The list of goods provided to the Japanese is not fully known to this day. Based on records from the OKW’s WiRüAmt, private German armaments producers and Military Tribunal interrogations, a rather diverse list of such components may be compiled:
- 1. Manufacturing Techniques - process for making cartridge steel
- construction of barrel linings
- electric welding in construction of naval vessels
2. Artillery & Small Arms - 105mm cannon - 128mm cannon - 88mm cannon/anti-aircraft gun - 75mm anti-tank gun - machine gun variants -grenade launchers
3. Optical Equipment - radar & optical range finders & directors - Leica cameras for air reconnaissance - bomb sights
4. Army Ordinance - ‘TIGER’ tank (unknown if it reached the Japanese Army
5. Naval Ordinance - gun stabilizers for surface naval ships - torpedo fire control unit for surface ships - 750 ton submarine hull - E-Switch (a control device for computing fire against enemy aircraft
6. Air Force Ordnance - specimens of Me 109 fighter specimens of Me 262 jet fighter specimens of Me 163 rocket fighter also offered access to dat a pertaining to the V-1 and V-2 rocket series
The exchange of military supplies and the war against Allied shipping were not the sole operations undertaken by Germany and Japan. As an extension to Axis collaboration in the east, the partners pursued a haphazard subversive policy throughout India and the Middle East. Late in 1941, the Japanese forces were closing in on the border of India. The Japanese suggested a joint tri-power declaration on India and the Arab territories. These nations were to be used by the Axis as subversive bases. German and Japanese intelligence units were to coordinate anti-British actions throughout the territories. Indian and the Arab East was considered by the Axis as the great ‘hinge’. Axis troops were expected to link up within that region and coordinate two pincer movements. These pincers were designed to destroy both Russian and British forces within Asia.
Operations in the Arab East proved difficult to coordinate between Germany and Japan. The Germans tried to provoke uprisings throughout the Arab world during the 2nd World War. In 1940, von Ribbentrop ordered that an effort be arranged to support arms shipments to Iraq via Japan. Iraqi-Japanese negotiations were pursued from October 1940 to January 1941. The Japanese eventually abandoned the venture, as the Iraqi Government that she had been dealing with, had fallen. The Japanese had agreed to shipments of small arms to Iraq with the former Government. the new Government of Iraq however, could not find support from the Japanese. The German and Italian Governments pressed the Japanese through their embassies in Tokyo. The effort had failed however, when the British began to blockade the port at Basra; Japan’s only transportation link. The Japanese venture of cooperation had failed in the Arab East. Henceforth, Germany and Italy would have to coordinate the strategy in Arabia.
Strategy in India would prove to facilitate a degree of operational collaboration. Late in 1941, Subhas Chandras Bose, the Indian Nationalist leader, spoke with the Japanese Ambassador to Berlin (Colonel Yamamoto Bin) and his military attaché. Bose’s aim was to try and persuade a joint collaboration between the two Axis powers against British domination in India. In April of 1942, the Japanese invited their German partners to co-sponsor a declaration of Indian Independence. The issue concerning a ‘Free India’ was one that Hitler found little interest in. Throughout 1942, German Government officials and propaganda leaders tried to encourage Hitler’s acceptance of the Declaration.
Bose had for some time, tried to set up a Provincial Government of ‘Free India’ within Germany. Both Hitler and his Foreign Office were in non-agreement with Bose’s request. On 9 April 1941, Bose presented a detailed memorandum to the German Government. The document was entitled the ‘Plan for Cooperation Between the Axis Powers and India’. The memorandum was clearly anti-British in sentiment. Bose called for the cooperation of the three Axis nations in order that ‘India may attain her national independence’. He emphasized that subversive work would have to be organized and a force of 50,000 fully armed Axis soldiers would be required. The Axis powers were expected to finance the entire effort. It is needless to mention that Hitler rejected the detailed program. One of the provisions within the document was however, given authorization by the German Government. Bose was permitted to create a ‘Free India Center’ in Berlin. The center included broadcasting facilities. On February 27, Bose spoke over the ‘Azad Hind Radio’ for the first time. The radio station was used for broadcasting anti-British propaganda and as a means of recruiting Indian nationalists throughout Europe.
In 1942, the Axis powers presented their draft declarations concerning a ‘Free India’. The drafts stipulated that Germany, Japan and Italy would recognize the ‘inalienable rights’ of the Indian people and promoted Indian ‘independence’ and ‘self-determination’. Britain was regarded as ‘the common enemy’ of the Axis and Indian peoples. ‘British Imperialism’ would have to be defeated. The Axis was obliged to secure ‘India for the Indians’ and ‘Arabia for the Arabs’. In the end, ‘the three Powers declare their readiness to afford India every possible assistance’. In reality however, the situation was quite complex. Bose had met with Hitler in 1942, to ensure that Germany would not allow Japan to dominate Indian policy. Hitler refrained from accepting Bose’s wish. Japan had conversely demanded of Italy an active position in India to counter Germany. Between both Axis powers stood Bose. He demanded that neither Axis nations overrule the independence of India. Bose’s concerns were justifiably valid. Ultimately, Japan would dominate the ‘Free India’ of Bose’s Provisional Government.
Axis concerns were lax in the creation of India’s combat potential. Germany and Japan both had greater priorities to tend to in 1943. Nevertheless, both powers managed to organize a small fighting force for Bose’s ‘Free India’. In Asia, the Japanese had been fighting alongside Indian nationalists units since early 1942. However, on 21 December 1942, General Mohan Singh of the ‘Indian National Army’ (INA) called for the dissolution of his forces. General Singh had recognized that the Japanese were no different than their British predecessors. there was no possible way that India would ever achieve its independence under such an alignment. General Singh stated that: “Circumstances have arisen under which it is impossible for the Indian National Army to forge ahead to achieve its goal, i.e. the complete Independence of India without any foreign control, influence or interference.”
General Singh insisted that an INA would only succeed under the leadership of Bose and a legitimate government in Asia. The Japanese agreed to the request and in January of 1943, Japanese Ambassador Oshima approached von Ribbentrop concerning Bose’s release to Asia. Oshima later appealed the issue to Hitler. The Führer agreed to the request, since he believe that Bose’s presence in Germany was of little value. On 9 February 1943, Subhas Chandras Bose, his secretary Abid Hassan and a cargo of equipment and armaments blueprints, left for the Indian Ocean on board U-180.
HARRY’S NOTE - OTTO DIETZ (209-+-1986) was a crewman aboard U-180 and had many long talks with Bose.
On 20 April, the Japanese submarine I-29 left Penang for the rendezvous with U-180. The transfer was made on 27 April, 180 miles southeast of Madagascar. I-29 returned for Penang with its cargo of equipment and two Indian guests. U-180 returned to Bordeaux with a cargo of quinine and Oriental gold. The successful transaction would promote future joint operations between the naval forces.
HARRY’S NOTE - YOYA KAWAMURA (1739-LIFE-1991) has sent a detailed account of this meeting, which we will present with the history of U-180.
Bose reached Japan in late May and immediately requested a meeting with General Tojo. On 10 June, Bose spoke with Tojo regarding the creation of a Provisional Government for ‘Free India’ and for the formulation of a new INA. Tojo was impressed with Bose’s scheme. On 21 October 1943, the Provincial Government of ‘Free India’ was established in Singapore under Bose’s leadership. Recognition of the legitimate government and its new army was provided by Japan on 23 October. Recognition from the other Axis nations followed thereafter.
Recognition of Bose’s government would not however, deter Japan from controlling the INA. The INA was financially supported by the Japanese Government. Arms, uniforms, supplies and training facilities were provided by the Japanese Army. Control of the Indian forces was placed under the Japanese Southern Army Command. Indian soldiers were attached to Japanese units for propaganda purposes and as a means of conducting intelligence work. Bose had continually demanded that the INA should lead the spearhead attack into India. The Japanese had different ideas.
More Imperial Japan and the Third Reich
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© Copyright 1996 by Harry Cooper, Sharkhunters International, Inc.
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