Napoleon’s Eagles (Part 4)
Russia 1812

Road to Berezina

by Kevin Birkett, FINS, Eire

26th October to 22nd November 1812

On the 26th October the Grande Armée, its personnel filled with a sense of foreboding at what lay ahead, began its slow and painful march to safety. To the fore marched the Imperial Guard followed by Ney and Murat, then Eugène and Poniatowski, and finally Davout and Grouchy. From the very beginning the retreat was fraught with difficulties and dangers especially for the rear guard. Harassed by Cossacks at every step the men of Davout’s rear guard were often obliged to halt to repair bridges damaged by the army’s long train of baggage. Assigned the arduous duty of guarding the wings and rear during the day and foraging at a great distance during the night, Grouchy’s cavalry were soon so fatigued that they were threatened with destruction.

Perceiving this Davout sent the cavalry to the front of his corps and resolved henceforth to guard the rear of the Grande Armée with infantry alone. For three days Davout continued his lonely task at the rear of the retreating army. Special care was taken to ensure safety of those wounded at Maloyaroslavets, and to destroying ammunition wagons whose teams had succumbed to the rigours of the march, however nothing could save Davout’s own wounded who were from necessity left to the tender mercies of the Cossacks.

Arriving in Mojaisk, via Borovsk and Vereya, on the 29th the army was strengthened by the addition of Junot’s and Mortier’s corps. The fillip to morale these additions brought was soon counter-balanced by the melancholy sight of the corpse-haunted field of Borodino. At every turn the soldiers of the Grande Armée encountered broken carriages, dismounted guns, helmets, cuirasses, muskets and, most disturbing of all, the half eaten remains of their former comrades. Such sights were guaranteed to cause even the stoutest of hearts to quail. Not wishing his army to suffer such sights Napoleon ordered that no corps should spend more than one night in the vicinity of that dreadful field.

Davout’s rear guard quitted Borodino on the morning of the 31st and that night bivouacked in the town of Gzhatsk. As the I Corps resumed its march on the morning of the 1st November, the Grande Armée was already becoming dangerously separated; Napoleon and the Guard had entered Viasma on the 31st.

Much of the fault for this lay with the nature of the country between Gzhatsk and Viasma which, consisting of narrow defiles through marshland, constantly delayed the baggage encumbered column. Straggling dangerously the retreating army presented a tempting target for the Russians, an opportunity they were quick to take advantage of.

Following the battle at Maloyaroslavets Kutusov had withdrawn the main Russian towards Kaluga intent on avoiding another bloody combat. Having learnt that Napoleon had reached Mojaisk Kutusov set out in pursuit believing that the French were taking the road to Vitebsk rather than that of Smolensk. However it soon became apparent which was the true line of retreat and orders were issued to take the road to Medyn and Juchnov with a view to intercepting the French in the vicinity of Viasma.

On the 3rd November Miloradovitch, commanding Eugen of Württemberg’s Sec-ond Corps and the cavalry of Korf and Was-siltschkov, struck some five miles east of Viasma driving the rear brigade of Eugène’s corps and the remnants of Poniatowski’s corps back on the head of the I Corps.

Davout’s advance guard, Gérard’s division, quickly re-established communications with the rest of the IV Corps however for the remainder of the day the I Corps was forced to conduct its retreat under a shower of balls from Miloradovitch’s more numerous artillery. As night fell the last troops of the I Corps defiled through Viasma having lost a great number of men. These losses, though great, would have been much worst had not Eugène dispatched Broussier to aid Davout and Ney had not held Viasma against elements of the main Russian army.

Allowing his troops some repose in a wood beyond Viasma, where huddled around campfires they dined on horseflesh, Napoleon ordered that henceforth Ney should command the rear guard.

On the 5th Napoleon reached Dorogobouge, followed by Eugène on the 6th and the other corps on the 7th and 8th. While in Dorogobouge the Emperor received disquieting news from a number of fronts that at last alerted him to the Tsar’s designs.

On his southern flank, in Volhynia, Schwarzenberg and Reynier had been unable to detain Tshitsagov who, detaching Sacken with 25,000 men to watch over the Austro-Saxon corps, was marching with 35,000 men on the Berezina.

