War Against Prussia, 1806

II. Battles Around Localities

by Jean A. Lochet

We have seen that there were not some radical differences between both armies to weight the outcome in a decisive manner. On the other hand, there were considerable differences in the manner in which each army used localities, adapted their dispositions to the terrain and circumstances, and combined their efforts to best utilize the troops. During modern times, localities began to play an important role once the musket had been introduced, that is from the moment that infantry became the preponderant arm. That role increased as the weaponry improved. The defense of localities which previously took place from the interior, was pushed to the periphery and then to the exterior in such a way that, in present day battles, one can find a series of actions within a battle fought around localities and with them as objectives.

In 1806, the two armies have an entirely different concept on the role of localities in war. The French took hold of the localities and used them to maneuver; on the contrary, the Prussians appear to avoid them. It looks like the latter, in an orderly battle, consider the localities as a burden, while the French look at them as essential strongholds to anchor on.

The most typical example is the abandonment of the village of Vierzehnheiligen by Tauentzien's troops as soon as Hohenlohe's cavalry arrived, without anyone in the Prussian army thinking of holding it until the arrival on the line of battle of Grawert's Division or throwing infantry into that village. Consequently, Vierzehnheiligen, which the 40th of the Line had been unable to take from Tauentzien, was immediately occupied by that regiment, the 21st of the Line and the voltigeur battalion of the VIth Corps without encountering any opposition. As soon as the French had occupied the village, the Prussians moved to retake it. It would have been simpler to hold it.

If we compare the above fact with the dispositions taken on October 10 by Prince Louis, who did not occupy any of the localities marking his front and who only placed a weak detachment in Saalfeld, without thinking of maneuvering around these strongholds; and if we also take into consideration the other fact that neither Michel during the second part of the battle of Jena, nor the main Prussian army at Auerstadt occupied or used any localities, it becomes clear that we witnessing a definite system.

And that is most surprising when considering that the Prussian light troops do not profess the same aversion for localities that the troops of the line do.

If we take as examples the operations of Pelet's battalion, Valentini's Jagers, Ruhle's, Rabenau's, Rosen's and Erichsen's battalions [8] , either at Saalfeld or lena or during the fighting of October 12 and 13, we find out that these light troops used localities in a manner that the line infantry ignored completely. Here, we find the same clear cut separation in concept between the light troops and the troops of the line, that we have found in the Prussian army with respect to the tirailleurs. To the former, the combats of outposts, away from the pitched battles. According to an already quoted German historian, "there is no place for them in a large attack or a pitched battle."

These were reserved for the line troops, and it's not without interest to recall the opinion of Clausewitz, an eyewitness of the 1806 events, on the state of mind that was preponderant on that matter in the Prussian army.

    "General Tauentzien, with an all Prussian instinct, looked for the plain, and believed he could not do anything better than leave the difficult and inconvenient slopes of the Saale valley to the French and to withdraw behind it onto the flat plateau ground in order to launch a new attack against the enemy in echelons, because it was taught, recommended and preached hundred of times, that in war it was always preferable to attack; that the attack brought some great advantages and that type of fighting suited best the Prussian troops; - the attack in echelons was in a way, the highest expression of the Prussian tactic, that with which Frederick II had defeated the Austrians at Leuthen, therefore, a similar maneuver had to be used in the most critical cases and that was the case."

With all the reservations on the abandonment of the slopes of the plateau by Tauentzien, intensely debated by German historians, it appears that the obsession with the attack in echelon had dominated Prussian thought in the battles of 1806. There is a single exception: old Mollendorf, feeling the imperative necessity to capture Hassenhausen, launched a full regiment into that village without worrying about echelons. Except for the latter attack, there is not one attack which took place that was not in echelon.

Hence, it can be accepted that the opinions given by Clausewitz are the exact expression of the leading principles of the Prussian army. A real sentiment of offensive animated that army. But all its manifestations took place for the officer in the oblique order who had kept the letter, without the spirit, of the Frederician traditions.

The spirit of old Fritz was not in the oblique order, but in the idea of the offensive, in the resolution to attack and the will to triumph. For him, the oblique order was only a means to an end. The Prussian army had only kept the means and lost the spirit that had inspired the acts of the great King.

