War Against Prussia, 1806

I. Bressonet's Conclusions
on the Campaign of 1806

by Jean A. Lochet

"At Saalfeld, Auerstadt and Jena, the French were victorious. But, in spite of the fact that they were under the command of men such as Lannes, Davout and Napoleon, and despite the French numerical superiority at Jena, victory was only achieved at the price of a fierce struggle.

The initial test of how fierce the struggle was, is found in the casualties suffered by the Grande Armee. For instance, Suchet's Division had a third of his effective strength "hors de combat" [1] on 14 October, 1806. The vanguard of the VI Corps d'Armee lost one fifth of its effectives. Finally, Davout's Corps was reduced by one-third on the eve of the same day. The proof of fierce combat is also found in the duration of the battles which was approximately ten hours at Auerstadt and Jena.

For the victory to be so dearly disputed, it must have been that in the partial encounters, in combat at the basic level, where tactical units are fighting face to face, a near equilibrium existed between the two adversaries, both in courage as well as the manner using the different arms.

What one can be sure of right now, is that at Auerstadt, Jena or Saalfeld, the Prussian soldier was not at fault.

The fierce struggles during these battles proves that the thesis put forth by General von der Golz, amongst others, in his works (Rosbach et Jena and D'Iena a Eylau), that the valor of the Prussian army suffered an eclipse in 1806 to reemerge in 1807, is perfectly inaccurate. The troops deserved the same recognition at Jena and Auerstadt that they should at Eylau or at Leipzig. Starting in 1807, it is the only the command that changed.

However, at the basic level of combat, i.e. that conducted by small units, morale value is not everything. One must also take into consideration the way in which the different arms of service are used, i.e. elementary tactics.

We touch here on a very controversial point, which until now has been studied very superficially and deserves to be cleared up. To be precise, as we already stated, we are now in a position to say that the elementary tactics of the Prussian infantry did not put it, a priori, in a very clear state of inferiority in comparison with the French army. If not, the victory of the latter would have been easier, the struggle shorter and the losses much lower.

During the battles of Saalfeld, Jena and Auerstadt, the lines of battle on both sides are in the form of deployed battalions, exchanging musket fire with the enemy line, separated by some intervals in which artillery batteries or regimental pieces are found and making slow progress in the favor of the combined fire of the musketry and of the artillery. When they were out of musket range, the battalions on the French side had their front covered by tirailleurs who extended to the enemy lines, and, which, as soon as they were rejoined by their battalions and the latter opened fire again, pulled back onto the flanks which they protected and linked with the neighboring units.

On the Prussian side, some battalions cover themselves with tirailleurs and some others do not use them.

In 1806, did a difference of doctrine existed? Had the tirailleurs partially disappeared from the Prussian army where they had been used in the previous century? There is nothing of the sort, and we are going to explain how the question of tirailleurs was understood in both armies.

Concerning the French, we can not do any better that to send the reader back to the book written by Colonel Marbot as an answer to General Rogniat's Considerations sur l'art de la guerre. [2]

This book is the most complete work on the tactical doctrine of the Grande Armee that was left to us by an eyewitness, who was both energetic and wise, as well as a participant in all its campaigns.

Colonel Marbot divides the tirailleurs into two clearly distinct categories: "tirailleurs de marche et de combat" (i.e. "tirailleurs for the march and combat") and "tirailleurs en grande bande" (i.e. "tirailleurs in large groups").

The first type operates in contact with the battalion, for which they scout during the march and which they cover during combat. Their origin lies in the pickets that were in the past detached forward from the battalions to protect themselves. "These tirailleurs", Marbot says, "have for a mission repelling the enemy's first outposts, and probing its position. But their main function is to bring disorder in the enemy's ranks, which is very easy for them if they are allowed to come close... .They upset the enemy, which must now send against them his own tirailleurs in order to push these masses back on the attackers and to try, in turn, to bring disorder to its columns.

So, the tirailleurs of both sides, in an attempt to protect their own line and to disorder the enemy, neutralize each other and decide nothing, because in the shock of the masses that decides the issue of the combat, and as soon as they come in contact, the tirailleurs become useless and even an hindrance and it becomes necessary to recall them."

