Left Wing History (4):
Waterloo 1815
Lack of Order
by Gary Cousins, Germany
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Wellington and his staff: copy of an 1824 painting by J.W. Pieneman (1779-1853). Meant as a tribute to the Prince of Orange (bottom left, wounded) the painting also features Wellington and many of his staff, including Fremantle (left, arm raised) and De Lancey (wounded, bottom right). The painting was not meant to be historically accurate: for effect, and to flatter Orange, Pieneman included important figures who (because killed or wounded earlier in the day, or for other reasons) were not present when Orange was wounded. If Vivian was telling the truth, still his account only gave his own narrow perspective, and the accounts of others suggest that more was going on than it disclosed. One possible reconciliation begins with Wellington’s intention to bring Vivian’s brigade in from the left as soon as possible, which would have been communicated and reiterated to all who needed to know. Perhaps, having received Wellington’s early order (through De Lancey), and Uxbridge’s instructions to all brigade commanders a little later, Vivian obeyed Wellington: he did not engage with his brigade during D’Erlon’s attack, and all afternoon limited his actions to keeping a lookout for the Prussians. But the staff officers visiting the left wing to check upon the progress of the Prussians, no doubt passing on news of events further to the right, were a constant reminder to Vivian of his earlier instructions. No fresh order could be given until Zieten’s Prussians were finally seen approaching; and when this happened, Vivian decided to move his brigade away from the left, but failed to persuade his senior officer Vandeleur to do likewise. In fact, if neither Vivian nor Vandeleur received fresh orders later in the day, both could arguably justify their conduct with reference to orders received earlier in the day. Vivian had hitherto obeyed his earlier order from Wellington, which implied that, as soon as the Prussians were sighted, his brigade would be released for action elsewhere; and when the Prussians were at last seen approaching, and knowing that cavalry was needed in the centre, Vivian used his initiative – perhaps in the spirit of Uxbridge’s order – and moved. As for Vandeleur, he was justified in resisting Vivian’s proposal to move both brigades to the centre: he had not received an early order from Wellington, and judged that Uxbridge’s instructions had not given him scope to leave the left wing with his brigade unless told, even though he was surely also aware of the shortage of cavalry in the centre and of the Prussian approach (indeed he may also have taken into account that Zieten had not yet joined the left wing). Instead Vandeleur waited until Uxbridge came out to the left, on his way to deliver formal orders to both him and Vivian. As Uxbridge, informed of the Prussian approach, made his way to the left, he met Vivian, leading his brigade towards the centre. Uxbridge congratulated him, and issued a formal order to Vandeleur to follow. No-one could have foreseen that Vivian’s movement would be followed by the hold-up of the advance guard of Zieten’s Prussian I Corps on the Ohain road, and the late French attack against the far left: but damage was limited when Zieten’s troops eventually joined and fought on the left wing, and Vivian’s Brigade gave much-needed support for the centre and made important charges towards the end of the battle. Given these results and the outcome of
the battle, perhaps Wellington was forgiving
in 1815, for no action was taken against Vivian.
Certainly Siborne believed his old chief
Vivian, [49] or if he did not, he was prepared to
indulge this “soldier’s tale”, for the version in
History largely repeated Vivian’s account. But
many distinguished old comrades of Vivian
claiming roles in this episode subscribed to or
read History when it was published in 1844
(two years after Vivian’s death): their silence
acknowledged either that its account was
largely truthful, or that they too were very
indulgent, because there is no record in
Siborne’s papers that any of them were indignant
and objected to History’s version (the
only dissent came from Müffling, as explained
earlier).
If Vivian’s account and History were not
truthful, exactly what happened to bring
Vivian’s and Vandeleur’s Brigades in from
the left wing requires another explanation, and
is still not exactly clear from the accounts of
others who claimed involvement.
Whether or not one believes Vivian’s
claim, it is suggested that Siborne’s version in
History was an incorrect and incomplete summary
of events on the left wing on the 18th
June. The claims of others, and the broader
picture and the detail of what really happened
which they might give, were largely ignored.
There is no overview of Wellington’s intentions
for the cavalry on the left wing, nor any
detail of how he carried through those intentions
during the day, probably through Uxbridge
and perhaps involving Müffling, and
by the constant use of staff officers. History
compounded the early order to Vivian from
Wellington (through De Lancey) – not otherwise
mentioned in History – with the errands
of staff officers throughout the afternoon –
details of which were largely omitted, and
Delancey Barclay’s specific errand was forgotten
– into the statement that Vivian had
“understood from Sir William Delancey and
other staff officers” that there was a shortage
of cavalry in the centre, thus leaving the false
impression that De Lancey personally told
Vivian of this situation in the early evening.
Uxbridge’s early instructions to his brigade
commanders are only briefly mentioned elsewhere
in History; [50] and his belated order to
Vandeleur, and the order which Seymour delivered
to Vivian when he arrived in the centre
(omitting Seymour’s name to spare his feelings),
are the only orders in the early evening
mentioned in History; and what his staff said
was ignored. Müffling’s claims are also given
no place, for reasons stated earlier.
It is a pity that Siborne appears not to
have investigated this matter further with
those who claimed involvement and who were
still alive. It is true that some accounts were
not available to Siborne (for example Lady de
Lancey’s Narrative of 1816 was not published
until almost a century later); and De Lancey
died in 1815 and Delancey Barclay in 1826.
But many of those involved were Siborne’s
correspondents: for example, all of Seymour’s
letters, including the one in which he claimed
to have delivered an order to Vivian, were
written in 1842, five years after the original
letter of 1837 from Vivian. Vivian could have
been quizzed up until his death in 1842, and
all of the others before the 1st edition of History
was published in 1844; indeed most lived
to see History run to a 3rd edition in 1848, and
outlived Siborne (died 1849).
But there is no such correspondence in Siborne’s papers.
However, whether intentionally or otherwise,
Siborne’s History may have got one
aspect right, for although Wellington is not
mentioned in Vivian’s account, at the end of Siborne’s version Vivian is praised for his
action by Uxbridge, who was not “much
pleased at what I had done”, as in Vivian’s
account, but “…much pleased to find that the
Duke’s wishes had thus been anticipated...”.
It was what Wellington had wanted all
along.
Left Wing History (4) Vivian’s 6th (Light) Cavalry Brigade on the 18th June 1815
Left Wing History (3) Vivian’s 6th (Light) Cavalry Brigade on the 18th June 1815
Left Wing History (2) Prussian I Corps
Left Wing History (1) Waterloo 1815: Vivian's 6th Cavalry Brigade
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It may be “a matter of perfect indifference
to history”, but did Vivian act without orders?