Left Wing History (5):
Waterloo 1815
The Final French Attack
by Gary Cousins, Germany
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“Whilst the imperial guard was forming
for attack, the French troops in possession of
La Haye Sainte and its inclosures, now consisting
of the entire of Donzelot's division,
from the left of d'Erlon's corps, renewed, with
redoubled vigour, their assault upon the centre
of the Allied line; the object being evidently
either to force that point previously to the
arrival of the guard on its left, and thus facilitate
the assault to be made by the latter, or to
harass it in such a manner that, should the
effort of the guard prove successful, they
would be enabled completely to overthrow the
Allied centre.
The fire from the skirmishers that had located themselves between the farm
and the position, and from those on the knoll
by the sandpit, on the opposite side of the high
road, had been incessant since the capture of
that post. Ompteda 's brigade of the King's
German legion, which had hitherto occupied
the hollow-way that descends into the
chaussée, was reduced to a mere handful of
men: the two squares in which Kielmansegge's
Hanoverian brigade, the next on
the (Allied) right, had stood its ground so
many hours, were fearfully diminished;
Kruse's Nassau brigade, still further to the
right, formed in three contiguous columns,
(two in front and one in rear), began to evince
symptoms of hesitation; and the interval between
this and Halkett's British brigade had
become much greater than was consistent with
the due security of this part of the line ...” [21]
Shortly before the attack columns of the
Imperial Guard began to move, the sighting of
the advanced guard of Zieten’s Prussian I
Corps approaching the left wing, and the news
of the shortage of cavalry in the centre, induced
Vivian, on his own initiative, to move
his brigade from the left wing towards the
centre-right, where the remains of
Wellington’s cavalry now stood. [22]
Murray of the 18th Hussars wrote of a sight full of portent:
“…About the time we crossed the
Genappe road there was a wonderful Column
of French pouring down from their position.
But that Column could not have been
engaged with the right of the British forces so
soon as the period when we first replaced the
Household Brigade in our position.” [23]
What support had the centre-right at this
point?
The artillery: “… completely disabled …”
The artillery attached to Alten’s Division
was Cleeves’ 4th K.G.L. Foot Battery to the
left, Lloyd’s Foot Battery, R.A. to the right.
Siborne represented their guns on his model:
“Major Lloyd’s battery in front of Halkett’s
left…Captain Cleeve’s German battery on the
Charleroi road, near Mont St. Jean, advancing
after having retired to refit …” [24]
Lloyd having been mortally wounded at Waterloo, Captain
Rudyard R.A. recalled for Siborne: “At seven
o'clock, when the Imperial Guards advanced,
our Guns were still in line. The French advanced
in masses of Infantry, upon which we
directed our fire.” [25]
The placement of Cleeves’ Battery on the model was based upon
the Hanoverian report upon which Siborne
relied, which said that after using up all of its
ammunition “…it withdrew to Mont St. Jean
to replenish, but could only advance again in
the evening, when the enemy had already
made its last attack….”; [26]
although Cleeves’ own report claimed that his battery later rejoined
the front line, on the right of the division,
from where it “opened a lively fire upon
the advancing enemy and its artillery.” [27]
These batteries were also supplemented by
Ross’ ‘A’ Troop R.H.A.: initially two of its
guns were on the Brussels road and four in
front of Alten’s Division: however, some time
after the loss of La Haie-Sainte, only three
guns were moveable when it took up a position
further to the right: [28]
Siborne’s model showed “…Major Sir Hugh Ross’s troop in
left front of Brunswickers…”, to the left of
Lloyd’s Battery. [29]
However, according to Macready, an ensign with the 30th Foot (of
Halkett’s Brigade) in 1815, by the time the
Imperial Guard approached, neither Cleeves’
nor Lloyd’s Batteries were in action, (nor
presumably Ross’ Troop, although not mentioned
by Macready): [30] and the uselessness of the artillery due to damage or lack of ammunition
is attested to in many reports of the Germans
of Alten’s Division. [31]
The cavalry: “… the skeleton remains …”
For the cavalry, [32]
Vivian described the position by early evening:
“…after these attacks of the Brigade of
Life Guards and Sir William Ponsonby's
