Left Wing History (4):
Waterloo 1815
Vivian’s 6th (Light) Cavalry Brigade
on the 18th June 1815
by Gary Cousins, Germany
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“…Order, order…” ? As promised in part 3, this article will examine the issue of Vivian’s claim to have left the left wing on his own initiative: how this was treated in Siborne’s History, what is said in various accounts, and what orders Vivian received (or is supposed to have received) on the 18th June, both before the battle began and during the day. Vivian’s accountA letter from Vivian to Siborne in 1837 told of the movement of his brigade from the left wing: “It was some time after this that patrols I had sent to the left to look out came & informed me that the Prussians were advancing on the road from Ohain in force & their advanced cavalry had come on, so that I saw them from a point on the left of our position & rather to the rear of the little lane. To that point I rode purposely to look out on hearing that they were coming. On seeing that there was no longer any apprehension of our left being turned, & hearing from Col. Delancey Barklay [or Barclay] that Cavalry were wanted in the centre, that [sic] I proposed to Sir O. Vandeleur to move with his Brigade and mine, he was the senior officer, although we acted separately, towards the centre where we might be of service. Sir O.V objected to moving without orders, & I then put my own Brigade in motion & passed along the rear of Sir O.V.’s Brigade, & soon after having commenced my march I met Lord Anglesey [Uxbridge], who was much pleased at what I had done, & sending orders to Vandeleur to follow, proceeded to accompany my Brigade towards the centre, pass-ing immediately at the bottom of the slope behind the position in which stood Sir T. Picton’s Division. On the march, in consequence
of a mistake on the part of Capn. Horace Seymour,
who (Lord Anglesey having left me to
proceed towards the centre in order to see where
I could be of most use) brought me an order from
Lord Anglesey, I understood to form line, I
wheeled my Brigade into line immediately before
reaching the high road & with my right
touching on it. I remained there some few minutes,
until Lord Anglesey discovering the mistake
came & moved me on.” [1]
That Vivian had received no order, and
used his own initiative, is made clear at several points in Vivian’s account (in another
letter, he repeated the claim, and timed the
movement at “about six o’clock”) [2] , and in
Siborne’s very similar version.
Colonel Sir William Howe De Lancey (1781-1815).
“It was shortly before the columns of attack
[of the Imperial Guard] were put in motion
that Vivian, whose hussar-brigade it will be
recollected, was posted upon the extreme left of
the Anglo-allied line, was informed by patrols
which he had detached to look out to his left for
the expected arrival of the Prussians, that the
latter were advancing in force along the road
from Ohain.
Having satisfied himself as to the
fact, and perceiving their advanced cavalry
coming on, Vivian felt that there could be no
longer any apprehension of the left of the army
being turned; and, having previously understood
from Sir William Delancey and other
staff officers, that fresh cavalry was much
wanted in the centre, he proposed to Vandeleur,
who was on his right, and who was his senior
officer, that the two brigades should move towards
the centre, where they might be of service.
Vandeleur declined to act without orders;
whereupon Vivian put his own brigade in motion,
passing along the rear of Vandeleur's, and
soon after having commenced his march he met
Lord Uxbridge, who was much pleased to find
that the Duke's wishes had thus been anticipated,
and sent orders to Vandeleur to follow,
accompanying the former brigade himself towards
the centre, passing along the foot of the
slope in rear of the position of the left wing of
the Anglo-allied line….
…The Brigade had previously, in consequence
of a mistake in the transmission of
orders, been halted on the left of the high road
about midway between the front line and the
farm of Mont St. Jean; whence, however, it
was speedily brought forward, and posted as
above, by Lord Uxbridge.” [3]
Early on the 18th June “…carte blanche…” ?
One would expect that Wellington’s cavalry
commander, Uxbridge, was a prime
mover in this episode: he claimed to have
received no orders from Wellington, apart
from the order to cover the retreat from Quatre
Bras on the 17th June, and others about the
command of the Netherlands cavalry (which
finally came to Uxbridge on the morning of
the 18th June); otherwise:
“I felt that he had given me carte blanche,
and I never bothered him with a single question
respecting the movements it might be
necessary to make.