Hence, the "tirailleurs de combat" are elements subordinated to the battalions for which they prepare the attack, scout and with which they ultimately join together. Their action can not decide an action, i.e. to carry a combat to its conclusion.

On the contrary, the "tirailleurs en grande bande", constitute a "main body which has as an assignment to take or defend a position, or to outflank the enemy."

When facing strong positions reinforced by fortifications and defended by good troops, the attack of which could invariably cause large losses, "several French generals during the wars of the Revolution used the tirailleurs en grandes bandes for such attacks, always with success. These generals were convinced that there was no position that could not be turned, no steep mountains that could not be climbed, and knowing that scattered men can easily climb among obstacles of all kind, the hillsides that would be inaccessible to the formed troops marching in columns or in line, these generals, I am saying, were throwing into tirailleur, on one or both flanks of the position they wanted to take, a battalion, a regiment or even at times a full brigade, while another formed in column, outside of artillery range, threatened the front of the position."

Consequently, the tirailleurs en grandes bandes were the "main body", that is capable in and of itself to carry a combat to a conclusion and capable of fighting on terrain inaccessible to formed troops. That was an extension of the principle that had brought about the creation of light troops, and it is fair to notice that the actions of the tirailleurs en grande bande were especially reserved for these troops during the wars of the Revolution. However, when the case arose, the troops of the line were employed in that function as well as the demi-brigades legeres (demi-brigades of light infantry, JAL).

But the tirailleurs en grandes bandes were the exception on the battlefield, and on the plateaus of the Saale, where the fighting of 1806 took place, neither the ground nor the circumstances required their usage. Thus, we only find one instance, that on the eve of the battle of Jena, where, to attack the steep position of the Eckartsberg, the I st battalion of the 48th was sent entirely in tirailleurs on the left of the Prussian line.

Aside from that instance, there are no more examples of the use of tirailleurs en grandes bandes on either side. On the other hand, a close study of the October battles of 1806 clearly shows that the tirailleurs de combat were constantly used by both sides.

In Prussia, an order from the War Cabinet dated March 3, 1775 had stipulated that "in order to have in a campaign a certain number of tirailleurs that would be able to fulfill the service in patrols, without being necessary to draw out some detachments from the fusiliers", 10 men per company would be trained as tirailleurs. In addition, in order to promote a sort of competition among the troops, "no one could be promoted to NCO without having been a tirailleur for a few years."

    "As shown the preceding lines, the basic point of these orders was not to promote a change in any way to the existing infantry tactics. The tirailleurs were created only to give more autonomy to the regiments or battalions isolated during a campaign and to give them the means to assure their security during a march, the outposts and to fulfill during a campaign the other services so far mainly performed by the light troops. "

But, as early as 1789, the tactical role of the tirailleurs was developed on a broader basis. On 26 February of that year, another printed special instruction completed and developed the principle of the regulation in which "the tirailleurs had to learn to fight entirely as the chasseurs a pied (i.e. foot chasseurs, JAL)". The exercises to teach to the tirailleurs, including outpost duties and patrols as well as that of the security of the columns during the march and of the chains ahead of a position, made up a very comprehensive program in which one can see a new concept appearing to make the tirailleurs fight in liaison with their battalions.

    "When a regiment or a battalion, " says the regulation, "moves forward to take a position, the tirailleurs can deploy ahead of their unit, then move forward ahead of their battalions to cause by theirfire a certain damage in the enemy's ranks and to disorder it before the arrival of the battalion. But when one or more battalions come within musket range of the enemy, the tirailleurs must fall back on each side and follow the battalion or regiment and hence can protect the flanks. "

The regulation is almost identical concerning their role in a defensive action.

However, it does not appear that this new concept was implemented. The tirailleurs created to complement the light infantry and to perform their duty with the battalions and regiments, were assimilated with that infantry by most.

    "In the 'petite guerre', in the small actions in wooded terrain or in mountains, in vanguard skirmishes, or the overhangs of fortified positions, the combat in open order of the light infantry found its natural application. In such conditions, it could fight the Croats and the Pandours, but no plan existed for their usage during a large attack taking place in a battle."