[against D’Erlon’s I Corps], they became non-effective,
and the other Cavalry of the right
having suffered most severely, there remained
only the Cavalry of the left, Sir J. Vandeleur's
and Sir H. Vivian's Brigades, effective.” [33]
The 2nd (Union) Brigade (now under
Lieutenant-Colonel Clifton) was brought from
the left across the Brussels road to the centre-right
at some time between 3 and 4 p.m. and
united with the remains of Somerset’s 1st
(Household) Brigade: Siborne wrote:
“... The united remains of Somerset’s and
Ponsonby’s brigades, which were on the reverse
slope, behind Ompteda’s brigade of the King’s
German legion, and which were extended in
single file for the purpose of making a show of
force, suffered much in this cannonade
[following the loss of La Haie-Sainte]…” [34]
Major-General Lord Somerset, 1st
(Household) Brigade), recalled:
“…About this time there was a considerable
space on the right of the Haye Sainte void
of British Infantry, and as it was threatened by
a strong force of the Enemy assembled under
the brow of the hill, the 1st and 2nd Brigades
continued to occupy the interval, exposed to a
destructive fire both of musketry and artillery,
from which they sustained such severe loss
that they were at length reduced to one Squadron…” [35]
Lieutenant Wyndham of the 2nd Dragoons recalled that these brigades,
“…although very much exposed to fire, had to
show front to the Enemy, and awe them by
advancing and retiring; and although there
was a large body of French Cavalry in front,
still they did not, fortunately for us, attack.” [36]
Captain Clark Kennedy of the 1st Dragoons
also recalled making “two or three advances to
check the Enemy's movements”, in this “…the
most trying duty of the day”, while under
grape and musketry fire; he also remembered
that skirmishers were sent out to meet those of
the French cavalry, who were trying to draw
the fire of the squares. [37]
So did Captain von Goeben of the 3rd K.G.L. Hussars, who said
that the French skirmishers were able to advance
so close due to the absence of opposing
infantry, and caused great losses. [38]
The 3rd K.G.L. Hussars (the only regiment in
Arentschildt’s 7th Cavalry Brigade) had been
ordered up into the second line in support of
the infantry of Kruse’s Nassauers, and after
being overpowered in charges against the
French cavalry, its remaining 60-70 files
were formed into two squadrons, and posted
behind Kielmansegge’s Brigade. It had also
helped to rescue the 5th K.G.L. Line Battalion
in its ill-fated advance.
Goeben said that his regiment was joined to the British heavies
at about 6 p.m. Two Netherlands brigades –
Trip and Ghigny - supported the centre-right
in the late afternoon, according to their bri-gade
reports, [39]
and the journal of the 1st
Nassau Regiment stated that the French cavalry
had been counter-attacked by “English
and Netherlands cavalry”. [40]
Though the accounts conflict, it appears that at least a part
of the 23rd Light Dragoons of Dörnberg’s
Brigade joined onto the heavy brigades in the
late afternoon, and at the end of the battle
acted as a support to both Vivian’s and
Vandeleur’s Brigades. [41]
Also according to one account, at the time of the last attack,
from Grant’s Brigade “…the 7th [Hussars]
were ordered from the right to assist in repelling
that attack, and consequently were on
the right centre at that time…” [42]
The infantry: “… fearfully reduced …”
The state of the infantry of Alten’s Division
at this time has been described, and Hanoverian
and Nassau reports stated that the
infantry on the centre right had little support
from the cavalry, and none from the artillery. [43]
However, assistance was given by the
neighbouring troops of Picton’s Division
(which was now commanded by Kempt, and
to which Lambert’s Brigade had joined):
“…On the Allied left of the high road, an
unremitting fire was maintained against their
opponents by the 95th and 4th British regiments
in extended order along the front hedge
of the Wavre road, commencing from the
Charleroi chaussée, as also from the 40th,
79th, 1st, and 28th British regiments, deployed
behind the embanked hedge on the rear
side of that road. The 27th British regiment
had been brought up by Lambert, and posted
in square, in the angle formed by the junction
of the above roads, having one face parallel
with, and close to, the chaussée, for the purpose
either of throwing a flank fire upon the
French troops on the opposite side, should
these succeed, as appeared very probable, in
compelling Ompteda's and Kielmansegge's
