Imperial Japan
and the Third Reich

Military Collaboration During
the Second World War
Part 1

A Portion of the Doctoral Thesis
of Phillip Attenborough (440-1988)
(reprinted with permission)


There has been a great deal written about the Second World War. Within the past forty years, historians have examined countless topics and themes concerning both the Axis and the Allied sides of the war. Little however, has been written concerning the military collaboration that existed between the two foremost Axis powers - Imperial Japan and the Third Reich. The history of the forging of the Tripartite is well known and the literature regarding German and Italian cooperation is also plentiful. Cooperation between Germany and Japan has, however, fallen by the way side. Perhaps it is because Germany and Japan seemingly accomplished little as Axis partners, or because European and Asian histories are seldom correlated. What ever the case may be, there is little source material in existence. An examination of primary sources proves invaluable in the study of this particular topic.

Although it is true that Germany and Japan were not the closest of military collaborators during the war, they both approached one another on a continual basis. The military collaboration between these two nations may in no manner be compared to the Allied undertakings or even to German and Italian operations. There existed, however, a relationship that was hindered by political, racial and geographical problems. The discrepancy in foreign policy towards Russia, the smaller degree or racist contentions, and the magnitude of the geographical placement between these two nations, caused problems in the forging of a cohesive military alliance.

Taking these relative factors into account, both partners were still capable of coordinating operations. A tremendous network of military attachés and exchanges had been established in the fields of intelligence, propaganda, subversion, procurement of military aid and tactical training. These networks continued to function right up until the last days of the Reich. Both German and Japanese authorities tried to cooperate within their zones of deployment. There were however, two devastating elements that proved fatal to the Axis alliance.

The Third Reich and Imperial Japan found it virtually impossible to coordinate effective joint operations. Both totalitarian states conducted their military operations within their own spheres of influence and rarely agreed to combine operations in a zone that was not necessarily of benefit to their individual war efforts. When joint operations were employed, a lack of coordination and initiative was evident on behalf of both parties. Both nations would press for a particular initiative in a zone that would benefit its own sphere of operations. The nation that was demanded of, would very often show a lack of interest. While both partners delayed their actions, the Allied forces would in the end take the initiative. the Allied forces were, by far, the greater threat towards joint German and Japanese military collaboration. By late 1943, it was evident that most Axis combined operations were doomed to failure. The unrelenting Allied military pursuit caused the Germans and Japanese to reexamine their priorities. Axis interests shifted homeward, as opposed to conducting worldwide offensive operations. Machinery, supplies and manpower were required for the defensive.

In commencing an examination of the subject of German-Japanese collaboration, one must first study the initial links forged between the two nations. One of the first links that brought the two nations together, was the 'Anti-Comintern Pact' of November 26, 1936. The pact was forged under the intention that Germany and Japan would work together as opponents of the Communist International. The aim of the agreement was to 'disintegrate and subdue existing (communist) states by all means.' [from the Anti-Comintern Pact: Presseisen, Germany & Japan; The Hague, 1958]. The Supplementary Protocol called for 'work in close collaboration' [from the same source]. and for an exchange of information and defensive measures.

The pact's creation was clearly a display of anti-Soviet policy. In conclusion to the pact, a Secret Supplementary Protocol was contained, in which was stated that if either party were attacked or threatened by Russia, the allied parties would not be friendly towards the Soviet Union. Specific military measures were not included in the pact. There were however, clear intentions that foretold of future cooperation. Ironically enough, this initial pact forges between Germany and Japan, would be one of the last agreements to show antiSoviet feelings. Henceforth, many contradictory policies would be enacted between the two nations and the Soviet Union.

By 1935, Japan had begun sending her military attaché to Berlin. Germany reciprocated the gesture of military diplomacy. the early creation of this development is not of concern in this particular study. One must understand however, that German and Japanese cooperation had been established in the mid 1930's. Ideas were being expressed and policies were being formulated.

On July 3, 1938 a document was created concerning 'The Army's (Japanese) Hopes: Regarding current Foreign Policies'. New developments were becoming evident, inspired from previously arranged agreements. The Japanese Army wished to strengthen the Anti-Comintern Axis with Germany. Moreover, the Japanese military was concerned with the war being waged in China. The Japanese expressed a desire to strengthen political and economical relations with both Germany and Italy. Furthermore, a prospect was raised whereby the German and Italian military were requested to create an anti-Soviet military alliance with Japan. The Japanese were concerned over her prospects in China and wished to forge an alliance against the Soviet Union. This would enable Japan to concentrate her forces in the China Theater.

The Japanese introduced two other concerns. She wishes to stop all exports of military aid to China. The German military had, of course, for several years been assisting China with military aid and advisors. The German attaché was well aware of what Japan was attempting to indirectly demand. Germany adhered to Japan's cause. By late 1938, Germany had recalled its military advisors from China and stopped further arms sales. During this meeting, the Japanese also approached the Germans in regards to former German colonial possessions in the Asian hemisphere. As will be examined later, both nations came to an understanding concerning colonial rights. The wealthy colonies would serve to aid both nations throughout the war.

Following the Japanese presentation, the Imperial Government issued instructions to its ambassadors in Berlin and Rome. The Japanese ordered its officials to avoid involvements in future European entanglements that were not seen as relevant to Japan. Cooperation on all bases was to be limited to anti-communism. Japan did not wish to become involved in disputes with either the United States or Great Britain.

On September 1, 1939 Germany invaded Poland. The European war had begun. Japan remained allied to the Axis cause, but refused to declare war against Great Britain. In 1939, Japan was not prepared to launch her attack against the United Kingdom. A war against England was certain to implicate a future war with the United States. Japan would not take that risk, for the sake of complying with the Axis intentions. On July 30, 1940 Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka produced a draft policy 'On Strengthening Cooperation Between Japan, Germany and Italy'. This draft would later become the basis for the famed 'Tripartite Pact'.

More Imperial Japan and the Third Reich


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© Copyright 1999 by Harry Cooper, Sharkhunters International, Inc.
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