Napoleon’s Eagles (Part 3)
Russia 1812

Battle of Vinkovo

by Kevin Birkett, FINS, Eire

18th October 1812

Raising the small wooden shutter Colonel Griois, commanding the artillery of the III Cavalry Corps, peered through the early morning mist. The sound of firing, that had woken him moments earlier, was clearer now.

On the far side of the ravine sentries could be seen exchanging shots with enemy sharp-shooters. Listening carefully Griois could hear the sound of firing from other quarters. Then, as if to end any speculation that this was a clash of outposts, trumpets began to sound throughout the camp. ‘To horse!’ The Russians were coming.

Colonel Griois and the III Cavalry Corps were part of a force under Murat, consisting of all the cavalry corps, Poniatowski’s V Corps, and Claparede’s and Friederichs’ infantry divisions totalling some 25,000 men and 180 guns, that had been encamped at Vinkovo, just three miles from the Russians in Tarutino, for the past three weeks.

Murat’s position was well chosen. Vinkovo was situated in the middle of a great plain on the left bank of the River Czernicznia. The bulk of Murat’s forces, apart from a detachment in Vinkovo, were behind the ravine of the Czernicznia. His right was covered by the deep part of that ravine, which issued into the Nara the same river that the Russians were sheltering behind in Tarutino, however his left was somewhat exposed being behind the shallow portion of the Czernicznia and flanked by a wood.

With normal precautions this position could have been rendered formidable however hopes of a general armistice, and over-reliance on a local unofficial ceasefire, had lulled the French into a false sense of security.

Since leaving Moscow Kutusov had succeeded in recruiting his army to such an extent that by the middle of October he had some 80,000 regular infantry and cavalry, and 20,000 Cossacks, with which to renew hostilities.

Nevertheless Kutusov hesitated, unwilling to stir Napoleon from the prison he had constructed for himself in Moscow. Others though were not so reticent about renewing hostilities. The position of the French soon attracted the attention of Bennigsen who proposed that a great force of cavalry should penetrate the wood and, using it as cover, debouche on the left and rear of the enemy cutting it off from Voronovo.

Although Kutusov was disinclined to assume the offensive he felt it necessary to approve the plan rather than lose ground to his rival in the Byzantine world of Russian politics.

So it was on the evening of the 17th October that the troops destined to make the attack left the Russian camp. General Adjutant Count Orlov-Denisov, commanding twenty Cossack regiments and several regiments of Jägers, received orders to advance through the wood and debouche in the rear of the French towards Voronovo. To his left Baggavout, commanding the Second and Third Corps supported by 60 guns, was to advance alone the margins of the wood to attack the French left. Ostermann-Tolstoi commanding the third column, which consisted of his Fourth Corps supported by twelve guns, was ordered to maintain communications between the flanking force and the main force.

To the left of these flanking forces, all of which were under the direct command of Bennigsen, were Doctorov with the Sixth Corps and 24 guns and Raevski with the Seventh and Eighth Corps with 46 guns, all of which were preceded by Miloradovitch’s advance guard consisting of the Second and Fourth Cavalry Corps together with a few Cossack and Jäger regiments.

At 7 a.m. on the 18th the storm broke on the French left. Moving undetected through the wood, Jägers from Baggavout’s column descended on the pickets of Sebastiani’s II Cavalry Corps as they searched for forage in the early morning mist. Alarmed by the sudden appearance of the enemy in their rear the French cavalry scattered and fled across the Czernicznia spreading alarm in their wake.

Fortunately for the French the Russian pursuit was conducted at a leisurely pace allowing Poniatowski and Friederichs, who were positioned to the left of Vinkovo, to retire in good order on Spass-Kouplia, four miles to the rear of Vinkovo, where they arrived in time to thwart Orlov-Denisov’s attempt to cut the Moscow road.

Elsewhere the Russian attack was not pushed home with any great determination. The Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Corps stopped short at the Czernicznia where they exchanged fire with Claparede’s infantry division and Nansouty’s I and Chastel’s III, Grouchy was absent, Cavalry Corps. Only Siever’s Fourth Cavalry Corps pushed across the river but only with limited success.

The lack of pressure from the Russian pinning forces allowed Murat, under cover of several successful cavalry charges, to withdrew his force to Voronovo.

In the event the French lost about 2,000 men dead while the Russians captured another 1,500 men, 38 guns and nearly all the baggage. The Russians meanwhile only lost 500 men killed but among the dead was Baggavout, who was struck by artillery fire while leading the second column. Another casualty was Bennigsen who, having complained once too often about his superior’s lack of vigour, was dismissed from the army.

Napoleon's Eagles (Part 3) Invasion of Russia 1812

Napoleon's Eagles (Part 2) Invasion of Russia 1812

Napoleon's Eagles (Part 1) Invasion of Russia 1812

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