Left Wing History (2):
Waterloo 1815
A Struggle At All Points…
by Gary Cousins, Germany
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Reiche says: “Amid the repeated hold-ups on the march, and the delay to the
same thereby produced, I hurried forward to discover the state of the
battle, and to assess in which way the first Army Corps could successfully
intervene there.” [36]
Reiche was not specific about from where he set off on his
mission: but news of the attack upon Thielemann’s III Corps at
Wavre – the details of which he reports inaccurately even though
writing with hindsight – apparently reached I Corps before he left,
and since this attack began in earnest at around 4 p.m., the advance
guard should have been more than half-way to the main battlefield.
Reiche tells what he saw as he reached the battlefield:
“As I emerged from the wood onto the
plateau of Ohain, the battle was in full swing
before me. To the right, in the direction of
Mont St. Jean, Wellington’s army; and to the
left, beyond Frichemont towards Plancenoit,
the Prussian army (the second and fourth
Army Corps) under Blücher’s personal command.
The enemy army had been forced to draw
back its right wing and divide itself. On the
attack against Wellington, and on the defensive
against Blücher, the battle was in lively
progress at all points. It was difficult to form
a meaningful picture of the whole; however, I
could tell this much, that the enemy still in no
way stood at a disadvantage.”
Reiche describes the deployments of Wellington’s and Napoleon’s armies: of the
former it is said, inter alia:
“When I came onto the battlefield after 6
o’clock in the evening, the left wing of
Wellington’s forces had been drawn in more
towards the centre, for its reinforcement, as far
as to the road which leads from Mont St. Jean
to Papelotte and Smolhain. The latter were
still in Wellington’s hands; however La Haye
Sainte had already been taken by the enemy,
and there was still lively fighting for the possession
of Goumont.
Blücher with the second and fourth corps
was in battle around Plancenoit, which the
enemy had occupied as a point of support for
his right wing during Blücher’s advance, and
was defending with the utmost tenacity…
…By the drawing in of Wellington’s left
wing towards the centre, an interval had developed
between Blücher’s and Wellington’s
forces, into which Ziethen’s army corps
moved, and in this manner came into the flank
of both of the French battle lines opposing
Blücher and Wellington….”
He continues:
“When I reached the battlefield, I was
closest to the English army, and I headed there
as a priority, to report that our army corps was
approaching. First I came upon the Nassau
troops, forming the left wing of the English
army, and it was not long before I met our
General von Müffling, attached to the English
headquarters. From him I learned that the
Duke was anxiously awaiting our arrival, and
had repeatedly declared that time was running
very short, and that if we did not arrive soon
he would have to retreat. Müffling added that
the Duke had already strengthened his centre
at the expense of his left wing, and it was
therefore urgent that Zieten should link up
with that wing; and I was to direct the corps
accordingly.”
We will look at some aspects of the battlefield,
especially as they affected events on
the left wing, as Reiche arrived “after 6
o’clock in the evening”. [37]
The left wing was still occupied, if
sparsely in places. The losses sustained, especially
during D’Erlon’s attack, had created
gaps, and the remaining infantry had closed up
to the right. The front line infantry here now
comprised the brigades of Lambert, (which
had been stationed in reserve behind the centre
since it arrived that morning), Kempt, and
Best: the brigades of Pack and Vincke had
been moved to behind the centre, (the latter
had been moved out of the front line shortly
after the failure of D’Erlon’s attack), and the
remains of Bijlandt’s Brigade were also in
reserve.
Best’s Brigade had also drawn closer
to the centre during the afternoon, although its
troops had also tried to spread out towards the
left to try to fill the vacancy between it and
Sachsen-Weimar’s Nassauers, who still held
their position on the extreme left. Ingilby of
Gardiner’s troop R.H.A., attached to Vivian’s
Brigade, tells of the situation after 5 p.m. that:
“Their [the French] numbers were evidently
diminished, as well as our line, for by
closing in as the ranks became thinned, a large
interval was left between the right of Sir H.
Vivian’s and the left of the German Legion
[actually Best’s Hanoverians].” [38]
Earlier the cavalry brigades of Vivian and
Vandeleur had closed somewhat to the right,
the former leaving the 1st Hussars of the
K.G.L. in an outlying position in observation
on the left, but they were still close to where
they had begun the day, and the guns of Gardiner, Rettberg and Stevenart were still present.