The tirailleurs, in the general opinion, assimilated to the light infantry and was consequently used in the same manner as that infantry.

    "For that reason the Prussian army could not establish a workable relationship between combat in close order and that in open order, in spite of the fact that the advantages of such a relationship were brought to light by the Wars of the French Revolution and the successes of General Bonaparte, but prior to that, promoted by enlightened soldiers like Marshal de Saxe."

The German historian, [3] had one more comment, which exactly completes what the study of the preceding battles (i.e. that of the Campaign of 1806, JAL) had taught us:

    "Where they were used during the Wars of the Revolution as well as in 1806 or 1807, the fusiliers showed themselves to be the equal of their adversaries. But, as the result of their small number and of a faulty distribution of troops, not only was the light infantry that was with the army completely missing from the major combats, but, several times, it had been necessary to withdraw the tirailleurs from their regiments to replace the light troops the army lacked.

    The main Prussian army that fought at Auerstadt had only 3 battalions of fusiliers of the 24 that the Prussian army included; in addition, these 3 battalions, as well as the Jager battalion of Weimar, were at the rear of army. That is the reason why Schmettau Division's tirailleurs were detached for vanguard duties and patrols on the flanks. During the battle, most of them found it impossible to rejoin their respective units. On a number of occasions, similar detachments were organized with the regimental tirailleurs to support batteries or occupy a wood, which had the effect most of the time of depriving the regiments, when they consequently had to fight, of the tirailleurs with them."

In a memorandum of June 13, 1807 dated from Soissons, while a prisoner of war, Prince August of Prussia summed up his opinion on tirailleurs:

    "We have misunderstood, for the greater part, their tactical objective. They were used as light infantry or they were considered as a school for NCOs. To be convinced of that, one has just to read the parts of the regulation concerning their exercises and their usage during the war against the French and on most of the exercises during peace tune. It is only in rare imperative times that the tirailleurs can be used as light troops; they must never be separated from their battalions. They are at their best when acting in liaison with the line infantry, and by the effect of their fire, preparing for its attack and supporting it."

As we have seen previously, the Prussians already had tirailleurs. [4]

Their number was 10 and 1 NCO per company which gives 40 to 50 per battalion, as in France. [5]

In 1803, General von Pelet, commanding the Fusilier Brigade of Lower Silesia, doubled their number in his battalions, using the 48 rifles of his NCOs to arm them. That measure was extended to the two other fusilier battalion which were part of his brigade (Ruhle and Rabenau), as well as the Guard battalions and the King's Regiment. In 1806, it was extended to the other seven fusilier brigades.

But until the end of 1806, the Prussian tirailleurs were considered more like light infantry than tirailleurs de combats, which had as a direct consequence their frequent detachment from their battalion at the time of battle. Consequently, Prince August ends his memorandum by saying:

    "It is the lack of light troops which caused the bad usage of the tirailleurs, and there lies the proof that it is necessary to use the men of the third rank as tirailleurs."

The thought of using the men of the third rank as tirailleurs was not new. As early as 1794, the Austrians in the Low-Countries had organized a division (i.e. 2 companies, JAL) with the third rank. They placed it behind each battalion, which allowed opposition to the enemy's longer frontage hence assuring a better protection of the flanks, and by the same token, mobile reserves behind their first line.

In Prussia, the idea took longer to develop; it needed the teachings of defeat for it to be established. And yet, already in 1791, the Duke of Brunswick in his Instructions for my regiment had given some detailed instructions to form platoons with the third rank similar to the ones that became regulations from 1812 to 1876. In 1797, Prince Hohenlohe, in his Instructions for the Inspection of Lower Silesia, , had devoted a long article to the organization of a reserve for each battalion with the third rank.

In July 1798, Feldmarschall von Mullendorf writes an "Instruction for the formation of a second line by means of the third rank" for the Berlin regiments, and that instruction was completed by a similar order from the King dated May 2, 1802.

Prince Hohenlohe's instruction precisely states in paragraph 22:

    "In war, there are numerous cases in which it is advantageous or necessary to attack the enemy with tirailleurs, either that he himself attack with that means or that we are compelled to or we find advantageous to defend ourselves in this way. Concerning the question to know if that kind of combat is specific to the light infantry or to the tirailleurs of the line infantry, experience shows that the light troops can not always be present and that the number of the line infantry tirailleurs is not high enough to attack or to defend in that manner. The third rank of that infantry could be, if necessary, used in that manner."

