already lost and only a swift withdrawal would have, perhaps, saved his command. How could a mere fifteen thousand men hope to hold out for two hours against a French force that had just routed a much larger body of Prussian troops?

Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part Vb [FE68]

More Prussians in 1806

Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part Vb: Jena [FE68]

Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part Va: Tactics [FE66]

The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part IV [FE65]

Other Parts

The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part III [FE63]

The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part II [FE61]

The Prussians in 1806 Dispelling the Myths Part I [FE60]

Related

1806: A Precis [FE59]

Back to Table of Contents -- First Empire #66
Back to First Empire List of Issues
Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List
© Copyright 2003 by First Empire.
This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com