I will only add that throughout he was
invariably conciliatory and confiding.” [4]
However, Wellington was not that confiding:
according to one anecdote, on the
evening of the 17th June Uxbridge was concerned
that, if command should fall to him if
Wellington should meet any “accident” the
next day, he had no idea of Wellington’s
plans. Encouraged by Vivian and General
Alava (the Spanish representative at headquarters),
he broached the subject with Wel-lington
with “all the delicacy imaginable”, but
was frustrated by the reply: “Bonaparte has
not given me any idea of his projects: and as
my plans will depend upon his, how can you
expect me to tell you what mine are?” [5]
Wellington was to be the mastermind
directing the expected battle: as he wrote succinctly
in 1851:
“Müffling saw that I did the business of
the army myself, that I . . . (inspired?) its
movements, that I ordered them, that I handled
it, that I directed its operations and superintended
everything. He frequently told me they
could not do this, and that none other but
myself could.” [6]
It is scarcely conceivable that Wellington
as C-in-C would not interfere if Uxbridge’s
dispositions did not accord with his own plans
and expectations, and Uxbridge was surely
given general guidelines for the cavalry operations.
The only question is how Wellington
did it, while leaving Uxbridge with the impression
of having had autonomy: perhaps by
expressing his views and desires in a
“conciliatory” manner, leaving Uxbridge the
discretion to issue the required orders, or by
issuing orders to brigade commanders
(personally or through his staff) of which Uxbridge
was unaware.
Wellington had good reason to intervene
on the 18th June: the initial deployment of
Uxbridge’s cavalry may have been less than
ideal. The cavalry had covered the retreat from
Quatre Bras on the 17th June, and arrived at
the Waterloo position in the late afternoon and
evening, where, according to Lieutenant-Colonel
Charles Murray Cathcart, Lord
Greenock, AQMG to the cavalry, bivouacs
had been “taken up without any attention to
order” or “regular disposition”. [7]
Lieutenant-Colonel
Lord Fitzroy Somerset, Wellington’s
Military Secretary, recalled that on the 17th
June the infantry “had been conducted to their
respective stations by the staff officers”, and
early on the 18th June he was with Wellington
as he issued orders and fine-tuned the dispositions
of the infantry and artillery. [8]
But although Uxbridge visited his outposts at daybreak on the 18th June, [9] it was only between
10 and 11 a.m. that the cavalry brigades
left their bivouacs [10] -- and according to Cathcart
/ Greenock these largely determined their
positions at the start of the battle. Not so with
Arentschildt’s (single-regiment) Brigade,
which had been at Brussels overnight – but
when it arrived at around 10-11 a.m., it became
held up behind the rest of the cavalry,
which was still deploying: [11] indeed, there is
evidence that some did not finish deploying
until after the battle began.
As for operations, cavalry were needed
on the left, including to look out for, and
communicate with, the Prussians, for having
been promised their support, and told (and
perhaps innocently misled) in mid-morning
that Bülow’s IV Corps was already at
Chapelle St. Lambert, Wellington expected
them to arrive in force soon afterwards. [12]
But to the far right, Wellington suspected either an
outflanking movement (for which reason most
of Estorff’s Hanoverian Brigade was with the
force in observation towards Hal and Tubize),
or a direct attack (against which possibility
Grant’s Brigade was posted on the far right
behind Hougoumont early in the morning).
These concerns determined that the cavalry on
the left would be brought into the centre and
right as soon as possible. But initial optimism,
that the first Prussians would arrive soon,
quickly gave way to a more realistic expectation,
and Müffling, Prussian liaison officer at
Wellington’s headquarters, was well-informed
enough towards midday to be able to
note that: “By 11.30 a.m., two brigades of
Bülow’s Corps had reached St. Lambert.
However, the Army Corps cannot be there
until 4 p.m.” [13]
Any early plans to weaken the
left wing became unrealistic; and soon afterwards,
the early French “feint” against the left,
and the visible build-up to the attack by
D’Erlon’s Corps in the early afternoon became
additional arguments; but the desire to
release the cavalry on the left will have increased
as the French massed cavalry assailed
Wellington’s right later in the afternoon.
“…Sir William Delancey…” In another letter to Siborne in 1839, Viv-ian
wrote of the role of the acting QuartermasterGeneral (QMG), Colonel Sir William
Howe De Lancey (known to Vivian from Peninsula
days) in choosing the Waterloo position,
[14] and De Lancey certainly directed the
infantry into position in the afternoon and
early evening of the 17th June: [15] so it would
be expected that De Lancey was also involved
in the deployment of the cavalry on the morning
of the 18th June.
In fact, the only known meeting between
Vivian and De Lancey on the 18th June took place during the hour before the battle began:
it is not mentioned by Vivian in his account,
but it was seen and overheard by Lieutenant
Ingilby, of Gardiner’s “E” Troop R.H.A., at-tached
to Vivian’s Brigade:
“Sir William Delancy was with Sir H.
