Left Wing History:
Waterloo 1815
The Prussians Come Into Action
by Gary Cousins, Germany
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The action involving the Prussians between now and about 6 p.m. can be broadly described, [82] before looking at the accounts of some of Vivian’s troops.
General Graf Bülow von Dennewitz (1755-1816). By Robert Trossin (1820-1896).
At about 4.30 p.m., the Prussian IV Corps advanced into action, as Bülow described: “It was half past four in the afternoon, when the head of our column emerged from the Frichermont Wood [Bois de Paris]. The 15th Brigade under General Major von Losthin deployed quickly into battalion columns, pushing forward skirmishers, which the brigade and reserve artillery quickly followed,
and sought to gain the gentle height lying in front, for the time being protected by the brigade cavalry and the 2nd Silesian Hussar Regiment at the head. Immediately ground had been gained by advancing, the 16th Brigade under Oberst von Hiller moved out to the left, and the line formed itself in this fashion on the plateau between the ravine of Abbaye Aywiers and the ravine of La Haye.” [83]
Thus Bülow began a general assault against the French right flank between Fichermont and Plancenoit, the Prussians advancing under a cannonade from their artillery upon the enemy cavalry, which was also intended to make Wellington aware of the Prussian presence and to boost the morale of his troops. [84]
But as the official Prussian report by Blücher and Gneisenau stated:
“The enemy did not lose his presence of mind; he instantly turned his reserve against us, and a murderous conflict began on that side. The combat remained long uncertain, while the battle with the English army still continued with the same violence.” [85]
Indeed the Prussians soon faced the French infantry of Lobau’s VI Corps and of Durutte’s 4th Division of D’Erlon’s I Corps, the cavalry of Domon, Subervie and Jacquinot, and its attached artillery, and IV Corps was soon stretched – thinly in parts -- along this new eastern front between the valleys of the Ohain and the Lasne.
To the north, the 15th Brigade advanced, but French resistance was so strong that the attack became bogged down, and a French counter-attack appeared possible until the situation was stabilised by the arrival of the 13th Brigade towards 6 p.m. The 15th Brigade sought to protect its open flank, but also to link up with Wellington's left, by making a detachment, which advanced towards the villages and farms in the Ohain valley; and when the 13th Brigade arrived a part of it was sent to augment this force.
Thus: “The 15th Brigade detached 3 battalions towards the right flank to the chateau and village of Frischermont… …At this time (6 o’clock) General v. Hacke sent another 2 battalions, from the 2nd Neumark Landwehr Regiment, for the support of the troops who were fighting near La Haye and Papelotte. The chateau of Frischermont was taken and occupied by the Prussians, and thereby the right wing gained a point of support, and also the connection with the brigade of the Prinz Bernhard von Weimar was secured. The following Prussian battalions could be used to support
the fight for Smouhen [sic].” [86]
Bülow reported the successful actions of this detachment in the valley below Vivian’s station:
“The two right wing battalions of the 15th Brigade (the Fusilier Battalion of the 18th Infantry Regiment and of the 3rd Silesian Landwehr Regiment) under Major von Kowsky [Koschkull] chased the enemy out of the village of Frichermont, and thereby linked up with the left wing of Wellington’s army….
…The village of Smohain was taken, just like Frichermont, without great effort.” [87]
Bülow did not mention that, during what has been called this “symbolic union of German soldier with German soldier”, [88] the advancing Prussians and defending Nassauers fired upon each other, and not for the last time this day. As the Netherlands quartermaster-general, Major-General Baron J.-V. de Constant Rebecque, annotated the copy of Bülow’s report in his Journal: “It was the Nassau troops of the Duke of Saxe-Weimar’s brigade” who occupied and were chased out of Frichermont; and of the Prussian success in taking Smohain, Rebecque noted: “The Nassauers were here.” [89]
It appears that, at least at the beginning, there was no “full concert” between the two allied armies, as envisaged by Müffling. Indeed, if accounts from some of Wellington’s troops are to be believed (see
later), Bülow’s account may also have exaggerated the ease with which the Prussians achieved their success against the French hereabouts.
But the main goal for the Prussians was to take the village of Plancenoit to the south, and from there to push westwards, breaking into the French rear behind La Belle Alliance. Hence the 16th Brigade, after sending out its own flank detachment, and supported at first by most of the Reserve Cavalry, advanced and tried to manoeuvre around the French right flank. This resulted in the Prussian line becoming unbalanced: indeed at one point a gap developed between the Prussian left and right wings, which was plugged initially by the Reserve Cavalry and then by a part of the 13th Brigade.
