Imperial Japan
and the Third Reich

Military Collaboration During
the Second World War
Part VI

A Portion of the Doctoral Thesis
of Phillip Attenborough (440-1988)
(reprinted with permission)


Throughout March, the Japanese naval planning staffs and attaches were trying to convince the German Naval High Command that their cooperation was needed if a success was to be accomplished in the Indian Ocean. an official plan was formulated by the Japanese. The ‘KUROSHIMA’ plan called for operations to be ‘synchronized’ with German offensives.

On March 2, 1942 a delegation of combined fleet officers presented their concerns to the German naval attaché.

    “At the present stage of the war the decision about the strategy to be used by the tripartite powers could be of decisive importance. Should we succeed in the next few months in establishing a link between East Asia and Europe via the Indian Ocean, the war would be practically won and the British Empire would be finished. the question therefore arose whether Germany should not also concentrate her forces on this aim.”

The German staff could not give a definite commitment, but welcomed any Japanese initiative into the western Indian Ocean. In effect, Germany had refused Japan’s wish for joint ventures. It was not until the loss of the Japanese operational offensive on May of 1942 that Germany began to seriously consider joint maneuvers in the Indian Ocean.

The Germans purused a variety of operations throughout the Indian and Pacific Oceans during the Second World War. Many of these activities were conducted at a later date, when the Axis lacked the offensive. One of the first initiatives employed by the OKW in eastern waters, were operations pertaining to the war against Allied shipping via Auxiliary Cruisers. Auxiliary Cruisers were commonly referred to as ‘Axis Raiders’ by the Allies during the war. The hips were originally built in the mid-1930’s as German merchantmen. They ranged in displacement from approximately 3,000 tons to 8,000 tons. At the outbreak of the war in 1939, the German Navy requisitioned several such vessels and converted them into Auxiliary Cruisers. the process involved modifications in powerplant, communications systems, armour fittings, and armament installations. Each new vessel was equipped with over six medium naval guns (16cm), several anti-aircraft emplacements, torpedo tube systems and two float planes used for reconnaissance. The auxiliary cruisers roamed the seas, concealing their identity and their weaponry, waiting to ambush stray Allied merchantmen.

An advanced system of supply and transfer ships at rendezvous points had been organized by the Germans throughout the Indian and Pacific Oceans as early as June 1940. After an auxiliary cruiser had found its target, it would convey to the enemy that the merchantman would have to be abandoned, after which German authorities would take command of the ship and its cargo. enemy prisoners would then be taken aboard the raider and later transferred to a German supply ship in the proximity. In many instances however, the enemy ship would be sunk after valuable cargos were taken on board the raider. Priceless cargos and prisoners were usually shipped back to occupied France. There were however, several instances whereby German auxiliary cruisers transferred prisoners to Japanese authorities. Examples of German-Japanese exchanges will be examined later.

In October of 1940, Eyssen, the commander of the auxiliary cruiser ‘KOMET’ took command of the ‘Far Eastern Squadron’. In addition to capturing and sinking Allied merchantmen, the raiders laid mine fields throughout the eastern waters. The disruption of Allied shipping lanes was considered the raider’s primary function. While the ‘KOMET’ and her partner the ‘ORION’ searched for enemy shipping, their supply ships ‘REGENSBURG’ and ‘KUMBERLAND’ made frequent ventures to Japanese ports. The ships were then re-provisioned by the Japanese naval authorities and returned to their operational hunting grounds.

There was a great deal of success in the Indian Ocean during 1940. On November 10, 1940 the German auxiliary cruiser ‘ATLANTIS’ captured ‘OLE JACOB’, a Norwegian tanker. The vessel was carrying a cargo of aviation fuel. The Japanese had been desperately trying to acquire sufficient supplies of the hard pressed aviation fuel.

The German naval attaché in Tokyo (Wenneker) arranged an exchange of the captured fuel with the Japanese, for a lower grade used by the German ships operating out of the Asian harbours.

Problems did arise between the two Axis nations late in 1940, over raider operations. On December 27, 1940 the German raider ‘KOMET’ shelled Australian oil and phosphate works on Nauru. The shelling lasted over an hour and the damage was apparently substantial. The ‘KOMET’ was operating under the disguise of the ’IMPERIAL CHRYSANTHEMUM’ at the time. The incident caused quite an arousal in the Japanese press. Japan accused the German military of attempting to provoke an undesired war between Japan and her southern neighbours.

By 1942, German auxiliary cruisers operated out of Japan’s harbors frequently. In October of 1942, the raider ‘THOR’ sailed to Yokohama from Borneo. The ship docked alongside the ‘UCKERMARK’, a German supply ship. By November 30th, ‘THOR’ was practically refitted, when suddenly there was a devastating explosion from ‘UCKERMARK’. Both ships were destroyed and several German seamen were killed. The ‘UCKERMARK’s’ fuel tanks were being scraped down when the incident occurred. It was felt that the explosion was due to the carelessness of the Chinese coolies, although sabotage might have been the cause.

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