brigades to retire, or, of pouring a close,
deadly volley upon any column endeavouring
to penetrate along the high road itself…” [44]
Baring acknowledged this support:
“… The enemy’s intention, to break
through the position there, where stood our,
General Alten’s Division, was easily deduced
from the constant and fierce attacks …
…However, General Picton’s Division,
standing to the left of the chaussée, which had
not been so much the main subject of the
enemy attacks as ours, held its position,
whereby it prevented the enemy pushing forwards,
but also drew the fierceness of the attack upon itself...” [45]
A fierce tiraillade…
Siborne wrote a stirring narrative of what happened next:
“…Such was the state of things in the
centre of the Anglo-allied army, when the
continued popping fire from the French skirmishers
suddenly quickened into a fierce tiraillade,
which threatened to bear down every
thing opposed to it. The bank along the high
road, beyond the garden of La Haye Sainte,
and the mound adjoining it, which latter was
quite close to the Allied position, became all
at once thickly crowded with skirmishers.
Those that lined the banks seemed intent upon
keeping down the fire from the British regiments
of Kempt's and Lambert's brigades,
along the Wavre road, while those under cover
of the little mound in advance, as if aware of
the object of the formation of the 27th British
regiment, and sensible of the necessity of
securing their right flank in their meditated
forcing of the position, opened such a close,
sharp, fire upon that regiment, that, within the
brief space of a few minutes, it lost more than
half of its numbers.
At the same time, taking advantage of the
crippled state of the Allied artillery in this
quarter, the French brought up two guns in
advance of the north-western angle of the
garden of La Haye Sainte, in which position
they were covered from any fire from the
opposite side of the high road, by the skirmishers
occupying the bank and the mound.
From these guns a smart fire of grape was
opened, and maintained without intermission,
upon the left square of Kielmansegge's brigade,
(consisting of the field-battalions Grubenhagen
and York), at the short distance of
150, and afterwards of scarcely 100, paces.
The square manifested the most exemplary
submission and forbearance, notwithstanding
the ravages that continued to be made in its
ranks; not venturing to reply to the fire, by the
apprehension of cavalry being under the brow
of the position, prepared to take instant advantage
of any favourable opportunity for a charge.
The right square (consisting of the field-battalions Bremen and Verden) also suffered
most severely. Some other guns, which
had accompanied the columns in rear of the
French skirmishers, were suddenly brought
forward, and opened so destructive a discharge
of grape upon this latter square, that
one of its sides was literally completely blown away; the remainder being left standing in the
form of a triangle. The commander, and many
other officers, were wounded. The ammunition
was failing rapidly. The combined fire of
grape and musketry continued to increase in
violence; and the square finally dwindled into
a mere clump of men. The French tirailleurs
continued pressing forward in a very compact
line, whilst the sound of drums beating the pas de charge announced the advance of the columns
immediately in their rear.
The Prince of Orange, perceiving the probability of the centre
of the Allied line being forced, unless some
great effort were made to check the enemy's
advance, ordered the 1st and 2nd Nassau battalions
of Kruse's brigade to charge, gallantly
placing himself at their head.
His Royal Highness was soon struck by a bullet in the left
shoulder; the attack failed; and the Nassauers
were falling back, when the reinforcement
which Wellington had provided for this part of
the line, consisting of five battalions of Brunswick
infantry, moved rapidly into the interval
between Kruse's Nassau, and Halkett's British,
brigade. But so unexpectedly did the Brunswickers
find themselves placed under a most
destructive fire, and so suddenly were the
heads of their columns assailed, that they were
unable, in the midst of the thick smoke in
which they became involved, to recover from
the partial irregularities by which, under such
circumstances, their advance was accompanied,
and to form up in sufficient order, before
they came in close contact with the enemy,
whose vigorous attack compelled them, as
also Kruse's, Kielmansegge's, and Ompteda's
brigades, to fall back about a hundred paces.