The oblique order could only be effectively used in open ground, free of obstacles. Consequently, the localities could only have been an obstacle, their presence could only break the plan of action. Thus, we can see the Prussian troops take them into consideration during their deployment only in order to avoid them. The Prussian instinct that Clausewitz speaks about brought them back to the denuded plain where the attack in echelon could take place like on the exercise grounds.

If the adversary occupies a locality and expects to defend it, so much the better. The attack in echelons favored the investment, and the enemy would succumb under the powerful concentration of battalion fire. That is the whole story, and the basis for the attacks launched by the Prussians against Vierzehnheiligen and Hassenhausen.

However, it was because of warlike passion, the desire to arrive at the solution by the quickest way and confidence in their own forces that the Prussians avoided localities. Consequently, they sought open ground where one can organize massive attacks and where the victory, when it is achieved, is more decisive that in broken ground.

The numerous documents that we have taken into consideration to analyze the combats fought around Hassenhausen allow us to comprehend first hand the manner in which the French conceived at that time how villages were to be utilized.

Vanguard

We remember that the vanguard of the 3rd Corps, in arriving in front of Hassenhausen, repulsed the Dragoons of the Queen, took their artillery and threw into the village the three companies of grenadiers and voltigeurs that had taken the battery. These companies moved their voltigeurs forward, up to the copses that covered the west of the village. The main part of Gudin's Division did not follow these three companies and did not enter the village, but discovering that Hassenhausen was at the bottom of a slight undulation, its commander positioned an infantry regiment on each side on the ridges that dominated the small valley. During all of the first part of the battle, the Hassenhausen garrison exclusively consisted of the three companies of grenadiers and voltigeurs.

When Wartensleben's Division suddenly appeared to the southeast of the village and the surprised 85th broke and exposed Hassenhausen, the 21st of the Line was thrown into it, but occupied the village on "its center", i.e. the tirailleurs on the edges and the battalions outside of it. Inside the village, a stronghold (reduit) was organized in the houses located on the furthest east side of the village. It's in front of that stronghold that a little later the efforts of the units of Division Schmettau that had entered Hassenhausen expired.

At that time, Morand's Division entered the battlefield. Its front regiment, the 13th Leger, was thrown into the village from which it repulsed the Prussians. Blinded by its ardor, it went beyond the village, but, because of the intense fire of the enemy that surrounded it, the regiment had to fall back. The regiment did not stop in the locality but withdrew behind it and there remained in reserve. Hassenhausen was then only occupied by the tirailleurs on its edges and the garrison of its stronghold. The 13th Leger, behind the village, was again ready to sweep enemy units that might have reentered the village.

At Vierzehnheiligen, the events took place in a similar manner. The French documents are mute on the subject, but, according to Hopfner, the edges were held by a multitude of tirailleurs, the reserves were behind, sheltered by thick walls or barns. Further in the rear, the regiments of the 5th Corps were spread out. As Division Grawert came closer, the 34th of the Line to the south, and then the 100th and 103rd to the north of the village, took part in the combat.

As it can be seen, the principle is unique. Some tirailleurs, in some cases more or less numerous, hold the edges of the village. With a solid stronghold, they form the bait on which the enemy will throw itself. Behind the village, a reserve is ready to enter in column to push back the invader, but will come back to its reserve position when its action is finished. The real defense is not on the locality, but on the flanks where the rest of the troops maneuver. The combats around Hassenhausen and Vierzehnheiligen are finally conducted on the same principles as those around Telnitz and Sokolnitz, in 1805.

To summarize, the differences in the two armies in the manner of using localities during combat were as extreme as possible: one did not use them at all, the other, not only had understood their importance, but used them in a especially skillful manner. That difference and the skill with which the French generals used the strongholds explain the considerable weakening of the Prussian troops around Vierzehnheiligen and Hassenhausen.

That considerable weakening incontestably contributed to the defeat. But it is very hard to accept that it was the preponderant cause for it. To be sure of that, it only suffices to imagine what would have been the outcome of the battle of Jena if Holtzendorf's Corps, that of Ruchel and the Saxon Division had fought side by side with Grawert's Division and acted together, and what Auerstadt would have been if the Divisions of the Reserve had been engaged at the right time with Wartensleben's and Schmettau's Divisions.