Meanwhile Wittgenstein’s First Corps had driven Oudinot and St. Cyr from the banks of the Dvina. Faced with the threat of 70,000 men uniting on his communications Napoleon reacted quickly. Schwarzenberg and Reynier were ordered to desist in their attempts to resist Sacken’s advance on Warsaw and to march, together with Durutte’s division of the XI Corps that was en-route to assist them, with all possible haste after Tshitsagov. Meantime Victor was instructed to combine with Oudinot and drive Wittgenstein back to the Dvina.

To replace Victor, Loison’s division of the XI Corps was ordered from Königsberg on Vilna while Baraguey d’Hilliers was recalled to Smolensk. Napoleon left Dorogobouge on the 6th November with the remainder of the army, all except Eugène’s corps, following in his wake on the 7th and 8th. Eugène had been ordered to take the road of Dukhovshchina in the hope of find some kind of subsistence in that direction.

Leaving Dorogobouge on the 8th the IV Corps found shelter that night in the castle of Zazelé.

The following day they set out again intent on crossing the Wop, a small stream that during the advance on Moscow had caused them no difficulties. Unfortunately the incessant snow had turned the stream into a raging torrent. Eventually a ford was found by which the corps could cross. At this point the Wop, its steep sides glistening with ice, could only be crossed where a gentle declivity had been dug to descend to the river. Initially the wagons and artillery of the IV Corps crossed without difficulty however before long deep ruts began to appear in the soft earth rendering the ford impassable for the remainder of the artillery and baggage.

At this moment clouds of Cossacks descended on the hapless column compelling the abandonment of a hundred pieces of cannon, numerous ammunition and provision wagons and a great number of droskis, the elegant little Moscow carriages used by many officers to transport the spoils of the occupation of the Russian capital. That night the men of the IV Corps encamped on the bare snow, their feeble fires barely sufficient to broil slices of horseflesh or to melt a few morsels of ice, while all the time listening to the cries of their wounded comrades deserted on the opposite bank or to the savage shouts of the Cossacks as they ransacked the baggage.

Continuing the retreat Eugène’s men entered Dukhovshchina on the 10th and, having rested a day in Dukhovshchina, on the 13th finally rejoined the Grande Armée in the suburbs of Smolensk. They had lost a thousand men and all their artillery and baggage; nevertheless the sight of the great city on the Dnieper filled them with hope. Those hopes though were soon to be dashed.

Napoleon had entered Smolensk on the 9th November to be greeted by the sight of nearly empty magazines rather than the eight to ten days worth of supplies he had been relying on. Having entered the city at the head of the Imperial Guard he forbad entry to any others in the hope of eking out its meagre supplies.

Those that followed, indignant at the assumed preferential treatment given to the guard, revolted forcing the city’s gates and pillaging the magazines that lay within. So it was that when Eugène and Ney, who had gallantly held Dorogobouge for two days before fear of encirclement had driven him from his post, entered Smolensk they found it bereft of supplies.

The supply problem was not Napoleon’s only care during his brief sojourn in Smolensk. Soon after his arrival he was greeted by the news of the destruction of Baraguey d’Hilliers’ division.

Baraguey d’Hilliers had originally been ordered to march on Jelna during Napoleon’s advance on Maloyaroslavets. Subsequent events had rendered this order superfluous however it was only while in Dorogobouge that the Emperor countermanded it.

With the countryside alive with Cossacks the imperial couriers stood little chance of delivering the vital message and so was that the isolated division blundered into the main Russian army. Arriving back in Smolensk with a handful of other fugitives, Baraguey d’Hilliers was ordered to quit the army and repair to Paris and await the verdict of a military commission.

This was not the only bad news to reach Napoleon. News from the south indicated that Tshitsagov had made further progress towards Minsk and its vast magazines.

Schwarzenberg meanwhile still dithered, unable to decide whether to pursue the Russian Admiral or halt Sacken’s advance on Warsaw. A similar state of indecision reigned further north. Victor and Oudinot had successful united on the banks of the Oula but, through a gross exaggeration of the enemy’s numbers, had declined to attack the Russians and had instead spent their time fruitlessly marching and countermarching between Lepel and Senno.

Departing Smolensk

To remain in Smolensk was no longer an option. Accordingly on the morning of the 14th November Napoleon departed the city accompanied by the Imperial Guard. Much had changed in the Grande Armée since Maloyaroslavets.

The prestigious Imperial Guard had been reduced to 11,000 effectives; Davout, following the inclusion of Baraguey d’Hilliers’ wreaked division, could muster 12,000 men; Ney 5,000; Eugène 6,000; Junot 1,000 and Poniatowski only 800 men.

Meanwhile Murat’s once proud cavalry corps had been reduced to just 500 mounted men.

To increase the speed of its march Napoleon had decreed that the army should depart Smolensk in echelon. Thus the Guard, preceded by some dismounted cavalry under Sebastiani, departed on the 14th, Eugène on the 15th, Davout on the 16th and finally Ney on the 17th.

On the evening of the 15th Napoleon approached Krasnöe only to learn that Sebastiani had been obliged to shut himself up in a church; besieged by a strong force of Russians. Having freed his subordinate Napoleon learnt with dismay that Kutusov with the main Russian army was no longer dogging his rear but was approaching Krasnöe from the south. Halting the Guard in Krasnöe Napoleon prepared to face the Russian onslaught.

Kutusov however had no intension of assaulting the elite of the Grande Armée but instead planned to cut it off from the remainder of the army. Leaving Smolensk the French had to cross a defile before entering Krasnöe.

This defile, consisting of a bridge thrown over a deep ravine through which flowed the River Lossmina to fall into the Dnieper some six miles below Krasnöe, was chosen by Kutusov to fulfil his designs. Approaching this position on the evening of the 16th Eugène discovered the corps of Miloradovitch barring his way. The trap had been sprung.

Having watched the remnants of Ornano’s cavalry repulsed by the Russians, Eugène deployed his corps to mount a general attack on this formidable position. Placing Broussier to the left of the road and the remainder of his command, including the Poles and Westphalians, on the road, Eugène advanced.

However it soon became apparent, as Russian cavalry and grapeshot poured down from the hills to the left, that the position could not be forced. With night falling Eugène conceived a stratagem for saving the bulk of his command. Ordering Broussier to resume his attack, in the growing gloom Eugène defiled to his right seeking a ford on the plain near the Dnieper.

After two hours marching he finally entered Krasnöe much to the joy of his stepfather. Eugène had escaped but at a terrible cost, in addition to Broussier’s sacrificed division the blood of some 2,000 dead and wounded stained the snow.

The arrival of Eugène’s bloodied corps at last alerted Napoleon to the proximity of Kutusov’s army. A decision had to be made. Should he retire on Orsha as planned or await the arrival of Davout and Ney? Unhesitatingly he chose the latter. His plan was simple.

Leaving Eugène in Krasnöe he would accompany the Guard to the plateau overlooking the Lossmina and there await the arrival of his subordinates.

To gain himself some room for manoeuvre, that night he ordered Roguet’s Young Guard Division to attack a Russian column that had encamped just two miles from Krasnöe. Advancing with bayonets fixed the guardsmen fell on the sleeping Russians massacring all who could not flee.

The 17th dawned cold and clear, the ground cloaked by hoar-frost. On the left bank of the Lossmina, to the south and southeast of Krasnöe, the guard stood under arms, Russian artillery fire playing on its ranks, while to the east the sound of musketry announced the arrival of Davout. Davout had risen early that morning to personally reconnoitre the road ahead. Some three miles from the ravine he encountered the wreck of Broussier’s division, just 300 men, and the parks of artillery, which had been under the care of Eugène.

Apprised of what lay ahead the marshal resolved to cut his way to safety. Forming his four divisions in close columns, Friant’s division, now under the command of Ricard, had been loaned to Ney, Davout advanced. Fortunately for the French veterans Kutusov had unwittingly eased their task by sending a part of his force towards Orsha in anticipation of Napoleon resuming his retreat. Faced only by the troops of Miloradovitch the I Corps drove forward brushing aside the enemy notwithstanding a brisk fire of musketry and artillery.

Reaching the ravine the I Corps deployed to the left and right relieving the Young Guard. As the day wore on the Russians made strenuous efforts to close the passage but to no avail, the French could not be dislodged.

Despite Napoleon’s satisfaction with the course of events the situation was still critical. News of Tormassov’s march on Orsha had reached the ears of the Emperor. Remaining in his position to await the arrival of Ney would be to risk losing possession of the last remaining bridge available to him over the Dnieper.

However to retreat would mean the inevitable sacrifice of Ney and his gallant rear-guard. To the Emperor though the situation was clear, the army must be saved at all costs; Ney would have to be sacrificed. Accordingly orders were issued. Davout, with the divisions of Morand, Gérard and Friederichs, would remain in the vicinity of Krasnöe to await Ney’s arrival while the rest of the army would retire on Orsha.

Throughout what remained of the day Davout’s 5,000 held off repeated attacks by Miloradovitch’s 25,000 men, however as night fell the marshal received word that Tormassov was about to cut the Orsha road to the west of Krasnöe. Realising that to remain would inevitably lead to destruction Davout retired leaving Ney to his fate.

Napoleon had escaped the trap Kutusov had set for him but the two days fighting had cost the Grande Armée some 5,000 dead and wounded not to mention the 6,000 stragglers captured by the Russians. One trap had been evaded but ahead, on the banks of the Berezina, another lay waiting.

Ney meanwhile was already on the road to Krasnöe having left Smolensk as planned on the 17th November. That night his 7,000 men encamped some miles short of Krasnöe already well aware that they would have to fight their way through but little realising the extent of their danger. Next morning they arose early and continued their march.

Approaching the defile of the Lossmina Ney’s vanguard, Ricard’s division of the I Corps, was the first to realise the magnitude of the task that lay ahead. Arrayed before it in order of battle stood virtually the whole of Kutusov’s 50,000 strong army.

Little accustomed to retreat Ricard immediately attacked but was easily beaten off by Kutusov’s numerous artillery. Arriving on the scene Ney resumed the attack but was in turn forced back. In a little over an hour some 3,000 Frenchmen lay dead and dying in the Russian snow.

Accepting the futility of mounting any further assaults Ney resolved to save his command by crossing the Dnieper and putting that great river between himself and his tormentors. The only question that remained was whether the ice, not yet at its thickest, would hold the retreating Frenchmen. That night in complete silence they followed a frozen rivulet to its confluence with the Dnieper.

Reaching the river the first soldiers placed their feet on the ice. Despite ominous cracks appearing all around them the ice held. Quickly the remainder of the corps crossed the river urged on by Ney. Unfortunately although sufficient for infantry the thin ice would not permit the vast bulk of the artillery and baggage to cross.

Daybreak found Ney’s command marching at full speed intent on covering the 46 miles that separated it from Orsha and safety. Shortly after midday the Russians made their first serious attempt to interfere with the French retreat when numerous Cossacks, supported by sledge-mounted artillery fell on the isolated band. Forming square the Frenchmen were able to beat off the attack but not without losing men and, more importantly, time.

As the day worn on more serious attacks developed until eventually Ney’s line of retreat was cut forcing him to take shelter in a wood on the margins of the river. As darkness descended small bands of Frenchmen were able to make their way along the banks of the river until, guided by the campfires of their comrades, by mid-night Ney’s whole command was once again reunited in a village on the edge of the wood. Allowing his men a few hours respite from their labours at 2 a.m. Ney ordered the retreat to resume.

At midday the Cossacks returned. Forming two small squares Ney’s men struggled on across the vast plain they were then traversing. Such was the numerical superiority of the Russians few in the French ranks had little doubt that here was where they would finally fall. And yet, driven on by the indefatigable Ney, they struggled on until incredibly they drove the Russians off.

That night as they approached Orsha they were greeted by the sight of numerous troops issuing forth from the town to intercept them. Advancing with some trepidation, for they were unsure whether or not the approaching column was French or Russian, Ney’s men were overjoyed to hear the French language.

Racing across the intervening space the two columns embraced, the one relieved at having survived and the other delighted to see again comrades they thought irrevocably lost. Of the 7,000 men that had left Smolensk with Ney only some 1,200 had survived but they had through their perseverance and bravery secured a place in the annals of the Grande Armée.

Napoleon did not witness the arrival of Ney’s Corps for he had already departed Orsha at midday on the 20th intent on gaining Borisov on the Berezina before Tshitsagov. Reaching the village of Tolotchino at midday on the 22nd November Napoleon received a dispatch from Dombrowski. The vital bridge at Borisov had been lost. The Tsar’s long planned trap had been sprung. The Grande Armée was trapped.

Napoleon's Eagles (Part 4) Invasion of Russia 1812

Napoleon's Eagles (Part 3) Invasion of Russia 1812

Napoleon's Eagles (Part 2) Invasion of Russia 1812

Napoleon's Eagles (Part 1) Invasion of Russia 1812

Back to Table of Contents -- First Empire # 81
Back to First Empire List of Issues
Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List
© Copyright 2004 by First Empire.
This article appears in MagWeb.com (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web. Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com