At this critical moment, Wellington hastened
to the spot in person, to avert so alarming
a catastrophe as that of having his centre
broken, at a time, too, when he was preparing
to receive a formidable attack, directed against
another point of his line, situated at but a short
distance on the right of that centre. He addressed
himself to the Brunswickers, and succeeded,
by the electrifying influence of his
voice, gesture, and presence, in rallying the
discomfited columns.
The 3rd line-battalion, under Major Normann, was the first to reform
in good order: it then boldly stood its ground;
and, when the enemy's infantry approached,
received it with so destructive a fire as completely
to check its further advance.
By dint of example and encouragement
on the part of all the commanding officers, the
brigades on the left of the Brunswickers were
also rallied and formed up: upon seeing
which, the Duke galloped off to the right.” [46]
According to Siborne, seeing that the
right wing appeared secure, and that direct
Prussian reinforcements would not be available
in time for the last French effort, Wellington
had ordered five Brunswick battalions to
move from behind Maitland’s and Adam’s
Brigades into the interval between Halkett’s
British and Kruse’s Nassau Brigades. [47]
Shaw’s version of this episode is slightly
different: he claimed to have alerted Wellington
to this “imminent danger”, initiating what
Siborne said had already been ordered by
Wellington:
“…La Haye Sainte was in the hands of
the enemy; also the knoll on the opposite
side of the road; also the garden and ground
on the Anglo-Allied side of it; that
Ompteda’s Brigade was nearly annihilated,
and Kielmansegge’s so thinned, that those
two brigades could not hold their position.
That part of the field of battle, therefore,
which was between Halkett's left and
Kempt's right, was unprotected; and being
the very centre of the Duke's line of battle,
was consequently that point, above all others,
which the enemy wished to gain.
The danger was imminent; and at no other period
of the action was the result so precarious as
at this moment. Most fortunately Napoleon
did not support the advantage his troops had
gained at this point, by bringing forward his
reserve…
…The Duke of Wellington stood at this
moment on the left of the Nivelles road, behind
the left of Maitland's brigade of Guards.
The Prince of Orange, Count Alten, and so
many officers of the 3rd division, had, before
this event happened, been killed, or wounded
and obliged to leave the field, that I did not
then know, nor do I now know, who was, at
the moment alluded to, senior officer of the
division on the field: I therefore, as the staff-officer
present, galloped direct to the Duke,
and informed him that his line was open for
the whole space between Halkett's and
Kempt's brigades…
His Grace's answer to my representation was in the following words, or
very nearly so:- "I shall order the Brunswick
troops to the spot, and other troops besides; go
you and get all the German troops of the
division to the spot that you can, and all the
guns that you can find."…
… Of such gravity did Wellington consider
this great gap in the very centre of his
line of battle, that he not only ordered the
Brunswick troops there, but put himself at
their head; …” [48]
Macready of the 30th Foot saw the Brunswickers arrive:
“A heavy Column of Brunswickers came
up to our left (30th and 73rd Regiments) in the
evening of June 18th. A remark upon them in
my Journal states that "they fell back at first
bodily, but were rallied and afterwards stood their ground."…
… The falling back in Halkett's Brigade,
and of the Brunswick Column occurred very
near together …” [49]
According to Macready, this falling back
in Halkett’s Brigade followed its engagement
against part of the French Imperial Guard.
Alava, the Spanish General in
Wellington’s entourage, saw him rally the
Brunswickers, and also linked this to the
Guard’s attack:
“At last, about seven in the evening, Buonaparte
made a final effort, and putting himself
at the head of his guards, attacked the
above point of the English position with such
vigour, that he drove back the Brunswickers
who occupied part of it; and, for a moment, the
victory was undecided, and even more than doubtful.
