Left Wing History (3):
Waterloo 1815
Vivian’s 6th (Light) Cavalry Brigade
on the 18th June 1815
by Gary Cousins, Germany
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“…no sudden & confused retreat…” The Prussians to Vivian's Left… “Wellington, who seemed to have acquired
a thorough insight into his opponent's
designs, having satisfied himself that his position
was destined shortly to be again assailed
by a formidable force, became anxious for the
arrival of the Prussian troops expected on his
extreme left…” [1]
By 7 p.m., as that “formidable force”
prepared its assault, all of Bülow’s Prussian
IV Corps had arrived, and the heads of the I
and II Corps were about to enter the battle.
Bülow wrote in his report that “…from 3
o’clock in the afternoon he [the enemy] had
renewed his attacks with doubled vigour, and
clearly showed the intention to throw back the
left wing of the English and to separate them
from us…”; [2]
yet by the time Bülow actually observed the battlefield and intervened, the
French focus had actually shifted towards
Wellington’s right.
However, perhaps impressed
by the French massed cavalry attacks
and the resulting long silences in Wellington’s
artillery fire, Bülow entered the fray at around
4.30 p.m. Only part of his troops had arrived,
and it was much later than originally hoped
for; but from then on there were no massed
French attacks on Wellington’s left wing.
But with his forces stretched across the
eastern side of the battlefield, Bülow’s attack
became bogged down.
On the Prussian left wing, several assaults were made upon Plancenoit,
until Napoleon sent part of his last reserves,
two Old Guard battalions, which threw
the Prussians out and back towards their original
positions, to await the arrival of support.
Perhaps the speed with which Plancenoit was
recaptured led Napoleon to think that he had
secured his right flank, and contributed to the
decision to throw his remaining reserves into
that attack which Wellington now awaited.
Bülow’s efforts on the Prussian right
wing were also stalemated; and it was beyond
the Prussian right wing that Zieten’s Prussian
I Corps now approached. After an unaccountable
delay in leaving Bierges (near Wavre),
and further delays during its march, its advance
guard reached Ohain at around 6 p.m. It
was then held up on the road leading to
Wellington’s left wing, after receiving an order
from Blücher (who wanted troops to join
or support the push against Plancenoit) and
(perhaps) a report that Wellington’s right
wing was retreating.
The advance guard at last
arrived on Wellington’s left wing at around 7
p.m.: the rest of the corps, amidst further
confusion and delay, arrived too late to take
part in the fighting.
I Corps was led by part of its cavalry,
which was unable to do more at first than fill
the gap on Wellington’s left, caused by the
movement of troops towards the centre, which
had already occurred during and following
D’Erlon’s attack in the early afternoon. But the
massed French cavalry attacks (from 4 to 6
p.m.) created a shortage of cavalry for
Wellington’s right; while the capture of La
Haie-Sainte (at around 6-6.30 p.m.) was followed
by a general attack along Wellington’s line.
Efforts to secure urgently-needed direct
support from Zieten, for which Wellington was
as impatient as Blücher, had failed, so infantry
reinforcements for the centre and centre-right
were drawn from reserves already there.
The only reinforcements brought in from
the left at this time were the light cavalry
brigades of Vivian and Vandeleur, which between
6 and 7 p.m. moved to augment the
depleted cavalry and to support the weakened
infantry on Wellington’s right. They could do
so because Zieten’s I Corps was approaching
Wellington’s extreme left from Ohain.
In a published letter, Vivian described
seeing how the French threw back the first
advance by Bülow’s forces directly beneath
his station, which “…must have been somewhere
between five and six o’clock. I should
say nearer five.”; and then said:
“It was a considerable time after this that
the Prussians appeared in force. They [we]
remained long enough for me to see the
French reserve and right form line en potence
in order to meet the attack on Planchenoit,
and I was surprised to see the tremendous fire
the French were able to direct against the
Prussians. It was just as this took place, that I
moved to the right.” [3]
Vivian recalled elsewhere that:
“About six o’clock I learnt that the cav-alry
in the centre had suffered terribly, and the
Prussians having by that time formed to my
left, I took upon myself to move off from our
left, and moved directly to the centre of our
line…” [4]
Among the unpublished letters from Vivian
to Siborne are several from February and
April 1837, in which Vivian told Siborne what
he saw of the Prussians on the left wing.
Vivian was concerned to describe only what
he saw and heard, or what he thought he saw
or heard. He told Siborne that he could not
offer anything in reply to questions about the
fighting around Plancenoit, because it was not
visible to him.
However, he did relate how the
first troops of Bülow’s IV Corps came into
action early to his front and left, and were
easily driven back by the French. [5]
In one of these letters (some of which has
already been published in part 1), Vivian answered
queries from Siborne about an attack
on Smohain in the early evening, and about
whether any of Zieten’s I Corps had reached
Wellington’s left wing before Vivian moved.
To the first question, Vivian said that the
French must have captured Smohain after they
had pushed back the first Prussians of Bülow’s IV Corps:
“I did not observe any other attack in
which they could have done so, and I feel confident
it could not have occurred after I had
quitted the left, for shortly after that the Prussians
must have been arriving there in force.