Vivian, and I learned the ultimate position of
the Brigade was to be on the extreme left of
the Line, and that Sir H. Vivian would be in
communication with the Prussians, for whom
a look-out was to be kept, and who would
arrive on our left …
… Sir H. Vivian’s Brigade was not to
engage, and be kept entire, until the arrival of
the Prussians …” [16]
The implication for Vivian was that, as
soon as the Prussians arrived, his brigade (at
least) would be ordered elsewhere - to the
right - and into action, if necessary.
“…act discretionally under certain limitations…”
But shortly after the battle began, Uxbridge
gave his brigade commanders his own
instructions. He later recalled telling them that
“…the general object was to support movements
in their front”; [17] but hindsight may
have been in operation: he was expressing
dissatisfaction with the support received from
the light cavalry when the British heavy brigades
charged against D’Erlon’s Corps in the
early afternoon - but it was (and is) a subject
of dispute whether or not Uxbridge had detailed
those brigades to provide their own
support.
Uxbridge’s instruction was delivered by
Major W. Thornhill, 7th Hussars and first
ADC to Uxbridge, who recalled:
“…Lord Anglesey directed me to go with
verbal instructions to General Officers commanding
Cavalry Brigades, authorising them
to act discretionally under certain limitations
it were needless to mention here.” [18]
Vandeleur recalled receiving the order:
“…About the time of commencing the
Action, an order arrived from Lord Anglesey
to Generals Vandeleur and Vivian to engage
the Enemy, whenever they could do so with
advantage without waiting for orders…” [19]
Regardless of the precise wording, for
Vivian this new instruction was in conflict with
the order from Wellington.
Whether by accident or design, Vivian complied with
Wellington’s order during the attack by
D’Erlon’s Corps, when he did not engage to
help Ponsonby’s Brigade to retire. Vivian’s
senior officer Vandeleur, whose brigade was
stationed next on the right, seems not to have
received a prohibitive order from Wellington
like that received by Vivian, [20] and he intervened
in this episode, presumably judging that
Uxbridge’s instruction gave him scope to do so.
Later on 18th June “… and other staff officers…” Ingilby also recalled, as did Captain Tay-lor
of the 10th Hussars, and Lieutenant-Colonel
Murray of the 18th Hussars, all of Vivian’s
Brigade, [21] that a succession of staff officers
rode over to the left wing during the battle,
seeking news of the Prussians expected to
arrive there, and no doubt they also passed on
how matters were progressing to the centre
and right of Wellington’s position, where
most of the action took place in the afternoon.
But these look-outs and messengers were relatively
junior staff officers – they included
Major Percy, 14th Light Dragoons and extra
ADC to Wellington, [22] and Captain Staveley
of the Royal Staff Corps, attached to the
QMG’s staff, [23] among others (see later). Once
the battle began, Wellington mainly stayed on
the right, and it is unlikely that De Lancey, the
most important of his three senior staff officers,
left his side.
And it was at Wellington’s side that De Lancey became one of the nine (out of thirty)
officers on the QMG’s staff wounded on the
18th June. [24]
At first Wellington believed that
De Lancey had died of his injury: his official
despatch spoke of his satisfaction with the
conduct of “…the Quarter Master General,
Colonel De Lancey, who was killed by a cannon
shot in the middle of the action.” [25]
But De Lancey survived until 26th June: his wife of
just a few weeks nursed him for almost a week
until his death, during which time he was
compos mentis, and no doubt told her about
how he had been wounded and taken from the
field; as she wrote in 1816:
“On Sunday there was a dreadful battle. It
began at about 11 o’clock – about 3 when the Sir
William was riding beside the Duke, a cannon
ball struck him on the back, at the right shoulder,
and knocked him off his horse to several yards
distance. The Duke at first thought he was killed;
for he said afterwards, he never had in all the
fighting he had been in seen a man rise again
after such a wound. Seeing he was alive (for he
bounded up again) the Duke went to him and
stooping down, took him by the hand.
Sir William begged the Duke, as the last
favour he would have it in his power to do him,
to exert his authority to take away the crowd that
gathered round him, and to let him have his last
moments to himself. The Duke bade him farewell,
and endeavoured to draw away his Staff,
who oppressed him - they wanted to take leave
of him, and wondered at his calmness.
He was left, as they imagined, to die; but his cousin, De
Lancey Barclay, who had seen him fall, went to
him instantly, and tried to prevail upon him to be
removed to the rear, as he was in imminent
danger of being crushed by the artillery, which
was fast approaching the spot, and also there was
a danger of his falling into the hands of the
enemy. He entreated to be left on the ground, and
said it was impossible he could live, that they
might be of more use to others, and he only
begged to be allowed to remain on the field, but
as he spoke with ease, and Colonel Barclay,
seeing that the ball had not entered, he insisted
on moving him, and he took the opinion of a
surgeon, who thought he might live, and got
some soldiers to carry him in a blanket to a barn
at the side of the road, a little to the rear.