The duke, who felt that the moment
was most critical, spoke to the Brunswick
troops with that ascendancy which a great
general possesses, made them return to the
charge, and putting himself at their head,
again restored the combat, exposing himself to
every kind of personal danger.” [50]
We will return to this point later.
Hanoverian reports stated that when the
Prince of Orange led the Nassauers in their
attack, the right-hand square of
Kielmansegge’s Brigade – the Bremen and
Verden Field Battalions – also went forward,
but had to withdraw when the Nassauers did. [51]
Among the Germans moved “to the spot” at
this time was a part of Vincke’s Brigade: the
Hameln and Giffhorn Landwehr Battalions,
which since mid-afternoon had been stationed
in reserve behind the centre, also joined
Alten’s Division, to help fill the gap -- the
Hameln Battalion to the left of the Nassau
contingent and to the right of the remains of
the 8th K.G.L. Line Battalion; the Giffhorn
Battalion further to the right (ending up between
the 1st K.G.L. Hussars and the Brunswick
infantry). [52]
Vivian arrives on the centre-right… Siborne continues:
“Just at this time, Vivian's hussar-brigade
drew up immediately in rear of these
troops …” [53]
Vivian recalled some years later:
“… Lord Uxbridge had himself led my
brigade from the left, (where it had suffered
but little, having been exposed only to a cannonade
and a distant fire of musketry), and
posted it immediately on the crest of the position,
to the right of the road to Genappe, where
the 10th and 18th Hussars formed in line, and
the 1st German Hussars [K.G.L.] in reserve;
the left of the 18th touching nearly to the high
road …
After having seen my brigade occupy
the position he had assigned to it, Lord Uxbridge
left me to proceed to Vandeleur's brigade,
which had followed mine from the left
of the line, and which his Lordship posted on
the right and rear of mine to act as a reserve to
it.” [54]
Vivian brought with him his artillery,
Gardiner’s ‘E’ Troop R.H.A.: First Lieutenant
Robert Harding recalled:
“…the troop having moved with the brigade
from the left of the position, was halted
with it in a slight hollow in the rear of I believe
the right centre of our line and was not at that
time engaged…” [55]
It is not entirely clear what happened to
the rest of the cavalry after Vivian’s Brigade
arrived. In the recollections of the officers of
the British heavy brigades, some insist that
they maintained their position on the centre-right
until the end of the battle, others that they
moved to the rear or right. [56]
Goeben wrote that, shortly after 7 p.m., the 3rd K.G.L. Hussars
were moved back to the Nivelles road,
and relieved by a brigade of “English light
dragoons”; [57]
at around this time the Netherlands
brigades behind Alten’s Division were
also moved to the right (Trip recalled a general
order to that effect), [58]
and a Hanoverian
report also recorded a general movement to
the right by the cavalry. [59]
Drawn up in line, Vivian’s Brigade
would have presented a front of perhaps 400m –- which would have covered substantially the
rear of Alten’s Division; but for some reason
- perhaps tactical, perhaps because of the
chaos on the right, not all of the brigade was
able to cross the Brussels road – initially the
1st K.G. L. Hussars “…was formed on both
sides of the road, and quite exposed to the
enemy small-arms fire, because the enemy
was still continually and heavily engaged with
our infantry…”, according to Major von der Decken. [60]
The coming storm…
If the left wing had been relatively quiet,
Vivian’s Brigade was about to enter a storm.
Murray of the 18th Hussars wrote:
“…I have been told that it was seven
o'clock when we passed Lord Edward Somerset's
Brigade, but I have no idea that it could
be seven till some time afterwards.
The Brigade now began to tread the
ground of devastation; the pavement of the
Genappe road was torn up and scattered.
Lord Edward Somerset's Brigade,
strengthened by the addition of what had been
Ponsonby’s, was dwindled to two various
Squadrons.
General Vivian asked: “Lord Edward, where is your Brigade?”