The answer I have now given to your first
question in part answers your second, viz.
whether any part of Zieten’s Corps had
reached our left before I quitted it. I have
already referred to an advanced body of Prussian
Infantry that arrived very early. Whether
they belonged to Zieten or not I cannot say.
It was some time after this that patrols I had sent
to the left to look out came & informed me
that the Prussians were advancing on the road
from Ohain in force & their advanced cavalry
had come on, so that I saw them from a point
on the left of our position & rather to the rear
of the little lane. To that point I rode purposely
to look out on hearing that they were coming.
On seeing that there was no longer any apprehension
of our left being turned, & hearing
from Col. Delancey Barklay [or Barclay] that
Cavalry were wanted in the centre, that [sic] I
proposed to Sir O. Vandeleur to move with his
Brigade and mine, he was the senior officer,
although we acted separately, towards the
centre where we might be of service. Sir O.V
objected to moving without orders, & I then
put my own Brigade in motion & passed along
the rear of Sir O.V.’s Brigade, & soon after
having commenced my march I met Lord
Anglesey [Uxbridge], who was
much pleased at what I had done, and
sending orders to Vandeleur to follow,
proceeded to accompany my
Brigade towards the centre, passing
immediately at the bottom of the
slope behind the position in which
stood Sir T. Picton’s Division”. [6]
In answering the first question,
Vivian answered the second. The
“advanced body of Prussian Infantry”
was part of Bülow’s IV Corps, which
attacked to Vivian’s front and left. What Vivian
later saw coming on in the distance towards
Ohain, and which induced him to quit
the left, was the cavalry of the advance guard
of Zieten’s I Corps, coming on towards
Wellington’s left wing.
By the time Vivian quitted the left, Zieten’s Prussians had not
arrived in force, because if they had, Vivian
conceived that the French could not have captured
Smohain (and one might suppose that, if
the French had made another attack on the far
left while Vivian was still there, quitting the
left might not have been justified).
Siborne valued the information in this
letter: a note written on the envelope reads:
“Movement of the Prussians, and also of his
own Brigade towards the centre. Important –
very clear” – and its contents formed the basis
of Siborne’s account in History of the movement
of Vivian’s brigade from the left. What
Vivian could not say for sure, Siborne said for
him: that at the time of Vivian’s movement,
Bülow’s IV Corps had arrived and formed to
Vivian’s left, but Zieten’s I Corps had not
directly joined the left:
“It was shortly before the columns of
attack [of the Imperial Guard] were put in
motion that Vivian, whose hussar-brigade it
will be recollected, was posted upon the extreme
left of the Anglo-allied line, was informed
by patroles which he had detached to
look out to his left for the expected arrival of
the Prussians, that the latter were advancing
in force along the road from Ohain.
Having satisfied himself as to the fact, and perceiving
their advanced cavalry coming on, Vivian felt
that there could be no longer any apprehension
of the left of the army being turned; and,
having previously understood from Sir William
Delancey and other staff officers, that
fresh cavalry was much wanted in the centre,
he proposed to Vandeleur, who was on his
right, and who was his senior officer, that the
two brigades should move towards the centre,
where they might be of service. Vandeleur
declined to act without orders; whereupon
Vivian put his own brigade in motion, passing
along the rear of Vandeleur's, and soon after
having commenced his march he met Lord
Uxbridge, who was much pleased to find that
the Duke's wishes had thus been anticipated,
and sent orders to Vandeleur to follow, accompanying
the former brigade himself to-wards
the centre, passing along the foot of the
slope in rear of the position of the left wing of
the Anglo-allied line.
The Prussian troops, whose advance had
thus induced Vivian to quit the extreme left,
were the advanced guard of Zieten's corps,
and consisted of a part of the 1st infantry-brigade…;
as also of a part of the reserve-cavalry…
The remainder of the reserve-cavalry which
was commanded by Lieut. General Röder, together
with the main body of the corps, were still
considerably in the rear…These troops did not
reach the field of battle until after the victory had been decided.”
[7]
Siborne is clear, and appreciates the distinction
between approaching and joining: p.
329 of History, on which this passage begins,
is headed: “Zieten approaches the Duke’s
Left”. Later Siborne writes: “It will be recol-ected
that Vivian's, and subsequently, Vandeleur's
brigade, quitted the left of the
Anglo-allied line, on the approach of the advanced
guard of Zieten's corps towards that
point….” before describing the French attack
on the far left before Zieten’s troops arrived. [8]
Only on p. 353 of History does Siborne use the
header: “Zieten’s Advanced Guard joins the
Duke’s Left”.
For some reason, in Siborne’s History,
the wording of the praise given to Vivian for
this action was changed, so that Uxbridge
“was much pleased to find that the Duke's
wishes had thus been anticipated”.
But more noteworthy is the fact that the way in which
Vivian learned of the shortage of cavalry in
the centre - in Vivian’s original account,
through “Col. Delancey Barklay [or Barclay]”
-- has become in Siborne’s account “Sir
William Delancey and other staff officers”: a
matter which will be explored in a future piece.
Left Wing History (3) Vivian’s 6th (Light) Cavalry Brigade on the 18th June 1815
Left Wing History (2) Prussian I Corps
Left Wing History (1) Waterloo 1815: Vivian's 6th Cavalry Brigade
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