Germany had initially hoped that Japan would be able to relieve American convoy pressure from the Atlantic Ocean by pressing conquests against the British in the South Seas. Germany had feared a war against the United Stated, just as Japan had earlier. Japan began diplomatic talks with American in April of 1941. Germany requested that Japan keep her informed during the talks. Germany, in fact, requested to be included in the talks. Japan rejected German mediation and ignored German requests for keeping her abreast of the happenings. Germany was infuriated with the entire situation, for Japan was conducting affairs contrary to the Tripartite Pact.
On December 7 1941, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor. Germany was both unaware and non-supportive of the Japanese action. German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop adamantly stated such in his memoirs:
“the Japanese did neither what Hitler nor what I wanted, but decided, unknown to us, to attack Pearl Harbor.”
Hitler had advocated a Japanese conflict with Britain, and von Ribbentrop preferred a coalition against Russia. Von Ribbentrop pointed out to Hitler that Germany need not go to war against the United States since the Pact stipulated that obligation coincided only if the partner had been attacked. Japan however, had been the aggressor. Hitler was surprised with Japan’s venture, as mentioned earlier, but he came to support the Japanese action. Besides, he argued, the United States had declared a war of sorts against German submarines in the Atlantic. He referred of course, to Roosevelt’s ‘SHOOT ON SIGHT’ speech earlier in the year.
December 11, 1942 Germany declared war on the United States. Japan followed shortly thereafter by declaring war on the United Kingdom in the Pacific. The conflict against America had brought German and Japanese war concerns to a paralleled equilibrium.
By 1942, the Axis partners had reached a high point in their cooperation. During the first meeting of the Tripartite Committee in Berlin on December 15, 1941, the Japanese presented a draft regarding future military cooperation. The draft underwent minor German and Italian modifications and was later signed in the Führer’s Headquarters on January 18, 1942. The document was simply entitled the ‘MILITARY AGREEMENT BETWEEN GERMANY, ITALY and JAPAN’.
The agreement was forged ‘in order to safeguard operational cooperation among them (the German and Italian Armed Forces and the Japanese Army and Navy) and to destroy the enemy’s fighting strength as quickly as possible.’
The agreement included three essential sets of provisions:
- 1. Division of Zones of Operations;
2. General Plan of Operation;
3. Main Points of Military Cooperation.
The Axis assigned themselves two specifically defined zones of military operations. Japan secured her sphere of operations in the lands and waters east of 70 degrees East longitude, which ran through Russia, west India and the middle of the Indian Ocean. Japan was given operational priority from this demarcation line to the west coast of the United States. Germany and Italy were given the lands and waters West of the 70 degree longitude partition. Their extent of operations were secured from the demarcation line to the east coast of the United States. Initially the German OKW was opposed to the 70 degree E division. The German forces preferred the boarder along the Yenisei River to the Mongolian and Chinese borders, following along the Indian-African border to the Indian Ocean. The military planners felt that the Yenisei would provide a superb defensive position. The German War Economy and Armaments branch of the OKW (WiRüAmt) wished to acquire the region beyond the demarcation, due to its wealthy deposits of coal. Eventually the German OKW accepted the Japanese proposal, but stipulated that the line was to be a flexible border, not a political boundary.
The ‘General Plan of Operations’ proposed that Japan’s responsibility was for the destruction and occupation of British, American and Dutch fleets and military bases in the South Seas and Pacific region. Similarly, Germany and Italy were responsible for the destruction and occupation of the enemy in the Near East, Middle East, Mediterranean and Atlantic regions. The Axis partners concluded that if their enemies concentrated their fleets within a particular area against a particular Axis member, then the other members would be obliged to transfer aid into the zone required.
The ‘Major Points’ regarding military cooperation included provisions concerning operational planning, coordinating the war on shipping, the collection of intelligence, joint subversive activities and the maintenance of a sea and air link. There was also a provision that required the Axis partners to give an advance notification of operations exceeding one’s own zone. It was stipulated that this be required in order to enable the hosting member to prepare bases and provisions for the aiding ally. It might have also been included as a protective measure to both parties involved, since many operations were covert in nature. Mistaken identity could have caused great military and political repercussions.
The agreement was most influential. Future operations would be conducted due to the cooperation that had been exchanged during the formulation of the document. There was however, one shortcoming. Operational cooperation seemed to be contained within certain limits of the agreement. Although joint operations were conducted beyond the demarcation line, priorities were centered within each member’s own region. The Axis partners were not as flexible as the Allied alliance.
In 1942, Axis military collaboration had reached a milestone. the partners had not really begun to coordinate the war effort until until January of 1942. Germany had concerns and demands that she laid upon the Axis and Japan similarly had her own. Germany had from the beginning recognized Japan as a force in keeping the United States and the United Kingdom at bay in the Pacific. Germany had initially wanted Japan to enter on her side against the Soviet Union. She also demanded from Japan support in the Arab East. Both of these prospects failed. Japan was neither in the position to actively take a stance, nor did she desire to. Germany recognized Japan primarily as a supplier of raw materials for the German war effort. Secondly, Germany hoped to use Japan as a counter balance of power against Italian supremacy in the Arab East. Japan had disappointed German military planners with regards to the Arab East. Nevertheless, Japan had managed to secure a diplomatic presence that was substantially capable of compensating for her military incapability.
Japan also had concerns and demands towards her Axis ally. Germany was a leading weapons manufacturer. Japan wished to forge an alliance with Germany as a means of securing technical aid vital to the Imperial Japanese war effort. Japan also wished to formulate common grounds with regards to colonial possessions in the Pacific region. Indeed, she succeeded in doing so by late 1940. The Japanese military planners were also distrustful of Italy’s military capabilities and wished to coordinate a closer relationship with the superior military force in Europe, namely Germany. On the operational aspects of the war, Japan had hoped for a German-Japanese link-up in the Indian region, as will be discussed later, attempts were conducted in this field.
More Imperial Japan and the Third Reich
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© Copyright 1996 by Harry Cooper, Sharkhunters International, Inc.
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