By further examination of the ‘Kriegstagebuch’ (war diaries) of the OKW, a reference to an exchange may be found. In 1941, a group of approximately 20 Japanese officers under General Yamashita, were brought to Germany in order to undertake six months of ‘Kriegserfahrungen’ (war experience) training. It is possible that that particular group of officers refers to the training maneuvers depicted in ‘DER ADLER’. Regardless, it is obvious that military exchanges were continually taking place. The majority of them were bound for Germany.

IT WAS NECESSARY FOR JAPANESE OFFICERS UNDERTAKE GERMAN WAR TRAINING.

The greatest proportion of collaboration between Germany and Japan was coordinated by the naval branches of the military. Naval strategy was diverse and required the cooperation and coordination of efficient attaches in Europe and in Asia. Military cooperation between the German Navy and the Japanese Imperial Navy proved to be the most successful example of collaboration throughout the war. The Japanese naval attaché (Admiral Nomura) met frequently with the German Naval High Command in Berlin. Similarly, Germany dispatched a naval officer (Captain Wenneker) to the German Embassy in Tokyo early in the war.

Axis naval strategy was centered upon defeating the British and American fleets in the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Oceans. The German and Italian navies were obliged to destroy the enemy fleets in the Atlantic and Mediterranean waters. The Japanese were given priority in the Pacific Ocean. In the Indian Ocean however, the three Axis partners combined their naval abilities to combat the enemy. Early in the war, the Axis found it relatively easy to maneuver within the Indian Ocean. Their naval operations raised great concern for the Allies, whose shipping to the Middle East and to southern Russian ports, was hindered by continual Axis submarine threats.

By late 1943, the tide of war in the Indian Ocean had turned to the Allies’ side. Advanced radar systems and coordination between naval and air arms made the war in the Indian Ocean deadly for Axis surface operations and highly threatening to submerged ventures. Haphazard Axis initiatives ultimately led to Allied victory.

Initially, the Japanese Navy was given the task of controlling the Indian Ocean and British naval forces. In February of 1942, the Japanese proposed plans for operations in the Indian Ocean. In Berlin, the Japanese naval attaché requested German officials for data and maps pertaining to Ceylon. Ten days later, the German navy obliged its Axis partner. After studying the German data in late February, the Japanese submitted a request to the German Government for the acquisition of Vichy submarine bases on Madagascar.

The Germans were not enthusiastic about the plan, since it required that the Japanese would be operating within the German and Italian spheres. Many German naval planners were however, impressed that the Japanese had taken an initiative. The Germans were not yet prepared to coordinate ventures in the eastern zone of operations. Grand-Admiral Raeder reported Japan’s request to Hitler on March 12. Hitler showed little interest in the operation and felt that Vichy France would oppose the request outright. Raeder spoke with Admiral Darlan (Commander-in-Chief of the French Navy), regarding Japan’s demands. Darlan did not oppose the initiative, concluding that Japanese forces should operate from Colombo, Ceylon. Madagascar operations were curtailed for the time being.

The SKL encouraged the Japanese Navy to deploy submarines to the northern Indian Ocean in order to cut lines of British shipping into the Red Sea and Persia. The resultant would eventually support the German war against the Soviet Union. A later extension was permitted by Germany, encouraging Japanese submarines to operate along the east coast of Africa. Stress was placed on the war against Allied shipping via the entrance to the Persian Gulf.

The Japanese operations lacked the efficiency that the German Naval High Command had hopes for. By March and April of 1942, the Japanese navy was active in the Bay of Bengal and managed to attain supremacy for a shore time. Churchill wrote of the Japanese threat in a dispatch to President Roosevelt on April 15, 1942:

“Until we are able to fight a fleet action, there is no reason why the Japanese should not become the dominant factor in the Western Indian Ocean. This would result in the collapse of our whole position in the Middle East; supplies to Russia via the Persian Gulf will also be cut.”

The Japanese pressure would not last much longer however. On April 5, 1942, Japanese naval forces bombed the airfield and port on Colombo, Ceylon. The attempt was to weaken enemy positions so that a Japanese landing might be made possible. The landing never occurred. The lack of cooperation between the Imperial Army and Navy led to its ultimate failure. The Japanese forces were later recalled to Japan, in preparations for the Midway assault. German agents on the Mozambique coast relayed to Berlin, of frequent British ship movements to Egypt along the east coast of Africa. The SKL was not pleased with Japanese inability to fulfill her operations. In late April of 1942, Vichy forces on Madagascar requested Japanese military aid. The Vichy Government feared a forthcoming British assault on the island.

The Japanese declined immediate aid. On May 5, 1942, Madagascar was secured by British forces, following a brief conflict with Vichy units on the island. Only a few Japanese midget submarines eventually arrived on the island. The Japanese aid was minuscule - and late.

More Imperial Japan and the Third Reich

Part I
Part II
Part III
Part IV
Part V
Part VI
Part VII
Part VIII
Part IX
Part X
Part XI