Left Wing History (5):
Waterloo 1815
Vivian’s 6th (Light) Cavalry Brigade
on the 18th June 1815
by Gary Cousins, Germany
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Generalmajor Freiherr August von Kruse (1779-1848) Oberst Freiherr Christian von Ompteda (1765-1815) The Loss of La Haie-Sainte and Afterwards “…the French were rather driving in our
right. Our Brigade, followed by Light Dragoons,
moved away to the right; formed close
to the infantry, which was retiring; advanced
only 50 yards in rear of them in a most heavy
fire. They beat the charge, drove the
French…” [1]
Siborne’s Task
When Vivian’s 6th Cavalry Brigade arrived
from the left wing towards the end of the
battle, it supported Alten’s 3rd British-Hanoverian
Infantry Division, which was deployed
on the immediate right of the Brussels road,
during the final French attacks.
It is not proposed to tell the full story of
the battle at this period, or to sort out the
controversies, [2]
but to tell what Vivian and his
men saw (or thought they saw) and did, as
they supported the centre-right, based upon
their accounts and Siborne’s History.
Siborne needed accurate information
about troop dispositions and operations for his
Waterloo model and History. He persisted
with his plan for a model to show that
“moment so definite, so distinct, and so critical”
– the defeat of the French Imperial Guard
– in the face of doubters in the military establishment
at Horse Guards.
But Siborne had no experience of battle, and he was over-optimistic
(and perhaps arrogant) about the ease with
which his correspondents would be able to
recollect the formation and position of their
troops, and of the French troops opposing
them. [3]
For the part in the story played by
Vivian’s Brigade and Alten’s Division,
Siborne could call upon the accounts he obtained
from surviving British officers, and,
through Captain Lewis Benne of the Hanoverian
service, reports about the Hanoverian and
K.G.L., Brunswick and Nassau contingents. [4]
Vivian was particularly keen to give information:
not only did he write many personal letters to Siborne, but also he gave him
material collected from former officers of his
brigade: Siborne also contacted many individually
(allowing Vivian to comment upon their letters).
Many cautioned Siborne as to the potential
pitfalls: Lieutenant-Colonel Murray of the 18th Hussars wrote:
“There is a great deal more difficulty
attending all narrative of this nature than is
imagined by those who have not seriously
attempted it; for when varying circumstances,
witnessed at the time under great interruption,
are sought historically after the lapse of many
years, suggestion occurs as remembrance, surmise
as fact; the difficulty then, with whatever
veracious intention, is to tell the truth, the
whole truth and nothing but the truth.” [5]
… while Lieutenant Bacon of the 10th
Hussars sympathised:
“I am well aware of the difficulties attending
the description of any field of battle,
and that you have chosen is perhaps surrounded
by more than most others, on account
of the improbability of distinguishing anything
that passed beyond your own immediate
position on account of the columns of smoke
that hung over the field during the whole day.
The conflicting accounts you have received
must no doubt be numerous, and the selection
a most difficult task.” [6]
Siborne later lamented:
“Had I been aware that so much difficulty
would have arisen in clearing up the circumstances
attending the last attack by the Imperial
Guards, as well as the [various?] actions
of the previous half hour, I should probably
have selected another period of the action. It is
now however too late, and I must persevere
with my original design…” [7]
As we shall see, Siborne’s account of
what happened on the centre-right was necessarily
a distillation and quite impressionistic.
Alten’s Travails…
Alten’s Division comprised the three brigades
of (from left to right of Wellington’s
position) Ompteda (K.G.L.), Kielmansegge
(Hanoverian), and C. Halkett (British); and in
addition, Kruse’s Nassau Brigade (the 1st
Nassau Regiment) acted with Alten’s Division
during the day.
The Germans of Alten’s Division had
already suffered greatly. From Kielmansegge’s
Brigade, which had detachments helping
to defend Hougoumont, the Lüneburg
Battalion had been cut up and scattered by
French cavalry when it was sent to reinforce
the garrison of La Haie-Sainte in the early
afternoon, and a jäger company was driven
back with heavy loss. [8]
From Ompteda’s Brigade,
the 2nd Light Battalion, and elements of
the 1st Light and 5th Line Battalions, had
defended La Haie-Sainte all day.