It is also important to remember that, in spite of the weakening, the Prussian troops' front did not give way and that the lateral attacks of the French to which the Prussians had nothing to oppose, were the deciding causes of the retreat.

A different distribution of the troops would have certainly achieved results altogether different. Perhaps the Prussian army would still have been defeated, but it is probable that, in this case, the defeat would have been limited and the disaster avoided.

Hence, above everything else, it is the mediocrity of the high command that must be faulted for the fatal outcome of Prussia in the Campaign of 1806.

Without considering the indecision, discussions and half-measures that preceded the decision taken by the Duke of Brunswick in the eve of October 10 to come closer to the Elbe river, we are going to take a brief look at the dispositions taken by the Prussian generals during the three days that preceded the battle.

On the eve of October 12, the King's and Hohenlohe's armies were at Kapellendorf and at Weimar respectively. Ruchel at Bechstedt was within a short march. The Saale was held by Tauentzien's troops.

With the exception of the Duke of Weimar's Corps and that of the Prince of Wurttemberg, the complete Prussian army was concentrated. During the night of 12th to the 13th, that concentration increased by the summoning and arrival of Ruchel's Corps at Weimar. Consequently, from Weimar to lena, the Prussian army was spread out about 20 kilometers (about 12.5 miles, JAL). That army could, altogether, be engaged during the same day on the battlefield.

Certainly, it was an excessive concentration. That mass was not articulated. But, worse, the high command was not yet determined either to fight or to withdraw. It hesitated and awaited events, without thinking about what to do in the different cases that could develop.

The appearance of the French on the Saale and the taking of Naumburg forced Brunswick to suddenly make a decision. Understanding the dangers of his situation, he decided to withdraw on the lower Saale and the Elbe with the complete army, by calling toward him the Prince of Wurttemberg, in order to, after facing the French, escape their pincer movement, recover the freedom of his communications and finally to fight a battle with the maximum force he can concentrate.

That sound decision, so justifiable, called for quick execution. The appearance of the French to the South of lena, along the Saale river and around Naumburg, called for an urgent retreat. On the 13th, that was still possible without a fight; but any waste of time had the consequence of bringing the Prussian army closer to an unavoidable disaster. Hence, it was imperative for the entire army to move in the vicinity of Auerstadt.

At that time, there was on both banks of the Ilm and on the plateau of Leopolda, enough roads and paths to allow such a movement. Just a limited security screen in front of Jena, Kamburg and Naumburg would have been sufficient to mask that movement to the Emperor.

On the evening of the 13th, Ruchel, Hohenlohe and the main army could have bivouacked around Auerstadt; and on the 14th, either crush Davout, if he had in that hypothetical situation attacked as bluntly as he did in reality, which appears highly improbable from a general of that valor, or crossed over the Unstrut in complete safety and then gained one or two marches on the French army. On the 15th, perhaps united with the Prince of Wurttemberg, the Duke of Brunswick could have started the campaign under better conditions.

Instead of acting with the necessary promptness that was required by the critical circumstances, the Prussian command lost considerable time. That fault was made worst by Schmettau's inexplicable delay. Beside that, it was believed necessary to make the different parts of the army march in some sort of echelons, in such a way, that closely concentrated on the eve of the 12th, the army on the morning of the 14th found itself divided and cut off in three different parts of unequal strength, separated from each other by half a day to a day's march: the King's army at Auerstadt, that of Hohenlohe at Kapellendorf, Ruchel at Weimar. And, as if such a measure was not sufficient to confuse the situation, on the 13th, Prince Hohenlohe in turn divided his own army into several detachments that he carefully isolated from one another. On the morning of the 14th, the distribution of his troops was not changed.

When the French army attacked, the prince thought of concentrating his forces, but instead, he satisfied himself by trying to attract his lieutenants toward him, without taking any measure to help and render possible that reunion. He accepted the battle passively, without doing any planning, without reserves, abdicating all initiative, and did so poorly that his army which, concentrated would not have been inferior to the number of the French troops until noon, was crushed piecemeal in separate successive combats, and that Rachel's Corps was in turn included in the disaster.

