War Against Prussia, 1806

III. Comments and Conclusions on Bessonet:
Lochet and Griffith

by Jean A. Lochet

SOME COMMENTS ON BRESSONET'S CONCLUSIONS
BY JEAN A. LOCHET

Bressonet is a very readable work. In addition it is a monumental work. As previously mentioned, Bressonet was a French army staff officer who died in 1908 before the publication of his Etudes tactiques de la campagne d'Allemagne, 1806 which appeared posthumously in 1909. Reading Bressonet, one finds much more limited data on tactics and grand tactics than the author covers in his conclusions above. Some of his conclusions, especially those on tactics, are somewhat misleading.

Before we make some comments and draw some further conclusions on Bressonet, let us review some comments made by Paddy Griffith in EEL 82 (Vol.1) (pp. 16-22).

L PADDY GRIFFITH ON BRESSONET

    "On the other hand, Bressonet never did write down any proper conclusions, unless you count the two paragraphs on p. 378 quoted by Harry [10]. This is a common fault in posthumous works - the author has no opportunity to cogitate deeply about his discoveries and tell us what he thinks they really mean! Conclusion: - Do not make generalizations aboutBressonet's supposed 'conclusions', but look deeply into what he really said.

    In addition, Paddy warns us: "Beware of Bressonet when it comes to the details of minor tactics."

To be complete and elaborate on Paddy's very pertinent conclusions on Bressonet, we have reprinted the relevant portion of his article on Bressonet originally published in EEL 82 in the "TRUDGING IN THE PENINSULA" section of this issue.

The reader will find that Paddy Griffith's conclusions on Bressonet are to the point. I agree with them. However, there are some further points of disagreement with Bressonet's conclusion that I'll like to cover. As the reader will see, my points of disagreement are actually more on what was not said or not clearly said by Bressonet rather, with a few exceptions, than outright disagreements.

(1) ON THE IMPORTANCE OF SKIRMISHERS

I, also, was very surprised by Bressonet's silence on the importance of the morale effect of some of the French tactics or grand tactics, mainly the use of columns and skirmishers, on some Prussian units. Granted, in spite of the damage done by skirmishers, most of the Prussian infantry put up a strong showing, but, as we shall see later, that does not mean skirmishers were not a significant factor in the Campaign of 1806. The tactical and grand tactical concepts of the Prussian army of 1806, like that of Frederick, did not recognize the importance of the "tirailleurs de combat" in spite of all the ordinences from the Cabinet, etc. which were not implemented. For those in doubt, let us see what Bressonet says about Prince August when he quotes him (see quotation above in Bressonet's text):

"In a memorandum of June 13, 1807 dated from Soissons, Prince August of Prussia, while a prisoner of war, summed up his opinion on the 'tirailleurs de combats'

    `We have misunderstood, for the greater part, their tactical objective. They were used as light infantry or they were considered as a school for NCO 's. To be convinced of that, one has just to read the parts of the regulation concerning their exercises and their usage during the war against the French and on most of the exercises during peace time. It was only on rare imperative occassions that the tirailleurs could be used as light troops; they must never he separated from their battalions. They are best acting in liaison with the line infantry, and by the effect of their fire, to prepare its attack and to support it. "'

Personally, I interpret Prince August's memorandum as an acknowledgement by a Prussian General that in spite of the several attempts made by the Prussian Cabinet, a significant difference of doctrine existed between the Prussian and French armies concerning the use of tirailleurs de combats. In 1806, the evidence, as stated by Prince August, is that the use of tirailleurs de combats was simply not understood by the majority of the Prussians generals.

Hence, I can not accept Bressonet's statement in toto that says:

    "In 1806, did a difference of doctrine exist? Had the tirailleurs partially disappeared from the Prussian army where they were used in the previous century? There is nothing of the sort..."

I also don't agree with Bressonet's statement that skirmishers were used by the Prussian army in the previous century. For instance, Frederick did not use skirmishers, or more precisely, light troops in the early part of the Seven Years War. [11]

Subsequently, he used them sparingly as light troops and not "tirailleurs de combat". We have to wait until 1759 to see some relatively effective volunteer (frei) battalions being fielded as light infantry.

