Reviewed by Charles Vasey
John Mosier for Profile Books This is one of those dreadful books, written by a quasi-historian, which sells a message that many readers want to read, but which it spells out with sloppy argument. Equally (like many such books) there is a lot of useful stuff here, except that it is not the useful stuff that the author believes. Mosier is one of those unfortunate men cursed with Language Dilution, armies are never defeated, they are completely defeated, Plumer is not just a competent general, he is the only competent Allied general. Overworking his superlatives and cranking up his absolutes, Mosier leads splendidly with his jaw. His book has three themes: firstly, that the Allies nearly always lost more men (usually a several times more) than the Germans. He definitely does not believe that the Somme (for example) had equal losses. This is a sensible conclusion (though the multiples may not be) in so far as losses exceed those of the Germans (since British and French killed outpace those of Germany, even forgetting the Eastern Front) though he points out that it was not known during the war by the Higher Commands. Secondly, that the Allied commands told dreadful fibs about how well they were doing, and overestimated their enemy's losses. This is also pretty sensible though Mosier cannot realise that deliberate lies about how much terrain had been captured do not prevent the Allies believing the higher losses really existed (they are liars and fools). Indeed, the trumpet-blowing may have nothing to do with the dreadful failure of intelligence. The result of all this is that the Allies kept bashing away fondly imagining the Germans were about to collapse, whereas in fact they might as well have taken the time to equip and train properly (just like Mosier's heroes - the American Army). Tempted by the beautiful Sirens of Victory Haig and Joffre came a dreadful pearler while curmudgeonly Pershing avoided this. So far so good, even if his arguments do not always quite get the working-out they need. His third theme is that America won the war. Shocked by Belleau Wood (the battle that saved France Mosier tells us) the German command went into a terminal decline at the thought of the elite US Army and gave in sharpish (…….and called him Macaroni). Oh dear me yes. Mosier reckons the Boche did well in combat for a number of reasons, Firstly their troops were more professional in training and spirit. Secondly, they were generously supplied with effective heavy artillery. Even before the arrival of the Stosstruppen the Germans were fixing their opponents and bashing him about the head with shells (This led to the BEF being "routed" Mosier tells us). Whereas the poor old Frenchies and daft Brits with limited trajectory weapons just kept charging in with the bayonet and getting killed. Nothing very surprising there I would suspect. Mosier chatters on in detail on 1914and 1915 but runs out of patience with 1916 and onward and goes through in much less detail. Although he admits the Allies improved they never improved fast enough and (with Dennis Winter's poisonous writings in tow) they are simply opposing flesh and blood against shells. Brusilov's work is avoided (after all with his low artillery strengths he should not really exist) and the Germans are repeatedly lauded. Unfortunately Mosier is too keen the partisan author. The Germans in 1915 certainly had an annoying habit of waiting until the French took aim and then pre-empting them. This left the French to batter away too small a target that they seldom retook. He therefore reasons that when they wanted the Germans could crumble territory easily. What the Allies spent much time to take the Germans could easily retake (see the March 1918 battles) - except against the Americans of course - and could then afford to abandon if. So although he admits (painfully) that the British did retake rather more territory than the Americans he says this was because the Germans could afford to lose it, they simply would retake it when they wanted, and they inflicted considerable losses on the BEF (the "Never Touched Me" meets the "Stab in The Back" argument). The last point (the losses) is certainly true. Old Duffer's Book Corner Book Reviews
The Northern Wars 1558-1721 1688: A Global History Richelieu And Olivares Warfare At Sea 1500-1650 Louis XIV The Renaissance At War The Great War and Modern Memory Battles of the Greek And Roman Worlds Histoire Militaire des Guerres Puniques Dictionnaire des Maréchaux de France The War The Infantry Knew 1914-1919 The Great War The Byzantine Wars The French Civil Wars The Somme The Myth of the Great War The Wars Of The Ancient Greeks Histoire de l'armée française de 1914 à nos jours To The Last Man: Spring 1918 Flodden 1513 Verdun 1916 The Mediterranean In The Ancient World The National Army Museum Book Of The Boer War La Bataille d'Abbeville Soldier Sahibs The Celtic Empire The Imperial War Museum Book of 1918 War And The World: Military Power And The Fate of Continents Back to Perfidious Albion #103 Table of Contents Back to Perfidious Albion List of Issues Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List © Copyright 2004 by Charles and Teresa Vasey. This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other military history articles and gaming articles are available at http://www.magweb.com |