Now that the groundwork had been laid with regards to AXIS intentions and alliances, one may concentrate on the operations. As mentioned previously, Japan and Germany had exchanged military attaches before the war began. Military attaches had been attached to their respective foreign embassies in Tokyo and in Berlin. Before the war, relations between the foreign military attaches were often cordial and infrequent. Field Marshall Keitel wrote in his memoirs, he enjoyed meeting with General Oshima in 1937-38. Oshima frequently shared information with Keitel concerning the war in China. However, little was achieved beyond general war correspondence.
After the signing of the Tripartite Pact in September of 1940, a General Committee was set up under one of the provisions within the agreement. The committee was headed by three representatives, one from each of the AXIS nations: Germany: von Ribbentrop; Italy: Alfieri; Japan: Oshima. Within the General Committee, there existed three specific committees representing matters of economics, propaganda and the military. The function of these separate bodies was in the coordination of the general war direction. The economic branch continued arrangements for future exchanges of vital raw materials and technical air. The propaganda section began discussing possible future arrangements in regards to subversive activities in India and Arabia. The military committee began to coordinate basic future goals and operations against the enemy. The military committee’s representatives were: Germany; Admiral Groos; Japan: Admiral Nomura and General Banzai; Italy: General Marras. On February 24, 1942 the Committee met for the first and last time. It is not known why the AXIS members refused to continue the sessions. A lack of enthusiasm has been suggested by some historians. Perhaps there were other reasons.
Early in the war, the German Naval War Staff (SKL) had suggested to its Asian allies that a German Admiralty be established in Tokyo. The Germans and Italians had successfully organized a similar liaison in Europe. Through the creation of such a system, the OKW would have maintained a direct line to the Imperial General Headquarters. The arrangement was never consummated. The Japanese were accused of refusing the OKW to establish representatives with direct lines to the IGHQ. The Japanese, however, argued that the maneuver failed due to a lack of genuine German cooperation. Von Ribbentrop had in fact refused such a venture, as it would bypass his own diplomatic lines. Later during the war, direct access was achieved.
The “AXIS Supreme War Council” failed under similar circumstances. In February of 1941, the SKL suggested the creation of a joint chiefs of staff in order to coordinate AXIS war aims and military operations in the field. A lack of enthusiasm doomed the network. Historians have attributed the lack of AXIS combined staff to the ultimate downfall of the AXIS war effort.
The Germans and Japanese were very cautious of each other’s war potential, ultimately or each other’s intentions. It was obvious that both allies agreed over who the common enemies were. They were also quite willing to wage war against them. Their ultimate enthusiasm and capabilities were however, continually in question. Germany had always felt that she was putting forth a greater effort towards the war than her Asian ally. Germany continually pressed Japan for harsher initiatives in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
Japan also felt a need to take precautionary measures towards her European ally. The Japanese Government maintained a number of diplomatic missions throughout the German-occupied territories, as did Germany in Asia. Japanese authorities ordered their officials to keep abreast of modern trends in the European war. These missions were to serve as listening posts, gathering balanced reports that could be compared to the biased reports from Berlin. Japan in fact distrusted its own military attaché’s capabilities in Berlin. A special mission was sent to Berlin in 1943. On March 1, 1943 Major General Okamoto (Chief of the Japanese 2nd Intelligence Bureau) led the mission to Germany from Tokyo, via Siberia. The mission reached its objective in June of 1943 and reported its findings concerning German war capabilities. The cables report of 5 July, 1943 found that Germany’s “national power” was lower than had been reported by the Japanese officials in Berlin. The mission concluded that Germany would probably be defeated unless she managed to overcome her deficiencies in industrial output, manpower, and fuel production.
Germany and Japan both kept close tabs on one another and tried to ensure themselves of their ally’s national strength. Nations began to distrust the efficiency of their own attaches during the war. AXIS attaches and military staffs found it difficult to come completely to terms with one another. Even the “Allied Joint Chiefs of Staff” lacked complete cooperation. There was perhaps one greater disadvantage that the AXIS military attaches were forced to overcome - transportation barriers.
Transportation facilities & communications links were to have been secured by AXIS members, as of their military agreement in 1942. Italy and Germany continued to share land, air and sea links with one another throughout the war. The distance between Japan and her western allies was by far, the greatest hindrance in the coordination of military collaboration. After the invasion of Russia in June of 1941, the key transportation network between the AXIS ‘neighbours’ had been terminated. The Trans-Siberian Railway served as the only route from Germany to Japan. Henceforth, the transportation of goods, let alone entire military staffs, became rather tenuous. There did exist a courier to the Orient, via Turkey and southern Russia. However, the route served merely as a last resort and was only intended as a covert operation involving a limited number of individuals. Mass transportation measures were desperately required.
Air links were planned by both Germany and Italy, but little emerged from their initiatives. Polar flights were envisioned as well as southerly links. In December of 1941, von Ribbentrop tried to acquire a long-range aircraft from both Hitler and Göring in order to make an emergency flight to Japan. He recorded in his memoirs that he was denied such a craft since a similar plane had crashed in Siam earlier in the year. Apparently the Japanese opposed German flights over Russia, as it breached the Russo-Japanese treaties. German flights over Russian air space on route to Japan were not permitted under such agreements.
Japan nevertheless, tried to organize a route of her own. In July of 1943, a Japanese long-range aircraft took off from Singapore. Its destination was to have been the German occupied region of the Crimea. The plane was never heard from. The craft was probably lost over Afghanistan. Germany, Japan and Italy shared in attempts to create an efficient air link with their distant allies. The brunt of AXIS transportation and communication would however, have to be forged via naval operations. Joint naval activities would eventually provide the raw materials, military aid and attaches that were so desperately required by the AXIS members.
Before examining in detail the various naval operations coordinated by the two nations, one should briefly examine an example of military cooperation on the staff level. Before the outbreak of war on the Russian front, Germany & Japan concluded a series of small military exchanges. There is evidence that would suggest cooperation between the two air ministries. In an issue of ‘DER ADLER’, the Luftwaffe’s official magazine, a group of Japanese fliers may be observed. It appears that a small contingent of trained officers were sent to Germany sometime before June of 1941, via the trans-Siberian Railway.
A careful examination of the magazine and its article would place the venture between September 1940 and December 1941. There is a mention of the Tripartite Pact in the introduction to the article. This would therefore imply that the article’s contents were after September of 1940. It is also known that “DER ADLER” was translated in English and sold in America up until December of 1941.
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© Copyright 1996 by Harry Cooper, Sharkhunters International, Inc.
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