As a matter of fact, the defeat at Kolin was mostly due to a lack of skirmishers or "tirailleurs de combat" on the Prussian side [12], to the point that the unopposed Austrian skirmishers harassed some flank units of the Prussian army so badly, that these units were forced to deploy prematurely to defend themselves [13].

This nullified Frederick's battle plan. The following are Napoleon's comments on the battle of Kolin as quoted by Home, which you will find most interesting:

    "At the battle of Kolin, it is difficult to justify the attempt to turn Daun' s right flank made from 600 to 1000 yards from the heights occupied by the enemy. This operation was rash and opposed to the principles of war. Never make a flank march before an enemy in position, especially when it occupies the heights at the foot of which you must march.

    The King might have attacked the Austrian left and he was admirably placed for doing so; but, to try and march under a fire of musketry and artillery from an entire army occupying a commanding position, is to imagine that that army has neither guns nor smallarms. To say that the King's maneuver failed because a battalion leader, wearied with the fire of the Austrian skirmishers, wheeled into line and attacked in his front is an error. The movement the Prussian army made was one demanded by the greatest necessity, - viz., its own safety, and that instinct which forbids men to allow themselves to be killed without defending themselves."

Napoleon simply absolves the Prussian battalion commander that wheeled his battalion into line to answer the fire of the Austrians skirmishers. If, to quote Napoleon, "...The movement the Prussian army made was one demanded by the greatest necessity (i. e. that a battalion leader, wearied with the fire of the Austrian skirmishers, wheeled into line JAL), - viz., its own safety, and that instinct which forbids men to allow themselves to be killed without defending themselves."

If the highly trained Prussian army of 1757 had to react to unopposed skirmishers, what makes us think that the equally brave and equally highly trained army of 1806 did not have a similar reaction to French skirmisher fire? That question is partially answered by Paddy Griffith and will be further covered later on. Note that I don't mean that skirmishers, especially unopposed skirmishers, had a decisive effect in 1806, but they were a contributing factor to the outcome of the combats that is difficult to quantify.

Unopposed skirmishers are defined as skirmishers that are not engaged by enemy skirmishers. Therefore, they are fighting formed troops (see Bressonet on skirmishers).

Another point that is ignored in Bressonet's conclusion is the ability of the French skirmishers to capture artillery and, in some cases, to turn that artillery against their previous owners. This is a point that we shall see in a future issue.

(2) ON THE NUMBER OF FRENCH AND PRUSSIAN SKIRMISHER AVAILABLE IN 1806

In his conclusions, Bressonet made a statement concerning the number of skirmishers available to both armies:

    "As we have seen previously, the Prussians already had tirailleurs. Their number was 10 and I NCO per company which gives 40 to 50 per battalion, as in France. "

As mentioned in note 5, that statement by Bressonet is in error and somewhat misleading. In 1806, a French battalion roughly numbered between 720 to 960 men in 9 companies, one of which was a voltigeur company, so that the French line battalion had somewhere around 80 to 110 tirailleurs. That is about twice the number of tirailleurs available to a Prussian line battalion! In addition, the French sometimes used the grenadier company as tirailleurs (like at Hassenhausen). During the campaign of 1806, we see numerous instances in which the light companies had been assembled with the grenadiers in a so-called "bataillon d'elite". Furthermore, in 1806, most, if not all, line battalions could deploy as tirailleurs if need arise, something the Prussian line battalions of 1806 were incapable of doing.

Of course, the Prussian army had additional light troops, Schutzen and fusiliers, which could be used either as tirailleurs de combat or tirailleurs en grandes bandes, but most of these light troops were largely used as tirailleurs en grandes bandes or as light troops. As such, they were detached from the main forces, and hence, there were too few of them left with the main forces to make any difference. Let us make some pertinent quotes from Bressonet's conclusions:

    "The main Prussian army that fought at Auerstadt had only 3 battalions of fusiliers of the 24 that the Prussian army included; in addition, these 3 battalions, and also the Jager battalion of Weimar, were at the rear of that army. That is the reason why Schmettau's Division's tirailleurs were detached for vanguard duties and patrols on the flanks. During the battle, most of them, found it impossible to rejoin their respective units. In a number of occasions, similar detachments were organized with the regimental tirailleurs to support batteries, occupy a wood, which had, as its effect, to consequently deprive the regiments, most of the time, of their tirailleurs at the time when they had to fight."