Lobau skilfully followed the Prussian manoeuvre, redeploying most of his troops to the north of the village, and detaching a portion to occupy Plancenoit, which became the scene of several bitter struggles. It is difficult to distinguish the number and timing of the Prussian assaults here, but it seems that the 16th Brigade made the first attempt, perhaps around 6 p.m., and may have achieved temporary
success; but ultimately the Prussians were thrown back, as the French Young Guard and more artillery arrived to share the task of holding the village with Lobau’s troops. As the 14th
Brigade arrived, it was deployed in support of the 16th Brigade.
These early Prussian operations were witnessed by Vivian’s troops. Dyneley said:
“About five o'clock the Prussians came into action; we had seen the head of their column four hours before and were not a little anxious to see their first gun fire. They advanced with a very heavy body of cavalry in front, with which they charged the moment they came on the ground. This was a remarkably fine sight and our army gave them three cheers.” [90]
Taylor recalled: “At last we remarked the French vedettes in some commotion, and some Prussian tirailleurs began skirmishing with their right to the village in the bottom, and after a considerable
time the Prussians began to come up and form with their right to the village, Corps after Corps, extending to the left in a line at right angles with the French Line. They established Batteries which opened, and the French reserves formed to oppose them opening their Guns also. The Prussians kept their right stationary, but pushed on their left getting round the Enemy, so that before we moved to the
right, their right formed an acute angle [? with our Line]. I do not think the Prussians commenced seriously till about four o'clock, or later.” [91]
Ingilby wrote: “At length, however, about 5 o'clock, the advance of a Prussian Corps did make its appearance, hurrying up in a direction to pass the village of Papelotte.
The French up to this time, upon the whole, had succeeded so far, that it was on a plain or flat in advance of the ground on which they had commenced the Battle their line now fired from -- but their numbers were evidently greatly diminished, as well as our Line, for by closing in as the ranks became thinned, a large space was left between the right of Sir H. Vivian's and the left of the German Legion
[actually Hanoverian infantry]. The Prussian Corps, when their front had halted, in contact with the French skirmishers, arriving in successive straggling and broken parties, gradually formed, and at about six o'clock (not being then in any great strength or sufficiently collected) made a brisk advance perpendicular to the French Army to attack its right. The French had perceived the arrival of the Prussians, and we saw them prepare for this attack by wheeling some troops to the right from their Reserves, and taking Guns from the right of their great Battery. They then advanced against the Prussians and very quickly repulsed them. This took place exactly in our front, but without the effectual range of our 6-pounders, and as the slope of the ground descended [? ascended] towards us, we had a flank bird's-eye
view of both the Prussians and French in their movements, and that Corps of Prussians made no further progress or any effort that I saw, during the remainder of the Battle.” [92]
The report of the 1st Hussars of the K.G.L. also remarked:
“Finally after five o’clock in the evening [5 Uhr Abends] the Hussars met the head of the Prussian Army not far from the battlefield. After an attempt by the Prussian advanced guard on the right wing of the Enemy was repulsed, the former fell back to the edge of the wood, where the pass to St. Lambert begins, reformed itself here and awaited the heads of the other Prussian columns.”
[93]
In several letters to Siborne, Vivian went to some trouble to describe what he saw of the Prussian advance. In a published letter, Vivian described a small body from the Prussian right flank coming into action in the villages and farms below his station, which was soon driven back (a detail omitted from Bülow’s account):
“The first Prussians that came into action I should say were the advanced guard of a Corps not exceeding two Regiments, and supported by another; they passed the hedge of Papelotte, drew up across the valley in line almost at right angles with us. They were directly under where I stood, and I saw the operation as plainly as if at a field day. The French at once advanced against them (their left flank rather) and drove them back. They then occupied the village of Smohain or Papelotte, I forget exactly the name. This must have been somewhere between five and six o’clock. I should say nearer five.”
[94]
Vivian gave more detail in several (as yet unpublished) letters written to Siborne in February and April 1837. One of these letters responded to questions from Siborne about an attack upon Smohain, and the identity of the first Prussians seen by Vivian.
