Left Wing History (2):
Waterloo 1815
A Turnaround…
by Gary Cousins, Germany
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Müffling’s history describes what happened next: “... During these scenes in the centre,
Bonaparte gave orders to all sides to advance
at the same moment as the Guards. The cavalry
brigades no sooner move off from the left
wing, than the enemy's infantry drives the
skirmishers of a battalion of Nassau out of
Papelotte, attacks Frischemont, then occupied
by General Bülow's troops, and thus separates
both armies.” [57]
In his letter to Hofmann, the French success is described as even greater:
“Meanwhile, after the departure of the
English cavalry, the enemy attacks had become
stronger. It had taken Papelotte, La
Haye and Smouhain.” [58]
In the meantime, Reiche says that he now
rode back again to the Prussian column:
“…Thereupon I was hurrying back on the
road towards the corps in order to report to
General Ziethen, when Hauptmann Scharnhorst,
now Generallieutenant and Inspector of
Artillery, at that time on Prince Blücher’s
staff, came bounding up to me, shouting that
the 1st Army Corps must push on immediately
through Frichemont to Blücher, because
things were beginning to go badly there. I
pointed out to him what had been arranged
with Müffling, and emphasised that Wellington
was for certain relying on our arrival. But
he would not listen to any more, and said that
this was Blücher’s order and he would hold
me responsible for the consequences if it was
not carried out.
Never in my life have I found myself in
such a difficult situation. On the one hand,
Blücher’s order, (even if it was false, I knew
that Blücher would still support it), and the
thought that our troops were perhaps in danger
there and could not hold out any longer. On
the other hand the certainty that Wellington
was counting on our arrival. I was nearly in
despair (I had quite decided, if any mishap
occurred as a result of my action, to seek death
on the battlefield: to survive would have been
for me a fearful torment to me), all the more
so as the head of the advance guard was already
arriving and now wanted to know where
to march next. General Ziethen himself was
still not in sight, (I was not prepared to hunt
for him along the column in the sunken road
so as to obtain orders, for fear of missing him),
and General Steinmetz, who commanded the
advance guard, came up to the halted troops at
this moment, stormed at me in his usual impetuous
manner, and insisted upon an advance.
He was scarcely willing to listen to how things
stood.
My embarrassment increased not a little
when General Steinmetz allowed the head of
the column to keep marching, and was already
beyond the point where the road to Frichemont
branches off. As I was unwilling to make
any decision, and, moreover, had no means of
knowing what General Ziethen would decide,
be it for Blücher or for Wellington, I had the
head of the column go back to the fork for
Frichemont (all the more permissible, as the
brigade had become very split up on the bad
road and still had not quite collected any of its
battalions). As this took place in view of the
Nassau troops, it had not crossed my mind that
this apparent withdrawal could be misunderstood
and could make a bad impression, as
was in fact the case for a moment.