Later in the afternoon, during the French cavalry attacks,
the 5th and 8th Line Battalions had advanced
in line against a force approaching from near
La Haie-Sainte, but a body of cuirassiers
which had just unsuccessfully attacked
Kielmansegge’s Brigade took these troops in
the flank: the 5th Line Battalion was supported
in time by Somerset’s 1st (Household)
Cavalry Brigade; but the 8th, on the left and
charging, had its right wing cut down and
dispersed, its remains collecting in rear of the
hollow-way. [9]
Nassau accounts stated that the
1st Battalion of the 1st Nassau Regiment was
in the front line before the battle began, between
Kielmansegge’s and Halkett’s Brigades,
where it suffered heavy losses during
the day, and that in the late afternoon, after it
was thrown into disorder by heavy artillery
fire, its square lost 1 ½ companies to a French
cavalry attack. [10]
At around 6 p.m., their cavalry attacks
upon Wellington’s right having failed, the
French renewed their attack upon La Haie-Sainte, [11]
“…covered by a vigorous fire from
the French artillery against that portion of the
Anglo-allied line immediately in rear of this
post, in order to disturb any attempt to relieve
or assist its defenders.” [12]
The farm was lost at around 6.30 p.m., but with most of the French
infantry and cavalry already exhausted and
reduced in numbers, or tied down by the Prussian
threat to the French right, and Napoleon
reluctant to commit his last reserves from the
Imperial Guard, it was followed up by a
“grand attack en tirailleurs”. [13]
Ompteda was now ordered to deploy a
battalion against the large body of French skirmishers now pressing against the left of
Alten’s Division. He hesitated to obey, knowing
that there were cuirassiers nearby, but the Prince
of Orange ordered him to comply, and so the 5th
K.G.L. Line Battalion advanced and was cut up,
and Ompteda, at its head, was killed: its withdrawal
was covered by the 95th Rifles and the
3rd K.G.L. Hussars, who were however forced
back by supporting cuirassiers. [14]
According to History, the French attack
upon Alten’s Division - by Donzelot’s Division
of D’Erlon’s I Corps, supported by cavalry
- was incessant from the time La
Haie-Sainte was lost, and increased in intensity
as the general attack across the whole line,
which accompanied that of the Imperial
Guard, progressed. [15]
The infantry on the centre-right had received
little reinforcement, and was about to
suffer a great crisis.
“…Exposed as Alten's division had been
to the most furious assaults of artillery, cavalry,
and infantry, the British and German brigades
of which it was composed had become
awfully diminished; and the facility which the
possession of La Haye Sainte now afforded
the French for continuing their desperate endeavours
to force that part of the Allied line,
rendered the situation of these troops extremely
critical…” [16]
Captain Shaw (later Shaw Kennedy) of
the 43rd Foot, AQMG to Alten’s Division,
was a correspondent of Siborne who later
wrote his own account of the battle, based
heavily upon History. According to Shaw,
after La Haie-Sainte fell:
“The French lost no time in taking advantage
of this, by pushing forward infantry supported
by guns, which enabled them to
maintain a most destructive fire upon Alten’s
left and Kempt's right, and to drive off
Kempt's light troops that occupied the knoll in
his front. By this fire they wasted most seriously
the ranks of the left of Alten's and the
right of Kempt's divisions; so much so that
Ompteda's brigade having been previously
nearly destroyed, and Kielmansegge's much
weakened, they were now not sufficiently
strong to occupy the front which was originally
assigned to them.” [17]
Major Baring of the 2nd K.G.L. Light
Battalion escaped from La Haie-Sainte and
returned to the main position: he was injured
when his horse was shot, but after about half
an hour he found a replacement and returned
to the front:
“…and riding up again I met my friend
Colonel Shaw, who will remember our conversation.
Shaw then made off in search of the
Duke, and I was informed, that during my
absence the enemy had brought up some guns
close to the position in the fields on the right
of La Haye Sainte, and there being no guns in
our line to answer their fire, they had badly
treated General Kielmansegge's brigade and
thrown it into confusion. Colonel Shaw and
myself, we saw neither troops nor guns on the
left of Halkett's Brigade, nor did I see any
afterwards until the moment of the general
advance.” [18]
In another account, Baring did not go
quite as far, saying: “…I saw that the part of
the position, which our division had held, was
only weakly and irregularly occupied...”, [19]
but clearly matters had become desperate.
Left Wing History (5) Vivian’s 6th (Light) Cavalry Brigade on the 18th June 1815
Left Wing History (4) Vivian’s 6th (Light) Cavalry Brigade on the 18th June 1815
Left Wing History (3) Vivian’s 6th (Light) Cavalry Brigade on the 18th June 1815
Left Wing History (2) Prussian I Corps
Left Wing History (1) Waterloo 1815: Vivian's 6th Cavalry Brigade
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