In the King's army, the vanguard Division, which had for its mission to secure the Kosen defile at the end of the day's march on the eve of the 13th, stopped on its own initiative a little beyond Auerstadt and, without worrying any further, allowed the French 3rd Corps to seize the Kosen bridge.

The Duke of Brunswick did not think of pushing forward that Division and make it occupy Kosen on that evening, and on the next morning, when he gave his orders, in spite of the fact that he knew of the occupation of Naumburg by Marshal Davout and that he been informed of Napoleon's presence in that locality, he did not consider for even a minute the possibility of a battle; with the exception of Schmettau, which was to serve a flank-guard, he directed the entire army toward the Unstrut. At 15 kilometers (9 miles) from the enemy, his main concern was not fight a battle but to cross a river. And yet, the old Feld-Marschall von Mollendorf had suggested attacking the enemy; but his suggestion was claimed to be ridiculous!

However, let us say that with the first shots, the warrior instinct came back to the Duke of Brunswick and he immediately issued complete, broad orders for the battle.

Schmettau's Division which was in the first line, had to await until Wartensleben's Division had arrived and aligned itself with the former. These two divisions together were to attack the heights of Hassenhausen. The Orange Division was to support them. Finally, the two reserve Divisions were called onto the plateau to the East of Gernstedt, awaiting orders from the high command.

These preparatory dispositions appear to have been wise, and we can presume that the Duke of Brunswick, if he had not been mortally wounded, would have certainly used his troops so deployed in a more rational manner than the way they were used. The Duke of Brunswick's disappearance was, in any case, a great calamity for the Prussian army. Everyone gave orders. The reserve Divisions remained inactive. In addition, the insufficient measures taken to move the troops did not allow Orange's Division to intervene in time during the combat and to have any other effect other than plugging the holes in the first line.

Briefly, as a consequence of the death of the Duke of Brunswick, the direction given to the battle on the Prussian side had the paradoxical result of rendering possible the victory of about 26,000 brave men over an army of equally brave men using tactical proceedings almost identical.

Finally, at Auerstadt, the royal army, like that of Hohenlohe at Jena, allowed its elements to be defeated in succession.

Finally, let us also notice that, for each one of the large units engaged on the Prussian side, everything was sacrificed for the initial impact. Behind the echelons, there were no reserves.

On the contrary, on the French side, we witness a careful concentration, at first a spacing out, in depth; then forces that are successively deployed to present a firing line as spread out as that of the enemy, an extreme economy on the front, distances that allow maneuvering on the battlefield, finally an interaction of reserves sparingly managed, but spent to the last man when a decision has to be reached.

Thus, it is in the manner in which the elements were used by the commanders rather than a difference in the valor or in the instructions of these elements that one should look for the causes of the Prussian defeat. Above all, it is the indecision of the high command and the forgetting of the main principles of the Frederician principles that have lost that army.

One can not make a better comparison between the high morale of the Prussian army in 1806 and that of the French army in 1870. On both sides, the troops were very brave and capable of greatest efforts. But, also on both sides, the high command was immobilized in false ideas, exclusive of movement and of the will to look for the battle.

The defeats, for the ones who know to contemplate, are the source of much teaching.

On both sides, it is the same commanders, defeated in 1806 or 1870, that proceeded with the army's reorganization and revealed the principles that had given the victory to their adversaries.

The bravest soldiers make good generals only if they add to their warlike qualities the extensive knowledge that prepares them to direct the troops in the middle of war's eventualities. Mack and Bazaine are the most flagrant and sad proof of that principle. And if we go back to the period of the First Empire, we notice that with the exception of Davout and Massena, [9] the Marshals, soldiers of fortune, show themselves incapable of commanding in chief, suffered independently only defeats and miscarried Napoleon's maneuvers.

A last conclusion can be found in these Etudes tactiques sur la campagne de 1806: before everything else, what is important in an army is to organize and instruct its command. The value of an army lies entirely in that of its officers and generals.

The soldier always fights well; but his efforts will be always fruitless if the direction lacks ability. To command, one must know. Only the ones that know are capable of acting competently, to conceive successful. And it is in that context that the very meaningful quotation from Napoleon can be interpreted: "The art of war is a simple art and everything lies in the execution."

More War Against Prussia, 1806 Comparison of French and Prussian Tactics During the Campaign of 1806-1807

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