Fortunately, General Ziethen galloped up
at this extremely critical moment. I hurried
over to him and when I had given my report,
he issued orders for the march to be directed
towards the English immediately. Nobody
could have been more pleased than I was.” [59]
Müffling also recalls in his history: “...The Prussian troops of the 1st corps do
not arrive; nay, the advance guard again withdraws
from the heights. Information is re-ceived,
that by a change of orders, the corps is
to march through the valley upon Frischemont.” [60]
His memoirs say: “General Zieten's advanced guard, which
I was expecting with the utmost impatience,
suddenly turned round, and disappeared from
the height just as the enemy took possession
of Papelotte with his Guards.” [61]
His letter to Hofmann stated:
“He [Müffling] also very soon saw the
head of Zieten [i.e. I Corps] 1000 paces [1000
Schritte or perhaps ¾ km] away, but soon
thereafter stopping and turning around.” [62]
It seems that Blücher had decided that it
would be better if I Corps joined or at least
supported the Prussian effort against Plancenoit,
where he had insufficient troops and was
perhaps at risk of a French counter-attack,
rather than joining Wellington’s left wing directly. [63]
The solution to the dilemma adopted by
Reiche, until Zieten reappeared, is contradicted by Müffling: his history says that he
received information (from who is not clear)
about the change of orders, and tells how it
was handled:
“If this [to march through the valley towards
Fichermont] was necessary, it could not
be done more properly, than leaving Papelotte
to the left, where the valley only beginning,
presents no obstacle; whereas in the neighbourhood
of Jeanloo, the valley becoming
more considerable, the passage becomes more
difficult. Lieutenant-General Zieten satisfied
himself of this, [and] quickly advanced, with
one brigade and the reserve-cavalry, just arrived…” [64]
“I hastened after this advance guard on
the other side of the height, from whence I saw
them in full retreat. General von Zieten, whom
fortunately I soon overtook, had received instructions
from the Field-Marshal, to close up
to him, and wished very properly to effect this
by going by Papelotte; but he changed his
intention, when one of his officers, whom he
had sent forward to ascertain how the battle
was going, returned with intelligence that the
right wing of the English was in full retreat.
This inexperienced young man had mistaken
the great number of wounded (by musketry)
going or being taken to the rear to be dressed,
for fugitives, and accordingly made a false
report. On my assuring General von Zieten of
the contrary, and undertaking to bring the
corps to the appointed place, and since in any
movement downwards from Papelotte he
would not only find difficulties, but also lose
the time for co-operation, he instantly turned
about and followed me, and continued to advance
until it grew dark, driving the enemy
before him.
By this retrograde movement of General
von Zieten, occasioned by this false report, the
battle might have been lost, as it would have
altogether prevented the corps from reaching
the field of battle; whereas, by marching on
Papelotte, its advance guard was in full action
a quarter of an hour later.” [65]
His letter to Hofmann was a little more
specific:
“He [Müffling] hurried over there and
found here also General Zieten, who to his
amazement told him that the battle was lost, as
had been reported to him by Rittmeister G…,
who had been sent forwards on reconnaissance;
also that Kapitain von Scharnhorst had
brought the order from Blücher to join onto
him immediately. Thus Zieten had turned
back towards Ohain. However, by explaining
the true situation, General Müffling persuaded
General Zieten to advance once more and
intervene.” [66]
Müffling does not say that he told Zieten
that the battle is lost. However, Major Graf
Gröben, chief of staff to the I Corps Reserve
Cavalry, reported overhearing Müffling say:
“The battle is lost if the Corps does not keep
on the move and immediately support the
English Army!” – and said that the arguments
became so loud that he feared their effect upon
the troops in the vicinity. [67]
Müffling persuaded Zieten that a crossing
of the Ohain stream downwards from Smohain
would not only encounter more difficult
terrain, but would also cost irrecoverable time:
he proposed a compromise solution, which
would bolster Wellington’s left wing while
supplying troops to Blücher: the places taken
by the French in the valley should be retaken,
whereupon the infantry of I Corps could then
be directed towards Plancenoit, and its cavalry
deployed to its right towards Wellington. [68]
The official report of the Prussian army,
Zieten’s report, and the Tagebuch of I Corps,
are silent about this entire episode.
(Again, Zieten’s had his own later and
more eccentric recollection:
“The Reserve Artillery having been
brought forward, I had given the 1st Brigade
my disposition very clearly, and only rode
back in order to instruct the 3 other brigades.
I can have been absent for perhaps 40 minutes,
and as I arrived I found the 1st Brigade was
indeed deployed, but moving backwards. As I
came up to the brown [i.e. the 4th (1st Silesian)]
hussar regiment, the hussars were crying:
“Here comes the attacker! Now the
turnaround is ended!” I laughed, and ordered:
“Front! Attack!”. Everyone was cheerful. The
next morning the general of 1st Brigade
[Steinmetz] came to me, to apologise. I replied:
“The battle is won: the rest I have forgotten.” [69]
For what it is worth, this account seems
to fit Reiche’s, that the turnaround had already
begun when Zieten arrived and reversed the
decision, although it is not clear why Steinmetz
should have been apologetic about obeying
an order from Blücher).