Which could explain why:

    "On the Prussian side, some battalions covered themselves with tirailleurs, some others did not use them."

Consequently a fundamental difference on the use of skirmishers existed between the doctrines of the French army and that of the Prussian army.

(3) ON PRUSSIAN GRAND TACTICS IN 1806: THE OBLIQUE ORDER

Unfortunately, the skirmisher question is not the only point that I logically question. There is also the issue of tactical and grand tactical differences between the French and the Prussian armies, such as the "oblique order" or the "attack in echelon", the importance of massed artillery, etc. that are ignored or not covered in part or as a whole. I claim and intend to prove that tactics and grand tactics simply can not be separated to get a true picture on the differences that existed between the two armies.

(The reader interested in the oblique order will find detailed coverage of that maneuver by Marc Raiff in "ON THE BACKGROUND OF THE NAPOLEONIC WARFARE" in our next issue).

In his conclusions, Bressonet tells us of the Prussian obsession with the attack in echelon. I certainly agree with his statements, but I wonder about the interpretation that I should give to a later statement: "...Consequently, it is completely inaccurate to pretend that in 1806, two completely different tactics were opposed; it would not be accurate either to say that the French and the Prussians practiced the same tactics."

I am the first one to agree that both the French and the Prussian of 1806 deployed into line to firefights or were under artillery fire and formed squares to repulse cavalry charges (see in the last issue, a more complete assessment on "similarities and differences" of FrenchPrussian tactics in Scott Bowden article "French and Prussians at War in 1806 - A discussion of the Battlefield Myths and Realities of the Saalfield-Jena-Auerstadt Campaign").

First, the above statement is somewhat misleading for the simple reason that it implies only tactics. Since, in many cases, there is such a thin line between tactics and grand tactics, the attack in echelon, which borders on grand tactics, should not be dissociated from the tactics used by the Prussian army.

Although they systematically practiced flank attacks whenever possible, the French in 1806 surely did not employ the Prussian oblique order, or attack in echelon while (quoting Bressonet again), with the exception of the attack on Hassenhausen, "there is not one (Prussian, JAL) attack which took place that was not in echelons."

In my opinion, the above points out a significant difference in the tactics or more exactly, the grand tactics used by the French and the Prussians. In 1806, according to Clausewitz, the oblique order was obsolete and had outlived its usefulness. Here is what Clausewitz's said on that matter in his famous On War [14] p. 154-5:

    "So long as no acceptable theory, no intelligent analysis of the conduct of war exists, routine methods will tend to take over even at the highest levels. Some of the men in command have not had the opportunities of self-improvement afforded by education and contact with the highest levels of society and government. They cannot cope with the impractical and contradictory arguments o f theorists and critics even though their common sense rejects them. Their only insight s are those that have been gained by experience. For this reason, they prefer to use the means with which their experience has equipped them, even in cases that could and should be handled freely and individually. They will copy their supreme commander's favorite device - thus automatically creating a new routine.

    When we find generals under Frederick the Great using the socalled oblique order of battle; generals of the French Revolution using turning movements with a much extended front; and commanders under Bonaparte attacking with a brutal rush of concentric masses, then we recognize in these repetitions a ready made method, and see that even the highest ranks are not above the influence of routine. Once an improved theory helps the study of the conduct of war, and educates the mind and judgment of the senior commanders, routine methods will no longer reach so high. Those types of routine that must be considered indispensible will then at least be based on a theory rather than based on sheer imitation. No matter how superbly a great commander operates, there is always a subjective element in his work. If he display a certain style, it will in large part reflect his own personality; but that will not always blend with the personality of the men who copies that style.

    Yet it would be neither impossible nor correct to eliminate subjective routine or personal style entirely from the conduct of war. They should be seen, rather, as manifestations of the influence exerted on individual phenomena by the total character of the war - an influence which, if it has not been foreseen and allowed for the accepted theory, may find no other means of adequate expression. What could be more natural than the fact that the War of the French Revolution had its characteristic style, and what theory could have been expected to accommodate it?

