One German raider in particular, typified the German-Japanese link of cooperation in Asian waters. the MICHEL was built in 1939 by Danziger Werft, displacing over 4,470 tons and was equipped with armament installations similar to other German raiders. During MICHEL’s voyages in the Indian and Pacific waters, so coordinated many operations with her Japanese allies.

Before sailing to Japan, MICHEL made a transfer of prisoners to the UCKERMARK in mid-1942. the German supply ship then took her prisoners to Tandjoengprick, Java where they were released into Japanese captivity. The horrors of the ordeal were remembered by the few that survived! “They were punched, beaten and starved from camp to camp, island to island, from Java to Singapore... Thousands died delirious, skeletonized by disentery and swollen with beri-beri, stinking cairns of bones.”

(HARRY’s NOTE - the above description was from the memoirs of Mr. Gorski; Müggenthaler - GERMAN RAIDERS OF WWII.)

The Japanese apparently encouraged the Germans to transfer their prisoners to her military authorities, as labour was desperately required in the construction of railway lines to the mainland of Asia.

By February 1943, German naval operations were coordinated directly by Wenneker in Tokyo. during this time, MICHEL was ordered to report to Japan. On her voyage through the South Seas, the raider made several stops in Japanese held ports. The commander and crew reported that their liberty ashore was very closely monitored by the Japanese authorities. The Japanese apparently wished to avoid contact between the Europeans and the natives of the occupied territories. On February 17, 1943 MICHEL had reached Singapore, where she transferred a load of prisoners directly to the Japanese Army. The Japanese military required the prisoners labour in the construction of a railway link between Burma’s Rangoon-Ye line and the Singapore-Bangkok line.

On March 2, 1943 MICHEL reached Japan, she sailed into Kobe Harbour for a refit at the Mitsubishi Yards. Unlike the cold reception she had received in the territories, the officers and crew of the German vessel were warmly welcomed by the Japanese officials. the commander and crew conducted several meetings with the Japanese naval staff and met on one occasion with Emperor Hirohito, who bestowed an award to the commander of the vessel. The MICHEL was transferred to Gumprich, the commander of ex-THOR. the raider was then prepared for her voyage into the Pacific. the German Naval High Command had decided to send MICHEL into the far Pacific, where she would be capable of aiding the Japanese effort against the Allied convoys to Vladivostock. The operation was cut short however, when MICHEL was sunk by a U.S. submarine on October 17, 1943.

(HARRY’s NOTE - MICHEL was sunk by USS TARPON SS 175 on her 9th war patrol under command of T. L. Wogan. The brother of WERNER KREYMANN 1907-1991 was in the crew of MICHEL and was lost in this sinking.)

A great contention followed the sinking of the auxiliary cruiser. The German naval attaché in Tokyo, complained of Japan’s lax operational obligations. the cruiser had been sunk merely 120 miles from the Japanese mainland, yet the Japanese search and rescue operations were pitifully undertaken. Japanese action was not initiated until 38 hours after the sinking. German naval officials argued that the Japanese denied them the right to fly as observers in the search and rescue aircraft. The Japanese pilots never did discover the origins of the sinking or any of its survivors. The survivors floated ashore on small life rafts. Several survivors were found by Japanese military authorities days later, along the Japanese coastline. The German Navy would not excuse Japan’s inefficiency in her search and rescue operations or in the fact that the Imperial Japanese Navy took no measures to assist an Axis ship’s security within 120 miles of her shore. The Germans had done their utmost to provide security in the Bay of Biscay, whenever the arrival of Japanese submarines were anticipated.

Late in 1943, the German Naval High Command was convinced that German operations would have to be extended to submerged vessels. Allied supremacy was taking a toll on its surface raiders and blockade runners. The Japanese had disappointed the German authorities regarding the war on enemy shipping. There existed a continual disagreement between the two naval staffs concerning the deployment of their submarine forces. Germany stressed the need to use the submarine branch as a means of raising havoc amongst enemy convoys. The Japanese on the other hand, preferred to reserve its few submarines for the war against the larger British and American naval fleets. German authorities relentlessly pressed the Japanese naval attaché in Berlin to revise submarine policies.

Since late 1940, the Japanese had invited German submarines to enter the war against shipping in the Indian Ocean. In Dec. of 1942, Wenneker reported to Berlin of a Japanese proposal to make U-Boat bases at Peneng and Sabang. Before the Germans would comply to the Japanese request, they demanded that proper supplies of fuel, lubricants foodstuffs be provisioned at the bases. Admiral Dönitz made particular mention in his memoirs with concerns regarding sufficient availability of ‘European’ food for the U-Boat crews. The German Naval High Command felt particularly confident of the future venture and requested that the Japanese start construction of the bases immediately. The Japanese complied to the German request and it was merely a matter of time.

Admiral Dönitz delayed the operation for some time, since there was sufficient opportunity to sink Allied vessels in the Atlantic. Finally, in April of 1943, the first ‘MONSUN’ Group was sent into the Indian Ocean. The first eleven submarines of the group were long-range U-Boats of the Type IX-D2 and IX-C class. Five of the eleven submarines made the journey successfully. The remainder were lost during the Atlantic run. This group of submarines was sent to operate in a surprise maneuver in the northern section of the Indian Ocean, ships were sunk during the initial ‘MONSUN’ operations. On August 26, 1943 U-178 arrived in the Penang base.

U-178 and her commander, Captain Dommes, were ordered to remain in the Indian Ocean. Dommes became the base commander of Penang and the other smaller U-Boat facilities at Singapore, Djakarta, Surabaja and Kobe.

In December of 1943, the second and last ‘MONSUN’ Group was underway. Six U-Boats left France for operations in the Indian Ocean. Only one of the boats would ever reach the base at Penang. The journey from France to the Indian Ocean was becoming treacherous to perform. Allied anti-submarine tactics were becoming increasingly effective. In 1941, the Allies had captured an ‘ENIGMA’ machine and the German codes used by the U-Boat Command. Allied air and sea supremacy, anti-submarine warfare tactics and the knowledge of the German codes, made German submarine maneuvers increasingly unsuccessful.

Although the ‘MONSUN’ ventures proved beneficial to the Axis, there were many shortcomings. Normal U-Boat refits between patrols lasted up to two months to compete. Spare parts were not available, the dockyards that were prepared by the Japanese were primitive, the tools were of poor quality and the crews were expected to repair their own vessels. In Europe, repairs were carried out by trained dock workers. Communications systems between the bases were also rather poor. The fuel provided by the Japanese was harmful to the U-Boat diesel powerplants and tended to ‘smoke’ while on the surface. Needless to say, Allied observation for such vessels must have improved.

Life in the Asian bases proved to be unacceptable to the European crews. The German crew members complained of sickness, unfamiliar foods and a mixed attitude from the civilian population. The relationship between the European members and their Asian hosts was not as harmonious as anticipated. The Germans were restricted to the use of public facilities such as the ‘Singapore Swimming Club’. The ‘Westerners’ were blamed for Allied successes in the Pacific. The Germans became contemptuous of the Japanese and furious at their satirical reception of Soviet victories on the Eastern Front. The Japanese became increasingly hostile towards their guests as the war worsened. The relationship between the German and Japanese military forces in the eastern zone became similar in nature to that of the Allied - Free French problem. While they often resented each other over petty grievances, they continued to work together for the common cause.

More Imperial Japan and the Third Reich

Part I
Part II
Part III
Part IV
Part V
Part VI
Part VII
Part VIII
Part IX
Part X
Part XI