It seems that both Reiche and Müffling
felt defensive about their roles, for again Reiche
appears to have objected to some points
in Hofmann’s campaign history: Hofmann
writes that Reiche disputed the story about the
staff officer and his erroneous report, objecting
that “…such [an officer] would have been
put in front of a court martial...” [70]
But Müffling’s letter to Hofmann asserted: “Oberst Reiche knows nothing of the
erroneous report of Rittmeister G…, nor of the
measures taken thereupon by Zieten himself,
because these happened in his absence; and
from the last of his remarks it seems to follow,
that he also has not learned that General Müffling
came to Zieten and brought him out of
this illusion. – Zieten used to say about this
episode of the battle: “Luckily Müffling came to me.” [71]
The identity of “Rittmeister G…” is as
mysterious as Reiche’s whereabouts if, as
Müffling states, he was not with Zieten at the
head of I Corps.
The report of Generalmajor von Pirch II
says that when his 2nd Brigade of I Corps
arrived above Ohain, he received an order to
turn left and go through Ohain and over the
bridge towards Fichermont: Pflugk-Harttung
proposed that the order came from Zieten, and
was his way of trying to meet Blücher’s order
in part at least. Pirch II obeyed, and as senior
brigade commander also took responsibility
for the 3rd Brigade.
But the 2nd Brigade had
already descended into the valley when Zieten
sent a counter-order, for both brigades to
march straight to the battlefield: Pirch II says
that Zieten was already pursuing the beaten
enemy with the cavalry when this order came.
Therefore Pirch II had the 3rd Brigade, which
had just reached the crossroads, continue its
march towards Wellington; the 2nd Brigade
was turned around, marched back to the main
road, and followed the 3rd Brigade. Neither
arrived in time to take part in the fighting. [72]
Thus between 6 and 7 p.m., Zieten’s
troops remained on the road from Ohain towards
Wellington’s left flank, although the
delay at least allowed the 1st Brigade, the
Reserve Cavalry and their artillery to close up
more before marching onwards towards
Wellington’s left. [73]
If they had turned off to the
south, they may have arrived too late to assist
Blücher, and may even have added to the congestion
caused by the almost simultaneous arrival
of II Corps. [74]
As it was, according to Müffling’s memoirs, Zieten was in action only
a quarter of an hour after being persuaded to
resume his original march, although for a solution
to have been negotiated and agreed must
have taken considerable time. [75]
On the other hand, the arrival of the rest
of IV Corps and the head of II Corps during
this hour may have eased Blücher’s need for
troops, making the presence of I Corps less
imperative. Blücher appears in the end to have
become simply impatient for any action by I
Corps: Nostitz, Blücher’s ADC, says that he
was sent to Zieten at around this time:
“Already the battle had taken a decidedly
favourable turn for us, but still the prince was
not aware of the intervention of our I Army
Corps in the fighting on the English left wing;
therefore he sent me to General v. Zieten with
the order to arrange for the hastening of his
movements.
I came upon the head of the 2nd Brigade,
and was able to indicate to its commander,
General v. Pirch, precisely the direction to
which he must adhere, because until then he
had veered too far to the left.
As I reached General v. Zieten, he was
already making the necessary arrangements to
begin the attack with the troops he had with
him. He had hurried ahead with the cavalry
and the mounted batteries of the infantry, to
have the support, assured to the brave English
army, take effect as quickly as possible.” [76]
Left Wing History (2) Prussian I Corps
Left Wing History (1) Waterloo 1815: Vivian's 6th Cavalry Brigade
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Generalmajor Philipp Friedrich Carl Ferdinand, Freiherr von Müffling (1775-1851)
In his memoirs Müffling gives more detail
and says that he took an active personal
role: