France and Prussia at War: 1806
Myths and Reality of Jena-Auerstadt

Background and Purpose

by Scott Bowden

There seems little doubt that the battles and campaigns of the early years of the first French Empire are the least written about, least discussed - and probably for American wargamers - the least often played period of the Napoleonic era. As a result, the armies, battles, leadership and tactics of 1805 through 1807 is, at least from this viewpoint, one of the most misunderstood - yet is the most fascinating - in the Napoleonic history.

The reasons for 1805 through 1807 - the Napoleonic "Glory Years" - not receiving its fair share of publicity is arguable a combination of two factors: 1) the historical preference of most Napoleonic historians; and 2) the personal agenda of the same writers. The combination of these two factors has resulted, by and large, to ignore or - perhaps even worse - to over simplify the 1805 through 1807 campaigns and battles. On can almost lose count of the seemingly countless number of Napoleonic histories retold by English-speaking historians in which the Glory Years are portrayed as hopeless mismatches between th French using their 'new' tactical system of columns screened by murderous skirmishers pitted against their obsolete rivals who are using 'old' linear-style tactics, resulting in predictable outcomes as the Grande Armée, led by the Corsican Ogre, road-kills one Coalition army after another.

Why have the Glory Years been apparently oversimplified, and as a result the armies and tactics misunderstood by many? To help us find an answer, let's consider the histories being presented to us, the English speaking people. The majority of English speaking historians, especially those in the United Kingdom have always focused the lion's share of their energies to the Duke of Wellington and his campaigns in the Peninsula as well as his final campaign in Belgium in 1815 which spelled the end of the Napoleonic wars. This is the first factor which we previously identified. There is absolutely nothing wrong with a historian having a historical preference and devoting oneself to that subject. However, in reading many of these histories by UK authors, this researcher cannot help but be struck by the fact that many are laced with the personal agendas of the authors which, at least from this viewpoint, is a disdain for continental armies and their style (read inferior style) of warfare.

Disdain for Continental Armies?

French pitted against Austrians, French against Russians, French versus Prussians, French against Austrians again - is viewed by one noted British historian as nothing more than "warfare amongst second class and third class armies." Another British historian noted that although the armies of Napoleonic France of the 1805 through 1807 period "swept across the Continent in victory" they "had yet to meet the English soldier."

A different British historian has taken the a well-known quote by a French officer out of context when he condescends to typifying the French army as "a traveling bordello" and their officers as inferior to the British. Yet another UK historian describes the French army of the Napoleonic era as "very predictable at both the highest and lowest levels of military activity." The same writer goes on to state that, in 1815, Napoleon's "battle plans tended to contain stereotyped features, whilst the tactical combination of skirmishers and troops in column (emphasis added) had varied very hardly at all in 20 years."

One of the same British historians states "that in most battles against continental enemies there has been little call for [French] massed infantry to do very much real fighting at all. Their mere appearance within musket range of the enemy had been sufficient to decide the issue" since the enemy were already so weakened and disorganized by skirmisher and artillery fire that they could not resist the advance of the French columns. This author goes on to state that "the superiority enjoyed by the French in their continental battles must have led them to regard infantry attacks as somewhat expendable." He concludes his erroneous thesis on Napoleonic infantry tactics by claiming "that the French aim, whatever their formation, was not to open fire but to press on with the bayonet."

Still another UK historian proclaims that "the success of the Revolutionary columns remained in the mind of the French generals as giving the best chance of totally disrupting the enemy's army. The technique was used triumphantly against Austrians, Italians, Prussians, Russians, and Spanish."

However, it is not only UK historians who have misunderstood French tactics or the warfare during 1805-1807. One American historian specifically writing on Jena-Auerstädt campaign states that there are "very few mentions of the offensive use of the line by the French" in 1806. Instead, this American claims that the Napoleonic victories at Jena and Auerstädt were won by "the advance of columns (emphasis added) as soon as the combined effect of the tirailleur fire and the French artillery fire caused the Prussian lines to waver." This writer concludes his thesis by maintaining that "the monumental failure of the Prussian army at Jena and Auerstädt in 1806 continues to serve as a textbook example of the confrontation between the old and the new" tactical systems.

German speaking historians have understandably focused their attention on the Befreiungskrieg - the War of Liberation 1813-1814 - when Napoleonic forces were expelled form German soil. With respect to the Glory Years, and specifically to 1806, some German historians have attempted to explain away Prussia's military disaster by simply underrating the army at every level and every aspect. General von der Goltz in his books Rossbach and Jena and Jena and Eylau, states that the Prussian army had declined to a horribly wretched state in 1806 and had improved as early as 1807. This remarkable statement, made without a single shred of supporting combat evidence, has unfortunately served as the foundation of numerous other German writers, then copied by one, then another, and still other English historians, all repeating the same disparaging remarks about the Prussian army of 1806, and then extending these assumptions further to include the other Allied armies of the 1805-1807 period.

Since it is impossible, within the scope of this presentation, to examine all armies of the 1805-1807 period, it is perhaps most useful to concentrate on what this researcher argues as being the most misunderstood period of Napoleon's imperial reign - that being the 1806 campaign.

What was the nature of the armies, leadership and tactics at Saalfeld, Jena and Auerstädt? What were the similarities and differences between the Grande Armée and their Prussian counterparts? Was Napoleon's 1806 war machine an unimaginative tactical stereotype of skirmishers and columns? Was the Prussian failure in 1806 due to an inferior tactical system vis-ā-vis that employed by the French? Did the French infantry simply make an "appearance within musket range" which resulted in the Prussians having to give way? When the French and Prussians exchanged musket and cannon fire, were these nothing more than "second and third class armies" going at each other?

The Napoleonic Glory Years, and 1806 especially, deserve to be examined without any emotional baggage, free of political or egotistical agendas. Therefore, it is with this goal in mind that this presentation is entitled French and Prussians at War: 1806 - A Discussion of the Battlefield Myths and Realities of the Saalfeld-Jena-Auerstädt Campaign.

Study

In order to impartially and thoroughly examine the French and Prussian armies of 1806, it is necessary to study what actually happened on the battlefield rather than what regulations or drill manuals said what the troops were supposed to do. Therefore, the primary source for this research has naturally been the after-action reports and other first-hand accounts written by the participants themselves. The French army archives at Château de Vincennes, including the journals of the 4th and 5th Corps, plus Marshal Louis Davout's monumental Journal of Operations of the 3rd Corps, provide a wealth of information on the tactics and deployments of the Grande Armée. Prussian reports as quoted in Höpfner and Lettow-Vorbeck are invaluable in reconstructing Prussian movements. Further, the French texts on 1806 authored by Foucart and Pascal Bressonnet's masterpiece Etudes Tactiques were of considerable value.

Perhaps it is appropriate at this point to focus further on our subject matter. It is universally acknowledged that Napoleon's system of army command and his operational placement of the Grande Armée in the famed bataillon carré were vastly superior to the antiquated command and control model exhibited in the Prussian army. To belabor this point would be outside the scope of this presentation. However, once below the operational scope, many histories seem to drop into a fog or - if you will - a 'black box', where what happened tactically and why are often omitted, vague or plainly inaccurate in their description.

Therefore, using the best sources possible we wish to explore what really happened on the battlefields of 1806, how each side employed formed troops as well as light troops and tirailleurs, how artillery was employed by both armies, how French and Prussian leaders differed in their important treatment of woods and villages, how and why French commanders formed converged elite units from their command.

War Against Prussia, 1806 Myths and Reality of Jena-Auerstadt

Related

War Against Prussia, 1806 Comparison of French and Prussian Tactics During the Campaign of 1806-1807 by Jean Lochet

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