War Against Prussia, 1806

IV. Overall Conclusions

by Jean A. Lochet

Note that I am in agreement with Bressonet on many points and I definitely agree with him that the poor Prussian leadership and generals were the real culprits responsible for the collapse of the Prussian army at Jena and Auerstadt and that the French generals were usually better than their Prussian counterparts. However, it is wrong to say that French and Prussian grand tactics and tactics were similar. There were basic significant differences.

(1) The French used the "impulse system" and the Prussian did not.

(2) The French impulse system and columns of waiting allowed the French to bring reserves quickly to the critical point, while the Prussian system in use in 1806 did not. Bressonet rightfully says the Prussian system lacked depth.

(3) Some important tactical differences existed in the usage of skirmishers especially with respect to the importance of the "tirailleurs de combats" and their integration into the line of battle.

(4) Differences also existed in the usage of artillery. The artillery was used by the French much more efficiently, which was very likely due to the practice the French had had during the Wars of the French Revolution and the Campaign of 1805.

(5) In 1806, the French used the Corps and Divisional system much more efficiently than the Prussians did. (6) The Prussian infantry could sustain much more casualties by fire than the French could.

I guess that my conclusions put me in somewhat direct conflict with some of Bressonet's conclusions which follow (although I don't profess that the French used the ordre profond but rather the impulse system which is quite different).

    "Hence, almost all military historians are in error when they claim that a great difference existed between the French and Prussian tactics, saying that the former used the ordre profond (i.e. column formations) consisting of columns headed by tirailleurs while the latter still used the linear order. Consequently, it is completely inaccurate to pretend that in 1806, two completely different tactics were opposed; it would not be accurate either to say that the French and the Prussians practiced the same tactics."

However, I do partially agree with Bressonet on the following:

    "But, it is also evident to report that if, on open ground, the fact of not using tirailleurs in liaison with the line battalions has been more costly to the Prussian battalions in their effort to advance, the lack of tirailleurs did not prevent them from resisting us vigorously until the action of new French troops on the weak points of their line or on their flanks forced them to give in."

Which does not mean that if the tirailleurs had been used by the Prussians, their ability to resist would not have been better!

I have to agree with Paddy Griffith when he comments that Bressonet never really wrote a real conclusion to his work. That may very well be due to the fact that, because of his death, only an unfinished conclusion was published with his work.

One should not conclude that I condemn Prussian linear tactics which remained dominant until the demise of smoothbore weapons nor pretend that the army of Frederick was defeated during the Campaign of 1806.

Well, even though my discussion of Bressonet is not complete, I am going to end my presentation and discussion of Bressonet Etudes tactiques sur la campagne d'Allemagne 1806 here. I have tried to place his conclusions in what I believe is the proper perspective. As usual, comments would be appreciated.

A much more complete comparison between French and Prussian tactics and grand tactics in 1806 can be found in the fine article authored and presented by Scott Bowden at Historicon '92: "French and Prussians at War: 1806 - A Discussion of the Battlefields Myths and Realities of the Saalfeld-Jena-Auerstadt" to be found in the last issue.

Notes

[1] "hors de combat" means "out of the fight" i.e. casualties.
[2] Remarques critiques sur l'ouvrage de M. le lieutenantgeneral Rogniat, intitule: Considerations surl'artde la guerre
[3] Urkundlichc Beitrage, von Heft, p. 82.
[4] Their name in German is "Schiitzen".
[5] Here Bressonet is somewhat in error. In 1806, a French battalion had about between 720 to 960 men in 9 companies, one of which was a voltigeur company, so the French line battalion somewhere around 80 to 110 tirailleurs, i.e. about twice the number of tirailleurs of Prussian line battalion. In addition, the grenadier company was sometimes also used as tirailleurs (like at Hassenhausen). In addition, most if not all, battalions could deploy as tirailleurs if need arose, something the Prussian line battalions of 1806 were incapable of doing.
[6] To be complete - and not in disagreement with Bressonnet is the fact that the lack of skirmishers on the Prussian side was very costly morale wise.
[7] It has been reported that when Napoleon visited Frederick the Great's tomb he said "If you had been there, I would not be here."
[8] These units were light troops, either Jagers or Fusiliers.
[9] Here, Bressonet exaggerates a bit. He is very severe with the marshals. Many did an excellent job under Napoleon's direct command. Granted, most were incapable of independent comman, but it would be unfair to put everyone in the same bag. Some like like Massena in his prime, or Davout or St.Cyr (he had an independent command in 1812 in holding Napoleon's left flank at Polotsk and did a good job there) held quite successful independent commands. So did Suchet in Spain.
[10] See Harry Jarosack' article in EEL 76, p.13.
[11] Several companies of Jagers were raised by Frederick starting in 1740.
[12] The Battle of Kolin will covered in the next issue of EE&L. On "Light Troops" in the Prussian Army during the Seven Year War, see Christopher Duffy, The Army of Frederick the Great, p. 76. Hippocrene Books Inc. New York, 174. Other light troops were raised after the Seven Year's War. See also Peter Paret, Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform, 1807-1815, The Princeton Press University, 1966.
[13] Which does not mean that the fire of the unopposed Austrians skirmishers was directly responsible in itself for the abortion of Frederick's plan at Kolin. However, it is the effect of that skirmisher fire that caused some battalions to deploy prematurely -in the wrong place -to defend themselves (see Napoleon's comments) causing the attack to occur piecemeal.
[14] The Clausewitz On War quoted here is the edition by Princeton University Press, 1984, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret.
[15] Prussian sources gives their losses at Saalfeld as 1700 men. According to Houssaye (lena), that appears to be in error since in his report Suchet claims that he made 1500 to 1800 prisoners.
[16] Journal du 4eme Corps.
[17] Let us not forget, that the impulse system used by the French was also an extension of the linear system, especially in 1806, when the French infantry depended heavily on firepower (see Paddy Griffith's conclusions). The "impulse system" is described in Brent Nosworthy, The Anatomy of Victory, p. 349-53.

More War Against Prussia, 1806 Comparison of French and Prussian Tactics During the Campaign of 1806-1807

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