These changes, made for consolidation
and reinforcement (according to Reiche, and
to Müffling when he spoke to Reiche – see
later), created the space into which parts of I
Corps eventually moved. They were necessary
because of losses suffered, and to bolster the
centre; they were possible because, after the
failure of D’Erlon’s attack early in the afternoon,
there were no formed attacks upon the
left wing: during the ensuing French massed
cavalry attacks, which lasted for perhaps two
hours, hostilities on the left wing were restricted
to skirmishing and artillery fire, and
occasionally forays against the far left, as
accounts by the Hanoverian and Nassau
troops stationed here testify. [39]
Not so the right wing: as Müffling observed,
describing the situation just before the
French massed cavalry attacks:
“Thus far (it might be four o’clock) the
battle had been bloody enough, but nowise
dangerous for the English army…
…From four o'clock, the enemy directed
his whole force against that part of the position
between both high roads, occupying the
left wing of the allied army no more than what
was necessary to prevent it from detaching
reinforcements…” [4]
Wellington had deployed most of his
forces, including his cavalry, to the right from
the beginning of the battle. But the cavalry
was still outnumbered and stretched; and by
the time Reiche arrived upon the field their
numbers and effectiveness was greatly diminished:
evidently not counting the Netherlands
cavalry in his estimation, Siborne says:
“The British and German cavalry-brigades,
with the exception of Vivian’s and
Vandeleur’s on the left, were reduced to less
than the ordinary strength of regiments –
Somerset’s and Ponsonby’s brigades united
did not comprise two squadrons.” [41]
Vivian also records:
“…the other Cavalry of the right having
suffered most severely, there remained only
the Cavalry of the left, Sir J. Vandeleur’s and
Sir H. Vivian’s Brigades, effective.” [42]
As the cavalry attacks began to peter out,
the French launched another attack in the centre,
upon La Haie-Sainte, defended by troops
of the King’s German Legion and Nassauers
under Major Georg Baring of the 2nd Light
Battalion K.G.L. By the time Reiche reached
the field, it had already fallen to troops of
Donzelot’s Division of D’Erlon’s I Corps. The
timing of its fall is uncertain, but may have
been between 6 and 6.30 p.m.
The French now pushed forwards again:
while Reille’s II Corps attacked Hougoumont,
and the main position behind it, D’Erlon’s I
Corps - the remains of Donzelot’s, Allix's and
Marcognet's Divisions, along with Pegot’s Brigade of Durutte’s Division
(brought across from the right earlier to support the attack upon La
Haie-Sainte), approached the ridge and attacked the centre. Both of
these corps were already weakened by their earlier exertions –
D’Erlon’s Corps by its failed attack on the left wing and its efforts
against La Haie-Sainte, Reille’s by the fighting for Hougoumont.
Nevertheless, a desperate crisis ensued, as French artillery and skirmishers
were deployed at close range against Wellington’s line.
The danger was particularly great upon the centre right, immediately
by the Brussels road, where Lieutenant-General Carl Graf von
Alten’s 3rd British-Hanoverian Infantry Division, comprising the brigades
of Ompteda (K.G.L.), Kielmannsegge (Hanoverian) and C.
Halkett (British) were stationed, as was Kruse’s Brigade (Nassau)
which appears to have acted with this division from the 17th June
onwards. Alten’s Division was particularly weak and unsteady, having
suffered assaults of artillery, cavalry, and infantry. But the French now
deployed artillery near La Haie-Sainte against the centre, and although
this was soon silenced by rifle fire, large bodies of infantry then used
La Haie-Sainte as cover to ascend the ridge and deploy in a thick line
of skirmishers.
The situation deteriorated further, and support was thin:
for want of ammunition, damage or exposure to fire, the artillery in
front of the Division was almost completely unserviceable; and the
cavalry directly behind Alten’s Division was insufficient, comprising
only the remains of the 3rd Hussars of the K.G.L. and of the British
heavy brigades. When the 5th Line Battalion of the K.G.L. was pushed
forwards, despite the protest of its brigade commander Ompteda that
French cuirassiers were nearby, and with predictable consequences, the
3rd K.G.L. Hussars intervened to try to rescue their compatriots, with
some success, but they were soon outnumbered and forced to retire.