The wound was dressed, and then Colonel B. had to
return to his division; but first he gave orders to
have Sir William moved to the village; for that
barn was in danger of being taken by the enemy.
Before Colonel B. went, Sir William begged he
would come quite close to him, and continued to
give him messages for me, nothing else seemed
to occupy his mind. He desired him to write to
me at Antwerp; to say every thing kind, and to
endeavour to soften this sad event and to break it
to me as gently as he could. He then said that he
might move him, as if he fancied it was to be his
last effort. He was carried to the village of Waterloo,
and left in a cottage, where he lay unheeded
all night, and part of the next day.” [26]
“…& hearing from Col.
Delancey Barklay…” Perhaps between 4 and 6 p.m. the French
massed cavalry attacked Wellington’s right,
during which the Prussians appeared on the battlefield: Bülow’s IV Corps entered the fray
against the French right at around 4.30 p.m.,
while Zieten’s I Corps reached Ohain at
around 6 p.m., although it did not join and
come into action on Wellington’s left until
about an hour later.
Vivian had earlier learned from De
Lancey that Wellington wanted to move his
brigade from the left wing as soon as possible.
But even after D’Erlon’s attack in the early
afternoon, in which the British heavy cavalry
brigades were rendered hors de combat, Wellington
still had some 7,500 fresh cavalry on
his centre and right, [27] which hardly suggests
a shortage in quantity, even if he was doubtful
of the quality of some.
A real shortage was felt only during or after the contests fought
against the massed French cavalry between
about 4 and 6 p.m.: and this news, passed on
by staff officers, will have particularly stirred
those officers on the left wing.
But De Lancey was not one of those staff officers: he was
wounded at “about 3” or “in the middle of the
action”, before the French cavalry attacks began,
and would not have known about the real
shortage of cavalry which they caused (and in
the unlikely case that he was later made aware
- while lying wounded, expecting imminent
death, composing final messages for his wife
- it will not have been uppermost in his mind).
Vivian positively identified only one of
the staff officers who came to the left wing
during the afternoon: the man who informed
him that cavalry was wanted in the centre was
Lieutenant-Colonel Delancey Barclay of the 2
/1st Foot Guards, [28] AAG to Alten’s 3rd Division,
[29] who had helped the wounded QMG De
Lancey (Barclay’s second cousin) from the
battlefield in the middle of the afternoon.
While Barclay’s role in this episode was forgotten
in Siborne’s version, Vivian, who
claimed in his correspondence with Siborne
an almost perfect recollection of the events of
18th June 1815, would not forget this detail of
the circumstances which led him to leave the
left wing for the centre, from where he made
his celebrated charges. [30]
It is not known who tasked Barclay with
this errand, but it is entirely plausible that, as
the French cavalry attacks were in progress,
Barclay was sent out to the left wing, and that
while there he told Vivian of the shortage of
cavalry in the centre. Regardless of their specific
theoretical duties, in practice staff officers
undertook other duties as required on
campaign and especially in battle, and towards
the late afternoon of the 18th June it is likely
to have been a question of “all hands to the
pump”, with any available officers being used
to deliver messages and orders, and to do
anything else required. [31]
Moreover, the French cavalry attacks were the beginning of
a real crisis for Alten’s 3rd Division in the late
afternoon and early evening, and it is perhaps
significant, and certainly fitting, that Vivian’s
Brigade was eventually posted - by Uxbridge
– in its support. But according to Vivian,
Barclay brought only news of that situation,
not an order to move his brigade immediately,
though perhaps the staff officers sent to the
left reminded Vivian of his earlier order from
Wellington, and that he could expect to be
moved from the left as soon as it was feasible.
As to whether any fresh orders were
given to Vivian during this period, we must
look at the accounts of Wellington (and Müffling),
and Uxbridge (and his staff).
Left Wing History (4) Vivian’s 6th (Light) Cavalry Brigade on the 18th June 1815
Left Wing History (3) Vivian’s 6th (Light) Cavalry Brigade on the 18th June 1815
Left Wing History (2) Prussian I Corps
Left Wing History (1) Waterloo 1815: Vivian's 6th Cavalry Brigade
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Siborne marked Vivian’s letter:
“Movement of the Prussians, and also of his
own Brigade towards the centre. Important –
very clear”; and, with minor changes, incorporated
it into his History: