Napoleon’s Eagles:
Russia 1812

From the Niemen to the Dvina

by Kevin Birkett, FINS, Eire

24th to 29th June 1812

Shortly after 10 p.m. on the 23rd June, having rowed 160 yards across the slow moving River Niemen, light elements of Davout’s I Corps stepped onto Russian territory. By dawn on the 24th, 3 a.m. at that time of year at that latitude, one division of infantry and the bulk of Murat’s light cavalry were across the Niemen, leaving the remainder of the army to follow in their wake. It quickly became apparent to the Emperor, from his vantage point on a hill overlooking the three bridges, the Russians were not conforming to the French plan and were in fact retreating along the whole front. Within hours of the first crossings Murat’s troopers had successfully driven the scattered Cossack patrols through Kovno.

The following day Murat’s cavalry, burning with desire to cross swords with the enemy, continued its advance; moving rapidly through the sparsely populated region that separates Kovno from the Lithuanian capital, Vilna.

On the morning of the 28th light cavalry of Nansouty’s I Cavalry Corps breasted the hills that overlook the town and prepared to advance against the Russian rearguard. A vigorous combat ensued before the Russians withdrew, setting fire to the magazines of provisions and forage as they went, in good order along the road to Drissa.

Drissa had long been the rendezvous for Barclay’s First Army of the West. News of the French invasion had reached the Tsar in Vilna on the evening of the 24th prompting him to put his long prepared plan to withdrew to his entrenched camp on the banks of the River Dvina. Barclay immediately dispatched orders for his army to concentrate at Drissa, all except Wittgenstein’s First Corps which, having originally been deployed around Rossieny, was ordered to fall back on Dünaburg.

Following close on Wittgenstein’s heels, Oudinot’s II Corps having crossed the Niemen at Kovno made an unsuccessful attempt to trap the Russian at Keidany. However on the morning of the 28th Oudinot finally ran his prey to ground at Vilkomir, forcing the Russians with some loss to continue their retreat towards the Dvina. Despite this defeat Wittgenstein, aided by the fatigue that was by now endemic in the ranks of the Grande Armée, was able to continue his retreat unmolested.

On the right of the main French thrust fatigue had also taken its toll on Eugène’s corps. Obliged to traverse not just Old Prussia but also Poland they had suffered dreadfully in the shifting sands that predominated in that region, only commencing their crossing of the Niemen at Prenn on the 28th June. No soon had the river been bridged when on the 29th the whole region was assailed by a tremendous storm.

Although all the Grande Armée suffered equally Eugène’s Italians and Bavarians were particularly affected. Eventually reaching Novi Troki on the 3rd July, Eugène had the unenviable task of reporting to his imperial stepfather that serious desertion and marauding had broken out among his troops.

Having failed to prevent Barclay’s withdrawal, Napoleon now turned his attention to Bagration’s Second Army of the West. Ordering Murat, commanding Ney’s III Corps, Nansouty’s and Montbrun’s I and II Cavalry Corps and a provisional corps consisting of two divisions of the I Corps under Mouton, to pursue Barclay towards Sventisiani and Vidzeme, Napoleon remained in Vilna to reorganise his remaining troops and to await events further south.

The Net Closes in on Bagration

29th June to 23rd July 1812

Having ordered his own First Army of the West to retire on Drissa Barclay, in his capacity as Minister of War, had instructed Bagration to move his Second Army of the West towards Minsk to operate on the flank of the Grande Armée. It was this movement that, while in Vilna, had attracted the Emperor’s attention.

On the 29th June, still uncertain of the identity of the formations manoeuvring to his south, Napoleon ordered the light cavalry of Davout’s corps to probe the area between Ochmiana, Lida and Minsk. The following evening he dispatched Davout with Compans’ division and Valence’s cuirassiers to Ochmiana while Dessaix was sent to strengthen the patrols around Lida. In addition he instructed Grouchy to move with his III Cavalry Corps on Lida to oversee operations in that quarter.

These forces, together with those of Jérôme who had occupied Grodno on the 27th, were deemed sufficient until the identity of the enemy troops could be ascertained.

On the 1st July the veil that had shrouded Bagration’s movements was torn asunder; he was reported, erroneously, to have passed through Grodno and to be heading for Vilna. Slackening his pace somewhat so that Grouchy’s troops could rejoin him, Davout continued his advance along the Vilna-Minsk road. On the evening of the 8th accompanied by his advance guard he finally entered Minsk. The door had been firmly shut on Bagration’s escape route to the River Dnieper or so Davout believed, however Napoleon’s plan had long since miscarried.

Bagration had left Volkovysk on the 28th June on receipt of Barclay’s order to operate on the flank of the Grande Armée. While attempting to fulfil these orders he met with Platov who apprised him of Davout’s movement to head him off. At once realising his peril Bagration resolved to retrace his steps and gain Bobruisk on the River Berezina via Mir and Nesvizh. Marching with all possible haste Bagration’s footsore soldiers entered Nesvizh on the very day that Davout entered Minsk.

Even though he had avoided Davout, Bagration should not have been able to escape the attentions of Jérôme’s forces, which were providing the vital southern arm of the French pincer movement. Jérôme had arrived in Grodno on the 29th June accompanied by his cavalry. The bulk of his forces, much delayed by the storms that bedevilled the region, only reached the city between the 1st and 3rd July.

Granting his men two days rest, Jérôme set out with his vanguard in pursuit of Bagration on the 3rd. However by then the opportunity to trap the Russians was irretrievably lost. With over 139 miles of difficult terrain, made worse by the weather and the constant attentions of marauding Cossacks, between Grodno, Novogrudok and Nesvizh, Jérôme could not now overtake Bagration, much to the chagrin of his imperial brother.

Having given his exhausted troops two days rest, on the 10th July Bagration set out once again for Bobruisk. That very day Jérôme’s advance guard, Latour-Maubourg’s IV Cavalry Corps, clashed with Platov’s Cossacks at Mir. Davout meantime was still in Minsk where, unable to establish communications with Jérôme or advance through fear of being overwhelmed by the Second Army of the West, he spent his time sending endless messages to the Emperor expressing his dissatisfaction with the course of events.

At length these messages had their effect and Napoleon, already exasperated by the slow progress of his brother’s corps, ordered that Davout should assume command of Jérôme’s forces.

Jérôme, unaware that he had been replaced, arrived in Nesvizh with Poniatowski’s V Corps on the 13th. Realising that there was still a chance to trap the slow moving Russians in Bobruisk he sent a message to Davout in Minsk proposing that the Marshal advance on the Berezina by Ighoumen while he moved on Bagration’s rear by Slouck. Concurring, Davout ordered his troops to be ready to move off the following day, the 14th.

Meantime he forwarded to Jérôme a copy of Napoleon’s orders subordinating the young king to him. These orders reached Jérôme on the 14th resulting in a chain of events that ultimately proved fatal to the whole of Napoleon’s campaign in Russia. Angered by what he believed to be his unfair treatment Jérôme resolve to throw up his command and return to Westphalia. Ordering his subordinates to undertake no further advances, Latour-Maubourg’s cavalry was just beyond Slouck while the Poles had just passed through Nesvizh and the Westphalians had arrived in that town, until Davout contacted them, he handed over command to his chief of staff, General Marchand, and retired on Mir.

An officer was immediately dispatched to Davout with news of Jérôme’s resignation. However instead of reacting to the news with his customary decision Davout, fearing that he had offended a prince of the imperial family, sought to dissuade Jérôme from leaving the army. Meanwhile he ordered his own forces to continue with their advance on the Berezina, which Grouchy reached at Borisov on the 15th.

All was by now lost. Although he had anticipated Bagration on the banks of the Berezina, Davout soon realised that without the support of Jérôme’s corps he could not hope to combat the numerically superior Russians. Nevertheless some benefit could still be gained from the debacle surrounding the change of command if the Russians could be anticipated on the Dnieper thus greatly retarding Bagration’s junction with Barclay.

On the 16th July he set his troops in motion, advancing on Mohilev by Pogost. While on the road Davout at last received correspondence from Jérôme announcing, despite the marshal’s entreaties, the final resolutions of that prince.

Somewhat belatedly Davout issued orders for the Poles and Westphalians to recommence their advance. The VIII Corps was instructed to repair by Ouzda, Dukora and Borisov to Orsha Meantime Poniatowski’s Poles were to advance on Mohilev by Ouzda, Dukora and Ighoumen, thus avoiding the marshes that separated Davout from Jérôme, while Latour-Maubourg’s cavalry was ordered to surround and attack those Russians that had lingered in the fortress of Bobruisk. However it would be some time before these units could play an active part in the campaign so meantime Davout was forced the detach Grouchy to Orsha to act as a link between himself and the Emperor who had once again assumed the offensive.

On the 20th Davout’s much diminished detachment, by now some 22,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry remained with him, captured Mohilev and its magazines intact.

Bagration meanwhile, having crossed the Berezina unopposed, was advancing slowly on Mohilev with little or no thought of having difficulties crossing the Dnieper. On the evening of the 21st he was disabused of this notion when Cossacks, forming the vanguard of the Second Army of the West, clashed with the 3rd Chasseur à Cheval Regiment at Saltanovka some twelve miles south of Mohilev.

The following morning Davout repaired to he scene of the skirmish with a view to establishing an entrenched camp from which to deny the Russians egress to the north. This done he retired for the night to await events. Shortly after dawn on the 23rd July Raevski’s Seventh Corps attacked Davout’s positions.

Safe in their entrenchments, the French infantry repulsed attack after attack until, realising the futility of any further assaults, Bagration retired to the south. Although outnumbered by two to one, the French had successfully denied the Russians access to Mohilev. Nevertheless despite this victory Davout was unable to prevent the Russians from crossing the Dnieper but he had at least delayed the junction of Bagration’s and Barclay’s armies.

Napoleon's Eagles (Part 1) Invasion of Russia 1812

Napoleon's Eagles (Part 2) Invasion of Russia 1812 by Kevin Birkett

Napoleon's Eagles (Part 3) Invasion of Russia 1812

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