    The danger is that this kind of style, developed out of a single case, can easily outlive the situation that gave rise to it;. for conditions change imperceptibly. That danger is the very thing a theory should prevent by lucid, rational criticism. When in 1806 the Prussian generals, Prince Louis at Saal field, Tauentzien and Ruchel on the Dornberg near Jena, Grawert on one side of Kapellendorf and Ruchel on the other, plunged into the open jaws of disaster by using Frederick the Great's oblique order of battle, it was not just the case of a style that had outlived its usefulness but the most extreme poverty of the imagination to which routine has ever led. The result was that the Prussian army under Hohenlohe was ruined more completely than any army has ever been ruined on the battlefield."

So, despite the fact that Clausewitz and Bressonet recognize that the Prussian defeat was due to poor leadership and the lack of imagination of that leadership, another reason for the Prussian defeat in 1806 was, unless Clausewitz is wrong, due to the adherence to a principle that had outlived its usefulness.

Accordingly, I can accept Bressonet's conclusion on the matter of tactics only with a grain of salt and conclude that there were some tactical and grand tactical differences between the French and the Prussians in 1806.

(4) ON ADDITIONAL TACTICAL/GRAND TACTICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE FRENCH AND PRUSSIAN ARMIES IN 1806

In addition, Paddy Griffith's analysis of Bressonet demonstrates that there are other points which, in my opinion, are not in agreement with the facts that Bressonet presents in his reports of Saalfeld, Jena or Auerstadt. These are covered in more detail by Paddy Griffith in his "TRUDGING IN THE PENINSULA" column elsewhere in this issue.

At Saalfeld, the facts show that we are far from the systematic deployment of the French infantry columns suggested by Bressonet as standard procedure for developing firefights with the (primarily Saxon) enemy infantry. On the contrary, the picture painted by Bressonet is very much one of aggressive skirmishing in pretty close country. The skirmishers needed support behind them to give them impetus, but it hardly seems to matter in which formation these are in. The French cavalry played a pretty decisive role and its fluid use is the other outstanding feature of the battle. In addition, at Saalfeld, the heavy French casualties mentioned by Bressonet are far from reality. The Prussian losses were about 3000 killed, wounded and prisoners, 34 guns, 4 flags and all the baggage train. [15]

The French losses were only 172 men.

Jena was a much larger action than Saalfeld. However, like Saalfeld, it was a succession of somewhat piecemeal fighting showing the same trend that was shown at Saalfeld, played out on a large battlefield compartmentalized by slopes, villages and woods mainly because, as mentioned by Bressonet, Hohenlohe's dispositions had scattered his command. The actions at Jena are covered in detail by Paddy Griffith and we won't elaborate further on them aside from the fact that, as at Saalfeld, the picture was also pretty much one of aggressive skirmishing supported by columns or lines. All that was combined with an effective artillery support that the Prussians did not appear to have enjoyed.

Let me continue with a partial reprint of the advance of Ruchel' s Corps at Jena which was authored by HansKarl Weiss and printed in EEL 62 (June 1982):

    "Heights were reached, they could survey the battlefield and see that only weak remains of Hohenlohe's Corps were still fighting. Then, the Corps deployed in eventail (like a fan). During the deployment, the soldiers already came under artillery fire. Then the first line marched forward some 100 steps and now the 2nd battle line seemed to suffer more than the 1st line from the artillery fire of apparently heavy guns.

    Von Borcke states: `However, from a great distance, the bullets of hostile skirmishers already reached us; they were placed formidably in the front of us laying down in the field, bushes and covers; we were unacquainted with such tactics; the bullets appeared to come from the air. To be under such fire without seeing the enemy made a bad impression on our soldiers. Then, because of the unfamiliarity with this sort of fighting, they lost their confidence in their muskets and immediately felt the superiority of the adversary. They therefore suffered, already being in a critical position, very quickly in bravery, endurance and calmness and could not wait for the time to fire themselves which soon proved to be to our disadvantage.