At the time of the mobilization of 1805, an order from the Cabinet dated October 5, stipulated to the complete army to form with the third rank a reserve for each battalion, a measure that was often used during the winter of 1805-1806. That order did not include the usage of the third rank for open order (i.e. as tirailleurs, JAL). But that had become standard practice in Hohenlohe's inspection, and furthermore was not limited to that inspection. In addition, that practice was also used in Berlin by the grenadier battalion Prinz August, and in some other garrisons, but as general rule, with the exception of the fusiliers and the foot chasseurs (Jagers), such innovations were isolated cases.

Most of the infantry did not implement it. The Guard received, as we know, twice the number of tirailleurs. The other troops kept their bad habits.

It is only on November 20, 1807, by a Cabinet order, that the Prussian army was ordered to use the third rank entirely as tirailleurs. As a consequence, the former battalion tirailleurs disappeared entirely.

That order, concerning the tirailleurs, is the corner stone of the regulation of 1812, of which some parts were to remain valid until 1866 and 1870.

Consequently, it is well established that in 1806, at the time of the opening of the Campaign, the greater part of the Prussian army considered the tirailleurs as auxiliaries to the light infantry, and that, in most of the infantry, they were not fighting in liaison with the line infantry. That is also the conclusion that comes out indisputably from the detailed study of the combat of Saalfeld and of the two great battles of 1806.

But it is also evident to report that if, on open ground, the fact of not using tirailleurs in liaison with the line battalions had been more costly to the Prussian battalions in their efforts to advance, the lack of tirailleurs did not prevent them from resisting us vigorously until the action of new French troops on the weak points of their line or on their flanks forced them to give in. [6]

Thus, the elementary tactics used by the Prussians was sufficient to measure itself with ours. In order to almost have an equilibrium between the two armies, it must have been, as mentioned in the beginning, that the differences between the two basic tactics of both parties would not have been very significant. Hence, almost all military historians are in error when they claim that a great difference existed between the French and Prussian tactics, saying that the former used the ordre profond (i.e. column formations) consisting of columns headed by tirailleurs while the latter were still using the linear order.

In fact, from the study of Saalfeld, Jena and Auerstadt, it comes out that the French used the column exclusively as a preparatory formation for combat and to maneuver on the battlefield, outside of artillery range. Under artillery fire, the columns deployed. The latest they deployed was when entering the zone of infantry fire, and the frontal combats, in the three battles, took place invariably in the form of two lines of battalions, more or less supported by some reserves, deployed within musket range in front of each other and which were firing at each other for hours.

Regarding the formations with close ranks, both armies are thus at about the same point. Perhaps there is more rigidity in the Prussians ranks, more flexibility and aptitude to maneuver with the French. Concerning the tirailleurs, the latter used them more constantly, with more reasons and more ability than the Prussians, which can be explained as well by their greater experience of war than some preconceived ideas.

Consequently, it is completely inaccurate to pretend that in 1806, two completely different tactics were opposed. It would not be accurate either to say that the French and the Prussians practiced the same tactic.

There was to the advantage of the French a slight difference that certainly contributed, but only second arily, to the successes of the 10th and 16th October, but which would very difficult to explain. The secret of the victory can be more likely found in the ability with which the French generals knew to adapt their dispositions to the terrain and circumstances, using the localities, playing with their reserves and combining their efforts.

On the contrary, the Prussians, perhaps because their leaders were badly selected or perhaps because they lacked the experience of war, acted with clumsiness, indecisiveness and in a disjointed manner.

When one thinks that the vanquished of 1806 are the same that inflicted our defeats of 1813, 1814 and 1815, and that we see at Jena and Auerstadt the energetic attitude of the old survivors of the real Frederician period, such as Feldmarschall von Mollendorf, one can only wonder that the same army, under the command of men of that caliber, could have aspired to a better outcome. [7]

More War Against Prussia, 1806 Comparison of French and Prussian Tactics During the Campaign of 1806-1807

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