Alten (who according to Siborne sent the fatal order) was soon
wounded and left the field, (followed shortly afterwards by the Prince
of Orange, who at least had seconded the order), and Kielmannsegge
took over command of the division. The French attack did not abate:
more infantry and artillery were deployed, and closer and closer, as the
battle reached its climax.
Wellington’s concern, as passed on to Reiche by Müffling, was
understandable: in the face of these attacks against his centre and right,
he had to shore up his position. Most of the reinforcements came from
the right, where they had been in reserve. The shifting of the left wing
towards the centre had already taken place, and the only significant
movement of troops from there at this time was the redeployment of
Vivian’s and Vandeleur’s light cavalry brigades from the extreme left
at some time between 6 and 7 p.m. – of which Vivian’s 6th (Light)
Cavalry Brigade was deployed to support Alten’s Division – a movement
which will be treated in more detail in part 3.
Whatever he may have agreed to with the Prussians, Wellington
was also looking for direct support: Müffling’s history says:
“On the left wing towards Papelotte, it had been observed, that the
enemy’s efforts were directed against the centre.
To reinforce it, a message was sent to the 1st Prussian corps
expected from Ohain, requesting it to hasten its march upon Papelotte.” [43]
Müffling does not name the messenger, but Lieut.-Colonel J.
Fremantle of the 2nd Foot Guards, one of Wellington’s ADCs, recalled
that he was sent on such an errand:
“…Towards six o’ clock Sir Horace Seymour [Captain of the 60th
Rifles, and an ADC to Uxbridge] came and reported to the Duke of
Wellington that he had seen the Prussian Column.
The Duke called upon me to go to the head of their Column, and
asked for the 3,000 men to supply our losses.
Blucher [sic] had not arrived, but Generals Zieten and Bulow were
at the head of the Column, who gave me for answer – that the whole
Army was coming up, and that they could not make a detachment. I said
I could return [sic – did Fremantle mean “could not return”?] to the
Duke with such a message. [44]
The errand shows Wellington’s anxiety at this point, although the
mention of a specific number of troops required is an odd detail. But
then, the answers Fremantle says he received are also questionable, but
unfortunately it is not clear who gave them. Fremantle says he was sent
to the head of “the Prussian column”: Siborne said that these Prussians
were the advance guard of Zieten's corps, and that Fremantle accompanied
them to the battlefield, [45] although Fremantle himself does not
mention this. Fremantle says that he delivered his message to Bülow
and Zieten, who were at the head of the column - but they arrived
separately and at different times. Moreover
Blücher was with Bülow, yet Fremantle says
Blücher had not yet arrived. There is even
doubt about whether Fremantle spoke to even
Zieten – Zieten never mentioned it, although
Reiche mentions Fremantle speaking to him,
(see later). It must be said that Vivian does not
seem to have thought much of Fremantle’s
testimony on other issues: “…As to what
Freemantle may so, he must be dreaming…” [46]
In fact the Prussians were already in action,
and their position at around this time has
been summarised thus:
“On 18 June at about 6 p.m., when the
great battle was at its height, Blücher's men
were either committed to the battle at Mont St
Jean or the fighting at Wavre or were on the
move. IV Corps was in battle with the French
VI Corps and the Young Guards. Plancenoit
had begun to make itself felt as a centre of
gravity, and this required Napoleon's attention
as much as the increasing commitment of his
reserves - up to now almost half of what had
been meant for a push against the English
front. II Corps was on the march to Plancenoit
with the 5th Brigade; the 6th Brigade was
close behind, and the 7th and 8th Brigades
were on the march from Wavre. The advanced
units and cavalry of I Corps had moved past
Ohain and were in sight of the English positions.
III Corps had successfully warded off
all the attacks of Grouchy's troops [near Wavre].” [47]
The Tagebuch of I Corps (quoted earlier)
undervalues the Prussian contribution up to
this point: things had changed on the battlefield.
Whether the French switched their attention
so distinctly from Wellington’s left to his
right in mid-afternoon because of the Prussian
threat, or for some other reason, must be left
open. But the ensuing French cavalry attacks
made such an impression upon the Prussian
command, observing events from the cover of
the Bois de Paris, that it was decided to advance
into action, at around 4.30 p.m., despite
the low number of troops which had so far
arrived.