    Then, Ruchel ordered an advance against Vierzehnheiligen.

    The hostile artillery and tirailleur fire became even more intense; already a lot of men had been killed and we had nothing to answer the fire aside from a few regimental guns which after a few shots were dismounted or brought in disorder, were silenced or remained in the back. We advanced toward the enemy deployed, staggering battalions without artillery. The enemy which was favoured by the terrain could hardly be detected and only his artillery and skirmishers fought against us...

    But in spite of all these nasty aspects, the Corps still advanced and the closer they approached, the canister and skirmisher fire grew and grew in intensity and the losses became heavier. Then a lot of officers and Ruchel were wounded.

    As the desperation penetrated the already torn apart battalions, the troops made a last attempt and some weak sections attacked with the bayonet. The enemy doubled his murderous canister fire which finally broke us. The rout of the 1st line was total....

    Then, the Prussians tried to rally at their 2nd line but they also retreated. Finally, under the attack of formed cavalry and infantry, the rout became final...

    Well, I think these accounts are revealing in some aspects. Here, we have it all: skirmisher fire, canister, artillery superiority and after the morale breakdown, the timely attack of formed troops. It is interesting to read that to a lot of Prussian soldiers in von Borcke's regiment, skirmishing appeared to be unknown. As other primary sources have proven, this was not true for all the Prussian regiments since in other parts of the battlefield, Prussian skirmishers fought well, even when drawn directly from the ranks."

Since Hans-Karl Weiss' article draws heavily from Lieutenant Borcke' s eyewitness account of the attack of Ruchel's Corps, its scope is necessarily limited and does not cover all the vicissitudes and partial successes of that unfortunate Corps. Ruchel's Corps included 26 battalions and 28 squadrons plus the Saxon cavalry of Zeschwitz's II Division which operated on Ruchel's right wing. Ruchel's Corps behaved splendidly under the combined fire of Lannes' skirmishers and artillery, pushed back the skirmishers, and even captured the village of Gross-Romstedt. The Prussian cavalry on the left wing repulsed the French cavalry. The Prussian cavalry was only stopped by the bayonets of St. Hilaire's Division. Soult's report claims that "that combat was certainly one of the most violent of the day". [16]

However, it did not prevent Ruchel's infantry from being submerged, as Borcke reported, by Lannes and Ney to their front; by Soult on their left with his infantry, his cavalry and Klein's dragoons; and by the combined efforts of Ney, Augereau and the cavalry of the 5th, 6th and 7th Corps, the second brigade of Klein's dragoons and the 1000 cuirassiers of d'Hautepoul on their right.

Note the terrible effect that the combined fire of the artillery and the skirmishers had on Ruchel's Corps. The very same thing had taken place a little earlier in the front of Vierzehnheiligen where that deadly combination of unopposed skirmisher fire and artillery took a heavy toll of Hohenlohe's troops that stood there, inactive, for two hours, while Napoleon's reserves were building up for the final onslaught which routed Hohenlohe's command as it later did Ruchel's Corps.

I don't see how the importance of the combination of artillery and skirmisher fire failed to be mentioned by Bressonet. As a matter of fact, Bressonet does not mention anything about the importance of the French artillery in achieving the decision during the key battles of the Campaign of 1806, not even including the massing of a 25-gun grand battery to fill the gap on Lannes' left at Jena.

Note that at Jena, the French had 108 guns versus 175 for the Prussians (104 for the regular artillery and 71 infantry guns). Yet, everywhere, the French artillery carried the day. At Auerstadt, Davout had only 44 guns and the Prussians some 230 guns (136 regular plus 94 infantry). There too, the French artillery were a more significant factor in the battle than the Prussian artillery.

In addition, as mentioned above, neither the use of skirmishers nor the use of columns by the French is given the proper importance and placed in the proper perspective for the role they played during the Campaign of 1806. The French tactics during the Napoleonic period are called the impulse technique [17] by Brent Nosworthy in his The Anatomy of Victory, Battle Tactics 1689-1763, p. 351.

More War Against Prussia, 1806 Comparison of French and Prussian Tactics During the Campaign of 1806-1807

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