Left Wing History (2):
Waterloo 1815
Another Reverse…?
by Gary Cousins, Germany
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1st Pommeranian Landwehr, by Steven Palatka Müffling described an attack by the French upon the Nassauers as soon as Vivian and Vandeleur move their cavalry brigades towards the centre. Reiche also says that during his second errand to the battlefield he saw that the Nassauers were in difficulty, but his account then tells what happened even after his dilemma on the Ohain road was resolved: “Before our eyes the enemy attacked the
village of Smolhain, still occupied by the Nassauers,
lying in front of their outermost left
wing, and took it. The Nassauers, who were
leaving the village, came back en debandade
upon our troops, who were just arriving. These
took the Nassauers, who at that time were
clothed very much in the French style, for
enemies, and fired upon them. Their commander
Prinz Bernhard von Weimar came
bounding up to General Ziethen, to clear up
the misunderstanding, which however was
done in such severe words that the General,
not knowing the Prinz, made no further apology
and retorted with utter cool: “My friend,
it is not my fault that your people look like
Frenchmen!” As luck would have it, I knew
the Prinz. So that no further unpleasant scene
might develop, I introduced both men to each
other…” [77]
Hence there was a successful advance
against the Nassauers, and an incident of
friendly fire, on the left wing, after the cavalry
brigades have left.
The official Prussian army report does
not mention either of these matters, but
Zieten’s official report said that the “English”
left wing had already been driven back when
his troops arrived, and the Tagebuch of I
Corps does tell of an attack:
“The cavalry which had been sent ahead
left Ohain lying to its left and went forwards
along the heights in the direction of
Schmouhen as quickly as possible. It arrived
on the outermost left wing of the English
army, consisting of Nassauers, at the moment
when these were being forced by the enemy to
vacate the village of Schmouhen. Through the
possession of Schmouhen by the enemy, the
4th and 2nd Army Corps, whose right wing
was near Frischermont, were separated from
the left wing of the English army, whose point
of support was Schmouhen. The enemy immediately
took advantage and pushed forwards
into the valley running from Schmouhen to
between the French and English positions,
with skirmishers as well as columns, in order
to attack the English left wing once more, just
as new columns were coming down from
Belle Alliance to support this attack. This was
happening when our cavalry appeared….” [78]
It is difficult to make sense of these
events, not helped by the fact that no doubt the
fortunes of the Nassau, Prussian and French
troops here fluctuated, and in their reports
they confused the names of the farms and
hamlets in the valley, and recorded conflicting
timings, such that it is difficult to delineate
attacks and pinpoint which places were in
whose hands at which times.
However, it seems that a stalemate had
existed until the early evening, with parts of
the valley – perhaps even parts of the same
farm or village – occupied by troops from
different contingents. If Zieten’s Prussians
were visible in the early evening towards
Ohain, it may have been hazarded that the left
wing could now hold out without them until
the Prussians physically arrived on the field,
and hence the two cavalry brigades here had
been moved towards Wellington’s right. [79]
Broadly speaking, Prussian reports – for example,
Zieten’s official report, and the Tagebuch
of I Corps and the accounts of Müffling
and Reiche cited above - suggest that, with the
Prussians of I Corps approaching but still not
in action, and Vivian’s and Vandeleur’s cavalry
brigades gone, the French exploited this
moment to attack the Nassauers and the Prussians
of Bülow’s IV Corps already here –
capturing farms and villages, and pushing
forward into the Ohain valley, thus separating
Bülow’ IV Corps from Wellington’s left wing.
Reiche’s account describes Sachsen-Weimar’s
Nassauers withdrawing; and perhaps
the sight of Nassauers, and Prussians of
Bülow’s IV Corps, falling back under a
French attack might have strengthened the
impression gained by the inexperienced staff
officer, mentioned by Müffling, of an army in
retreat; although if the Nassauers, who had
been anxiously looking out for the Prussians,
saw them halt and then turn around, this would
no doubt have hastened any retrograde movement.
The places lost to the French then had to
be retaken by the advance troops of I Corps –
and the unit reports describe the advance and
fighting against the French, who appear to
have put up some resistance, (although I
Corps’ losses on this day were only around
300, and not the 1,500 given by Zieten’s official
report). The French opponents in this area
were probably troops of Durutte’s Division,
and perhaps their attack may have been given
extra impetus by the general advance of the
remains of the French army, including the
weak remains of D’Erlon’s I Corps, which
accompanied the attack of the Imperial Guard
against Wellington’s main position. [80]
But on the French side, Durutte’s account
[81] states that he had already sent one brigade
(Pegot) to the French left, and another regiment
towards the Brussels road, in which case
he would only have two battalions and a few
pieces of artillery with which to attack, and
that D’Erlon’s Corps was already very weak;
and by this time the Prussian threat to his right
was clear and growing. Durutte also says that
around this time – he says 7 p.m., and that the
attack of the Imperial Guard upon
Wellington’s position was under way – he saw
a large number of troops in retreat, some of
which came towards his position, and he withdrew
with his remaining brigade (sic) intact,
although later he was accused of putting up
weak resistance to the Prussians facing them,
and his troops of causing a widespread panic
by their withdrawal.