The growing Prussian threat tied
down French reserves, and distracted
Napoleon’s attention from the attacks upon
Wellington, and ruled out any massed attacks
on the left of Wellington’s position. It also
hindered any communication he might want
with Grouchy at Wavre, [48] where
Thielemann’s III Corps kept occupied a
French force far superior in numbers to his own.
Nevertheless, when Reiche arrived things
were not going well for Blücher. Already he
had received a plea for help from Thielemann
at Wavre, [49] but he needed more troops where
he was.
The French - Lobau's VI Corps and
Durutte’s Division of D’Erlon’s I Corps -
were offering strong resistance to the Prussian
IV Corps, which was spread from Fichermont
to Plancenoit. An advance by the battalions
detached to secure the Prussian right flank had
been forced to withdraw again, although at
least it gained a foothold here.
On his left wing Blücher had ordered the capture of Plancenoit,
in order to strike at Napoleon’s flank and rear.
He had opened his effort with only two brigades
of IV Corps in place, the others arriving
only by 6 p.m. [50] The II Corps had been unable
to move off until midday, owing to delays in
IV Corps’ advance, and only its 5th Brigade
made it to the field in time to take part in the
fighting, arriving between 6 and 7 p.m. - perhaps
towards the latter, although Reiche says
that II Corps was already engaged when he
arrived. [51]
Over the next hour this force would
prove insufficient to take and hold Plancenoit
against the troops of the French Young Guard
and Lobau, and finally two battalions of the
Old Guard. There is some evidence that some
of the troops detached to the outermost Prussian
right wing were being drawn in to the
main body at this time, much as Wellington’s
left wing had been drawn towards the centre.
Vivian, having witnessed the first advance of
Bülow’s troops below his position, says that
after they were forced to withdraw, they
“…remained quiet as long as I was there.
Perhaps they moved to the left and joined in
the attack on Plancenoit.” [52]
Hofmann says that when he later led troops of the 24th Prussian
Infantry Regiment and other units of I
Corps into Smohain and then left towards
Fichermont, he saw no troops of the right
flank of Bülow’s IV Corps, apart from a cavalry
regiment, and he rejects Siborne’s statement
that I Corps linked up with IV Corps
here. [53] Siborne places some of the battalions
earlier detached by Bülow to the extreme right
in a formed attack by Bülow’s right wing upon
Lobau’s troops at about 7 p.m. [54]
At all points the struggle continued: the
French were by no means at a disadvantage,
and there were strong forces drawing Wellington
to his right, and Blücher to his left, as
Zieten’s I Corps approached Wellington’s left wing.
Müffling’s instructions to Reiche at this
point are therefore not surprising:
“Oberst von Reiche, who had hurried
ahead of the advance guard of Zieten’s Corps,
met General Müffling, in order to orientate
himself over its intervention. General Müffling
stated to him what was required: a hastening
of the march; the advance guard
strengthened by a 12-pounder battery on the
heights behind Papelotte (where the Nassauers
were); the reserve batteries to advance with
speed and join the English left wing. The
Oberst quickly understood this and hurried
back to implement it.” [55]
Reiche continues:
“With this instruction I hurried back to
the column, and having decided not to waste
time by first looking for General Zieten, who
was further back, I gave the advance guard the
appropriate direction in the light of that instruction,
and hurried forward again to await the corps.” [56]
Reiche does not say where he met up with
the advance guard again, but it was after 6
p.m., and from that time Zieten’s advance
guard was arriving at Ohain (see earlier).
Reiche says that he now returned to the
battlefield a second time:
“On returning to the battlefield I found
that the situation had much deteriorated. The
Nassau ranks had slackened and their guns
were already in the process of leaving. I did
my best to prevent anything worse happening,
assuring them repeatedly that the first Prussian
Army Corps must arrive at any minute...”
There seems to have been little point to
this second errand, apart from to see how
things had developed.
Left Wing History (2) Prussian I Corps
Left Wing History (1) Waterloo 1815: Vivian's 6th Cavalry Brigade
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Lieutenant-General Karl (Charles), Graf von Alten (1764-1840)