Left Wing History (3):
Waterloo 1815
Situations Across the Front
by Gary Cousins, Germany
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The Condition of the Left Wing… According to several Prussian reports, in
the early evening the French were able to
launch an attack and gain ground in the Ohain
valley, and Wellington’s left wing had been
somewhat forced back, by the time Zieten’s
Prussians arrived. [28]
Among Wellington’s troops who remained
on the left after the cavalry had gone, the Nassauers
on the far left, who came under “friendly
fire” from Zieten’s I Corps, had reason to recall
their arrival, although (as mentioned in part 2)
their accounts disputed the circumstances and
outcome of the attack upon them.
However, other troops on the left wing,
who were part of (or for the time being attached
to) the 5th British-Hanoverian Infantry
Division, and were at this time posted on its
left, also recalled Zieten’s arrival.
Hauptmann von Rettberg, of the Hanoverian
Foot Battery no. 2, recalled Zieten’s arrival
at or shortly after 7 p.m., with a
numerous body of cavalry which took up position
to his rear, and a battery which relieved
his own. [29]
Otherwise unoccupied due to the
lack of ammunition, Rettberg withdrew his
battery to near where Zieten’s cavalry was
posted, and went off to witness events in the
centre. [30]
One of his officers, Lieut. Lewis
Heise, put the Prussian appearance at
“…toward evening at about 6 o'clock.” [31]
Oberst Best, commanding the 4th Hanoverian Infantry
Brigade, left several accounts, which are inconsistent
in some details, but noted the arrival of the Prussians:
“At about 6 o'clock pm we descried the
heads of columns of a Prussian corps under
General Bülow defile through the wood from
the village Smohain, their artillery soon began
to cannonade the right of the enemy's
position…The rest of the Prussians under old
Blücher [by which is meant Zieten’s Corps]
soon followed, their cavalry forming behind
our left to be at hand when required….” [32]
Best said that at about 7 p.m., when the
Imperial Guard advanced to attack:
“The 6th Division was formed on a height
between La Haye Sainte and Papelotte, behind
a hedge of bushes running along these
heights, intersected in its immediate front by a
deep gutter (ravine). Consequently the 4th
Brigade with a company of Hanoverian foot
artillery were in the same line…
…As the Prussians had at this moment
begun their attack on the enemy's right, there
was little danger for our left, except in the
event of our right being repulsed. Our left was
therefore only to be considered as steady
spectators of the struggle, merely exposed to
the enemy's cannonade.” [33]
Another report by Best from 1824 said:
“Towards 6 o’clock in the evening we
saw the smoke of artillery to the left, between
the two opposing armies, and soon descried
that the 4th Corps of the Prussian army was
defiling towards us, and soon afterwards was
attacking the enemy right wing at Plancenois.
This circumstance inspired our troops with
new courage, and no more did we doubt the
happy outcome of the battle. Towards 8 p.m.
our left wing was reinforced by the approach
of the 1st Prussian Army Corps, which defiled
towards us through Ohain…. Our left wing
was now free: the Prussian cavalry formed up
behind my brigade, to be able, where it was
necessary, to act there.” [34]
From the reports of Best and Rettberg, it
does not sound like their troops were under
great pressure at the time of Zieten’s arrival
(the deployment of the Prussian cavalry near
Best and Rettberg on Wellington’s left wing is
given in History [35] ).
For sure, Rettberg’s battery
had withdrawn from the front line due to
lack of ammunition; and according to one
British account, by Major General Sir John
Lambert, Best’s Brigade also withdrew some
distance behind the ridge, under sharp French
skirmisher fire, and perhaps also suffering
from a shortage of ammunition with which to
reply.
But, thanks to fire from the British
brigades in the front line to the left of the
Brussels road, under Kempt (now leading the
5th British-Hanoverian Infantry Division) and
Lambert, which also covered Best’s Brigade,
the French were unable to advance to physical
contact and make any serious impression. [36]
Shortage of ammunition did not prevent
another interesting “friendly fire”
incident,which apparently happened some
time later, and perhaps involving Best’s Brigade,
which is related in the history of the 1st
Westphalian Landwehr Infantry Regiment, of
the 1st Brigade of Zieten’s I Corps: “…The
English left wing had withdrawn, and Hauptmann
Bennert was sent forward with the skirmishers
of the 1st Battalion and the 1st
Markaner Jäger detachment to seek out contact
again. The wavering English took the
Prussian detachment for the enemy, and fired,
until the lack of reply cleared up the error.” [37]
Some accounts from the 1st Nassau Regiment
suggest that the French got behind the
rear of the left wing at around this time, but
they are ambiguous, and perhaps not dependable,
because this regiment was posted on the
right of the Brussels road, and it is not clear
how, in the heat and smoke of battle, such an
occurrence could have been seen from there;
[38] certainly Best, stationed on the left wing,
said that he could not see what was happening
in the centre and on the right. [39]
It is, of course, possible that some accounts
were written with a degree of circumspection,
and it is clear that the left wing was
under severe pressure from artillery and skirmisher
fire, and no doubt parts wavered at times.
According to Siborne, Sir Denis Pack,
most of whose brigade was in the second line
of the 5th Division, and had dwindled to “a
mere handful of men”, approached Vandeleur
as he passed later on his way to the right,
“…and having told him he had received orders
to hold his ground until the last, consulted him
as to the most advisable course to be pursued
in case of a retreat.” [40]
But Wellington’s public message to his troops – no retreat -- was clear,
whatever were their private thoughts (and
whatever might have been said by Müffling,
according to Major Graf Gröben, chief of staff
to the I Corps Reserve Cavalry [41] ).
So it is questionable whether or not the
left wing had been physically forced back at
this point. Vivian does not suggest that it had,
and might have been expected to notice and
perhaps do something if it had.
The situation on the centre-right…
But on the right when Vivian arrived the
situation was more serious, if not desperate:
Vivian wrote:
“On the right of the road, and in front of
the ground to which I afterwards moved after
passing the road, there appeared to be a more
serious attack, & there was some shouting, but
I saw no sudden & confused retreat such as
you speak of. I must tell you however that
during the whole of my movement from the left
to the right, & especially when I halted &
formed line, the impression on my mind was
that our troops were getting the worst of it on
our position, & that Vandeleur & I should
have to cover the retreat, & when I got the
orders, as I understood to form line, in the
plain below [?] the slope at the back of our
position, I was persuaded it was for this purpose.”
[42]
Ingilby was evidently more confident at
this point: he wrote:
“This movement of Sir H. Vivian's Bri-gade
gave rise for a moment to misgiving as
to the result of the Battle, that it was to cover
the retreat of the Army. From the details,
casually heard in the presence of Sir William
Delancy [sic], I expressed a different expectation,
which was soon proved…” [43]
The “details” referred to are those which
Ingilby “casually” overheard being given to
Vivian by Colonel Sir William Howe De Lancey,
the Deputy Quartermaster General, before
the battle started - not to engage, and to keep
itself intact, until the Prussians should arrive…
Left Wing History (3) Vivian’s 6th (Light) Cavalry Brigade on the 18th June 1815
Left Wing History (2) Prussian I Corps
Left Wing History (1) Waterloo 1815: Vivian's 6th Cavalry Brigade
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