The accounts of the Nassau troops assert
that by and large they maintained their positions
throughout the day: for example, the
account by Hauptmann von Rettberg of the 3/2nd Nassau Regiment (not to be confused
with his namesake commanding the nearby
Hanoverian foot battery), defending Papelotte,
says:
“…After 7 o’clock they [the French] suddenly
pulled back, without being compelled
by me. This event was just as inexplicable as
a heavy cannon- and musket-fire which appeared
to come from Smohain and Plancenois;
straight afterwards, my line, which I had
pushed forward up to La Haye, was forced
back by numerous skirmishers, followed by
infantry columns, as far as the road which
divides La Haye from Papelotte, and I was
even attacked by skirmishers from the hedges
in the rear of my position. While I drove the
latter back, I discerned that we were dealing
with Prussians. These at the same time convinced
themselves of their error, which did not
last ten minutes, but cost both our sides several
dead and wounded. I now abandoned
Papelotte, which I had maintained uninterrupted…,
[and] joined up with the Prussians advancing
along the road to Plancenoit…” [82]
Rettberg says that he advanced with the
Prussian 18th Infantry Regiment, which was
in Bülow’s IV Corps, but it not impossible
that they met somewhere on the way to Plancenoit.
Starklof [83] avers that the attack on the
Nassauers by the Prussians was a direct result
of I Corps wrongly taking the road leading to
Wellington’s position, and appearing unexpectedly
in the rear of the Nassauers. He accuses
the Prussian 12th (2nd Brandenburg)
Infantry Regiment, of I Corps, perhaps relying
upon Hofmann, who describes that regiment
coming close to opening fire upon some Nassauers,
[84] although the battalion reports of this
Prussian regiment appear to say nothing about this. [85]
Starklof further suggests that some
Nassauers may have been leaving their positions
for perfectly understandable reasons – to
help the wounded away and to fetch ammunition,
as well as due to “combat fatigue” –
which might have been mistaken for a withdrawal;
[86] and that when fired upon by Prussians
the withdrawal became contagious,
although not all units were affected. Shortly
after the battle, Sachsen-Weimar wrote a
private letter to his father, mentioning that his
Nassau troops fell back at this time, and that
he was only able to rally them some distance
from the battlefield. The letter was somehow
published in a newspaper, provoking strong
protests from the Nassau officers (and almost
leading Sachsen-Weimar into a duel with
General von Kruse of the Nassau service...):
they protested that the reason for their withdrawal
was that they had been attacked by
Prussians. [87]
It is all rather confused, as one might
expect, but if, as is suggested, the French were
allowed to achieve some success in this sector,
it is rather surprising – given that I Corps was
so close on the Ohain road but held up by the
conflicting orders and reports. That “friendly
fire” occurred – and there is some evidence
that it did, although by no means did it come
solely from the Prussian side – is also surprising,
especially after the earlier incident with
Bülow’s IV Corps.
It is interesting that Zieten’s official report and the Tagebuch of I
Corps do not mention the “friendly fire” episode,
and nor, in any of his accounts, does
Müffling, who was apparently there to ensure
that the Prussian arrival went smoothly.
Finally, the advance guard of I Corps
comprised cavalry accompanying artillery,
and at around 7 p.m. its batteries opened an
effective fire upon the French in the Ohain
valley and beyond. [88]
Reiche claimed to have been decisive in directing its deployment and
operation, [89] which is backed up by Zieten [90]
and by Nostitz. [91]
Fremantle, ADC to Wellington, told of
his return from his errand to the “Prussian
column” (see earlier):
“On my way back I found a Prussian
Battery of eight Guns firing between our first
and second lines, and desired the Officer to
cease firing. I returned to the knoll…, and
begged the Generals to send orders for the
Battery to cease fire.
“After a period of prolonged firing one
became aware of movement in the enemy
masses; rejoicing one saw how they started to
become unsteady, and by and by to break up,
finally losing all cohesion and all order.
It was not long before an adjutant of the
Duke of Wellington (if I am not mistaken it
was the then Colonel Freemantle) came, with
the request to cease firing, because the Duke
intended to advance with his entire line. This
request was complied with without delay…” [93]
Reiche does not mention Fremantle having
spoken to Zieten or any other generals, or
having joined Zieten’s I Corps as it approached
the field, or that the Prussian artillery
fire was coming dangerous close to
Wellington’s troops – although Prussian artillery
fire upon friend as well as foe is mentioned
in several accounts. [94]
Damitz relates this last episode in detail
simply to prove that Zieten intervened in the
battle before Wellington began his general
advance: [95] and despite the problems caused
by the delay on the Ohain road, French successes,
and friendly fire (which did not all
come from the Prussians), at least some cavalry
had been released to bolster Wellington’s
right, and at around 7 p.m. the Prussian I
Corps entered the action.
But arguably the greatest service came from Bülow’s IV Corps,
which tied down French reserves and ensured
that Wellington’s left wing suffered no serious
French attacks in the late afternoon and early
evening – the consequences of which would
have been something serious indeed.
Left Wing History (2) Prussian I Corps
Left Wing History (1) Waterloo 1815: Vivian's 6th Cavalry Brigade
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What happened when I Corps arrived on
the battlefield has also been the subject of
controversy: it would take much space to discuss
such issues, and probably with no conclusive
outcome, but mention will be made of a
few incidents in which Reiche and Müffling
were involved.
The last attack was now in full force, and
when the dense smoke cleared off, we saw that
the French were in full retreat.” [92]
Reiche recalled meeting Fremantle at this time: