The project that demanded the most of Axis cooperation entailed the exchange of vital war materiel. Germany, Italy and Japan worked together in the acquisition and transportation of the various goods. The exchange of these vital resources first began in the latter 1930’s. By 1941, Germany and Japan were exchanging substantial amounts of material. Following the Japanese ‘occupation’ of French Indo-China, Thailand and the Dutch East Indies, German and Japanese competition for valuable resources became fervent.

These materials were influential upon each nation’s military capability. Procurement of the resources was ultimately essential in the formulation of foreign policy. German demands were centered upon natural rubber and ferroalloy supplies. Japanese concerns were largely based upon technical manufacturing procedures and scientific developments of synthetic oil production. The key link that provided the exchange between the two Axis demands was the Trans-Siberian Railway line. In 1941, Japan had managed to ship over 12,000 tons of goods to Germany via Russia.

In early 1941, the WiRüAmt became increasingly concerned over Hitler’s demands for an invasion of Russia. In a conversation between Field-Marshall Keitel, General Jodl and General Thomas of the WiRüAmt, they observed that Hitler was well aware of severing the last overland tie, yet he would not ‘let himself be influenced by these economic difficulties’.

After Pearl Harbour, German stock piles grew tremendously in East Asia. The Japanese continued to purchase large quantities of materials at Germany’s disposal. By December of 1941, approximately 90,000 tons of strategic resources were collected in Japan, Manchuokuo and Malaya. In 1942, the German purchasing mission in Tokyo reported that over 60,000 tons of rubber alone had been collected for Germany in the last harvest. Japan continued its generous offers to Germany throughout the war.

Germany complied by allowing Japan to examine her modern war machinery. Japan lacked manufactured products, capital goods, German production technology and blueprints and samples for armaments. Japan hoped to acquire such products, so as to enable her the long-range self-sufficiency that she so desired. In February of 1941, Japan presented a list of demands to the German military officials in Berlin. The list included war materiel such as: artillery, radar, optical equipment, submarine and airplane samples and components, precision instruments and machine tools. The initial German reaction to the list was apprehensive. While the German military wished to aid Japan in the war against the common enemy, Germany was not about to consider releasing her most advanced weapons systems.

The general feeling of the German military was one of apprehension. Many German officials felt the Japanese maintained missions in Germany whose sole function was to ‘snoop around’. As examined earlier, the Japanese did precisely that. German officials were correct in their assumptions. On March 5, 1941 the issue came to a head when Hitler issued his directive for cooperation with the Japanese Government. He demanded that the German military fulfill Japan’s requests generously and that no reciprocal benefits be attached to the transaction. Included in Hitler’s draft for cooperation, he stated:

‘It was Germany’s aim to cause Japan to act decisively in the Far East at the earliest opportunity . . Germany should allow the Japanese a generous look at German war and combat experiences, and should give her permission to copy modern weapons and implements.’

Regardless of the Führer’s directive, German agencies delayed cooperation. Von Ribbentrop’s foreign Ministry insisted that Japan’s demands for aid be produced on one list and that no individual orders be placed with private German companies until it had been finalized by the German Government. Japan complied with the German demands. The matter became increasingly complicated with the loss of the Trans-Siberian Railway. Japanese officials were required to alter their list. The initial Japanese list included the construction of an airplane factory in Manchuokuo with heavy German machinery.

Due to the lack of a mass transportation network, Japan was required to ask for single airplane samples. Their blueprints and license would also be required in order to build the machines on a large scale within Japan. The Japanese list was continuously scaled down by the German authorities. Contentions also arose over the sales rights of private licenses. In the end however, Japan would be supplied with weapons designs and components beyond her hopes. Hitler’s enthusiasm for the exchange led to its ultimate success. A problem did exist however, with the transportation of the goods.

The shipment of aid to and from Japan would have to be undertaken by the German Navy. Japan had refused to place any of her merchant vessels at the disposal of the German authorities. she resented the fact that Germany had initiated and pursued the war against the Soviet Union. Before, Japan had shipped many resources to Germany with her own train facilities, via Russia. After the invasion of Russia however, she would not threaten her few vessels in the open sea as a result of German ambitions. In 1941, the German Navy organized a direct service between Germany and Japan. The blockade running would be made by ex-merchantmen. The ships were required to be fast, efficient and large enough to make good size shipments and capable of making long range voyages. The merchantmen were then refitted, armed with one 15cm gun and placed under the command of the German Naval authorities.

More Imperial Japan and the Third Reich

Part I
Part II
Part III
Part IV
Part V
Part VI
Part VII
Part VIII
Part IX
Part X
Part XI