France and Prussia at War: 1806
Myths and Reality of Jena-Auerstadt

Conclusions: Similarities and Differences

by Scott Bowden

At Saalfeld, Jena and Auerstädt, the French were victorious. However, even though the operational command and control of the French troops was markedly superior to the Prussians, and even though the French had superior number of combatants at Jena, these victories were achieved only after fierce fighting. Proof of the intense nature of the battles is graphically illustrated not only by the devastating losses suffered by the Prussians, but also the number of casualties suffered by the Grande Armée. At Jena, Suchet's Divisions in Lannes' 5th Corps suffered one-third casualties. The avant-guard of the same corps lost 20% of its effectives. Marshall Davout's victorious 3rd Corps was more than 30% smaller after fighting at Auerstädt. Further proof is in the duration of these battles, which lasted about ten hours both at Jena and at Auerstädt. Indeed both sides were tenacious.

For victory to take so long despite the French being led by great combat leaders like Lannes, Davout and Napoleon, the adversary had to be "relatively equal in courage and skill in the engagements where tactical units go head-to-head." From the after-action reports of Lannes, Suchet, Ney, Soult, Davout, Gudin, Friant and Morand, it can be unequivocally stated that the Prussian soldier of 1806 was never an unworthy opponent. The battles of 1806 were certainly not what has been described as "warfare amongst second and third class armies."

What then where the similarities in the style of warfare between French and Prussians? And what where the differences that led to the Prussian defeat? These points are discussed below:

Similarities

(1) Both sides deployed their formed infantry to fight in line versus opposing infantry;
(2) Both sides utilized columns only for maneuver outside effective artillery fire range;
(3) Both sides utilized squares to defend against enemy cavalry;
(4) Both sides officers believed in leading 'from the front';
(5) Both sides believed in offensive warfare; and
(6) Both sides, in theory but only in a few instances, utilized tirailleurs in a like manner.

Differences

(1) French had a more flexible tactical system, especially with regard to tirailleurs, which allowed them to be used in large groups or work in conjunction with their parent units. In either instance, they were an important part of the battleline.

(2) Prussians viewed tirailleurs as light infantry and assigned them separate, secondary duties, almost always which were away from the decisive sectors of the battleline. French could maneuver their infantry and cavalry by multi-regiments and brigade. Once under fire, except for one instance during the 1806 battles, Prussians infantry always deployed and attacked in battalion echelon. The Frederician oblique order had not been abandoned or forgotten by the officers who only remembered the literal interpretation and not the spirit of Frederick's traditions. Indeed, the Prussian army of 1806 had only kept the way of Frederick and had forgotten the will "which had inspired the acts of the great king."

(3) French could maneuver and concentrate their artillery batteries along any portions of their line. Prussians almost always had their batteries deployed on the flank s of the brigade or division, saving the center of these lines for the formed infantry and their battalion guns. The deployment of the batteries to the flanks of the Prussian brigades or divisions resulted in their being vulnerable to attacks by French tirailleurs. There are numerous examples during the battles of 1806 where French infantry and cavalry in unformed order attacked and overran Prussian batteries. Also, the superiority of the French artillery companies over the Prussians is in evidence again and again during 1806.

(4) French utilized woods as areas through which they could send troops, entirely in unformed order if necessary, to envelop and /or threaten the enemy's flank or rear. Prussians viewed woods as an area in which only light troops operated. If no light troops were around, the woods would not be occupied by their men.

(5) French utilized villages as important positions to hold as these build-up areas would serve as point around which their battleline would maneuver. To hold a village, the French utilized a strong point defense covered by tirailleurs, with formed troops behind the village, ready to counter-attack the foe who had become disorganized trying to move through the village and/or trying to take the strong point or 'hideout.' The defense of Hassenhausen is classic example of this French philosophy. The Prussians, on the contrary, stayed away from taking and holding villages prior to a battle as it would disrupt their formed battleline. Once battle was joined and a village needed to be taken to maintain their battlelines, the Prussians would attempt to seize the village. Punished by French artillery and tirailleurs fire during their advance, disorganized by moving through the village, facing defenders who were firmly positioned in one or more strong points, the Prussian forward momentum would be arrested. The Prussian infantry would then be counter-attacked and broken by fresh reserves waiting behind the village. Once the enemy was driven off, the French troops would return to their previous positions and await the next enemy assault. This astute form of defense bled white the attackers. Thus, the Prussians fighting in and around Hassenhausen at Auerstädt and at Vierzehnheiligen at Jena suffered disproportionately high casualties compared to their French adversaries. The strong point defense was successfully employed by the French throughout the Napoleonic era. In addition to the Jena and Auerstädt examples would be Telnitz and Solkonitz at Austerlitz in 1805, Essling in 1809, Möckern and Schönefeld at Leipzig in 1813, and Plancenoit at Waterloo in 1815 to name but a few.

(6) During battle the French routinely formed special commands for specific tasks. The examples of Davout and his generals forming special 'task forces' at Auerstädt would take pages. While these commands could be any number of companies, they were invariably formed from regiments within the same division. The flexibility of the French to form the special commands and have the leadership pool available from which they could pull officers to command these 'task forces' stands in sharp contrast to the Prussians only being able to form similar command by order - and presence of - an officer of divisional command or higher. Thus, the more this happened on the Prussian side, the more Prussian generals were tied down fighting small tactical engagements rather than directing troops.

Thus, it was superior organization, command and control, and to a lesser extent more flexibility tactics of the French army which brought victory. Perhaps French historian Pascal Bressonet best summed up the French and Prussian at War in 1806: A soldier always fight well; but his efforts will remain useless if the commanders lack knowledge. To command, one must know. Only the ones who know how to act fruitfully, to conceive and to carry out simple plans are the only ones who succeed in war. And it is with this in mind that Napoleon's phrase must be understood: "The art of war is an art of simple execution."

War Against Prussia, 1806 Myths and Reality of Jena-Auerstadt

Related

War Against Prussia, 1806 Comparison of French and Prussian Tactics During the Campaign of 1806-1807 by Jean Lochet

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