“Here,” said Lord Edward.” [61]
Vivian recalled his reply to Somerset:
“ ‘You had better move to the rear & take
care of those you have left. I will advance with
my Brigade & take the front’; which was
done.” [62]
Vivian wrote: “Lord Edward Somerset with the
wretched remains of the two Heavy Brigades,
not 200 men and horses, retired through me,
and I then remained for about half an hour
exposed to the most dreadful fire of shot,
shell, and musketry that it is possible to imagine.
No words can give any idea of it (how a
man escaped is to me a miracle), we every
instant expecting through the smoke to see the
Enemy appearing under our noses, for the
smoke was literally so thick that we could not
see ten yards off.” [63]
Murray continued his account: “…The ground was strewed with wounded,
over whom it was hardly possible sometimes
to avoid moving.
Wounded or mutilated horses wandered
or turned in circles. The noise was deafening,
and the air of ruin and desolation that prevailed
wherever the eye could reach gave no
inspiration of victory…” [64]
Murray also recalled: “The formation of the 18th Hussars was
three squadrons in line. Its left to Genappe
road; its right to the 10th Hussars. Squares to
its front according to the position.
The position of the brigade was nearly
behind where the plan, attached to Major
Gawler's statement [65]
places the Brunswickers,
its right extending towards Hougoumont,
but the left of the 18th was near, rather than
‘nearly brushing’ the Genappe road. (Sir Hussey
Vivian says, ‘nearly touching’, he has seen
the ground since I have)…
…At the precise period about 7 o' clock,
the smoke made it impossible to see what was
in our front. None of the enemy came on the
crest where the 18th were, nor I believe where
the 10th were.
From the time when the 6th Brigade of
cavalry replaced the household brigade, until
after having moved in column of half squadrons
parallel to the position, and wheeled
again so as to be moving perpendicularly to
their original front, I do not imagine the enemy
were at all perceptible; …
… very little was to be seen - except (as
in a fog) what was immediately near
you…and it was one of the annoyances of the
moment that you were so completely in the
dark as to what was going on, whilst you knew
a great deal was going on of great importance.”
[66]
Captain Shakespear of the 10th Hussars
remembered:
“I perfectly recollect our forming in line,
upon being taken to the right of St Jean, and
that the 18th [on the] left, was close upon the
chaussée. It is not likely that any one present
at that time, should forget it, for a heavier fire
I don't believe any troops ever stood under.
You will remember, that the roar was so great,
though close together, we could not make
ourselves understood, but by Holloa'ing.” [67]
Bacon of the 10th Hussars wrote:
“After forming upon the plateau in the
right rear of La Haye Sainte, and upon the
right of the remnant of Lord Edward Somerset's
and Ponsonby's brigades, we were exposed
to a murderous fire; …and our men and
horses fell fast…
…The smoke was so thick at this period
that I could not see further than a few file from
the right of our centre squadron…” [68]
Even Lieutenant Ingilby of ‘E’ Troop noted:
“The smoke was so dense we could for a
time see nothing immediately before us, while
thus, at the distance of about 15 paces, supporting
what proved to be at length an attack
from our side, and a total overthrow of the
French.” [69]
Left Wing History (5) Vivian’s 6th (Light) Cavalry Brigade on the 18th June 1815
Left Wing History (4) Vivian’s 6th (Light) Cavalry Brigade on the 18th June 1815
Left Wing History (3) Vivian’s 6th (Light) Cavalry Brigade on the 18th June 1815
Left Wing History (2) Prussian I Corps
Left Wing History (1) Waterloo 1815: Vivian's 6th Cavalry Brigade
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Napoleon, having put a temporary halt to
the Prussian attacks against Plancenoit, by
sending two battalions of the Old Guard to
clear the village, now decided to make a last
major attack upon Wellington’s position.
Siborne told how the skirmisher attack
was intensified while the Imperial Guard and
the remains of the French army formed up and
moved forward: Wellington’s centre “… was
not to be allowed a moment’s respite …” [20]