Vivian wrote: “…In reply to your first question as to any sudden attack on Smouhain [sic] I should say that when the advanced body of the Prussians was driven back (as I have said in a former letter without making much resistance) I think the French followed them & occupied Smouhain. There came a good deal of firing out the hedges & lanes below where I stood, & on my left as I faced the French position, & I have little doubt that the French then pushed into Smouhain. I did not observe any other attack in which they could have done so, & I feel confident it could not have occurred after I had quitted the left for shortly after that the Prussians must have been arriving there in force. The answer I have now given to your first question in part answers your second, viz. whether any part of Zieten’s Corps had reached our left before I quitted it. I have already referred to an advanced body of Prussian Infantry that arrived very early. Whether they belonged to Zieten or not I cannot say. It was some time after this that patrols I had sent to the left to look out came & informed me that the Prussians were advancing on the road from Ohain in force & their advanced cavalry had come on…”
[95]
Vivian’s optimism that the arrival of Prussians in force, after he had left, ruled out any later attack upon Smohain, proved to be ill-founded. As to the identity of the Prussians, about which Vivian was uncertain, it is clear from the description that this Prussian infantry which arrived very early was from Bülow’s IV Corps -- for Vivian goes on to say that it was some time after this that his patrols found Prussian cavalry advancing from Ohain –- which was unmistakeably the later appearance of the advanced guard of Zieten’s I Corps. Siborne valued Vivian’s information, as
shown by its discernible influence on Siborne’s account of the advance of Bülow’s troops in this area:
“The three battalions already mentioned as having been detached to the right, had, by this time, reached Smohain. Their advance in that direction had been conducted with so much caution, that they debouched from the south-eastern inclosures of the village most unexpectedly for both the Allied troops in that vicinity, and the infantry forming the extreme right of the French front line. The Prussians continued to advance; crossed the principal fence which separated them from the French extreme right, and drew up in line almost at right angles with the direction of the enemy's front - two battalions in line, with the third in support. It was half-past five o'clock when this took place. The French at once advanced against them, whereupon the Prussians retired, and after regaining the hedges in the valley, lined the latter as skirmishers, and maintained a vigorous and successful tiraillade with their opponents ...” [96]
Although Vivian (and others) saw the arrival and attack of Bülow’s troops directly below his position, with regard to the fighting at Plancenoit he was not exactly an eye-witness: as he wrote in one of these letters: “In reply to your questions respecting Planchenoit [sic]. You are aware that from where I stood I could not see that village. For the most part therefore my answer must be determined rather by what I heard than what I saw.” He recalled that after the first Prussians arrived, he heard “a considerable firing” from the rear of the French right, which seemed to him to indicate a Prussian attempt to get around the French flank. However, the French then began “a tremendous cannonade” and appeared to regain ground, though as Vivian said, “…from my position I could not see what was occurring.”
He saw French troops leaving their positions just in front of where he stood to join the fighting around the French right flank, and when later his brigade left the left wing for the centre “the battle was going on about Plancenoit, and a very severe fight to judge from the [noise?], both of artillery and musketry, it appeared to be.” [97]
A few days after sending this letter, Vivian sent a sketch-map to Siborne to illustrate his description. Vivian marked his own standpoint, well in front of the crest of Wellington’s position, where he appears to have stood for as much of the day as possible. French troops moving from below Vivian’s position to join the fighting around Plancenoit (as described in his letter) are visible, as are (just – in a corner of the sketch-map) the French troops already fighting around Plancenoit. However, the Prussians at Plancenoit are not shown -- and the village itself is not even labeled as such. [98]
By 6 p.m. the entire Prussian IV Corps was on the battlefield, and Blücher was ordering his troops into another assault upon Plancenoit, when a plea for help arrived from Thielemann, whose III Corps was engaged near Wavre. [99]
But Blücher himself needed reinforcements, and they were only just coming into view.
“This was the crisis point of the day for the Prussian Army. Blücher’s main attack was faltering, his reinforcements were coming up too slowly, his ally’s defences were showing signs of crumbling under the French assault,
and now his line of retreat was in danger of being cut.” [100]
Some of those reinforcements -- Zieten’s I Corps -- were heading towards Vivian’s Brigade on Wellington’s left wing. But how events pulled Vivian westwards and Zieten to the south, creating a gap
which the French exploited, will be the subject of the next piece.
Left Wing History Waterloo 1815: Vivian's 6th Cavalry Brigade
Left Wing History (2) Prussian I Corps
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