France and Prussia at War: 1806
Myths and Reality of Jena-Auerstadt

The French Army

by Scott Bowden

The Grande Armée of the campaigns of 1805 and 1806 has been described as one of the three greatest instruments of war of all time. No doubt, everyone has his or her own opinion of what armies stand head and shoulders above all others. However, it may be safe to assert that anyone would be hard pressed to realistically demonstrate three other armies - including their leaders from top to bottom - that were all better than the Grande Armée of 1805 and 1806. Perhaps what we have to present today may help explain why and how this army has this reputation.

In stark contrast to the Prussian army, Napoleon's Grande Armée was not an army on the model of the ancien régime; it was history first modern army organized exclusively by army corps. Each corps was capable of fighting independent action, a point graphically illustrated during the 1806 campaign. Compositions of corps, divisions, brigades were stable. In fact, most brigades and divisions remained unchanged from year to year, through one campaign to another and another. Commanders up and down the chain of command got to know their subordinates and their units extremely well. This familiarity produced a coordination and esprit de corps at the brigade, divisional and even the corps level unmatched by any other army of this period. Also the staff efficiency at all levels of French command was light-years away ahead of the old centralized style of command exhibited by the Allied armies of the 1805-1807 era.

At the head of the French army was Napoleon Bonaparte - unquestionably the greatest military organizational genius of all time. While Napoleon was not perfect, the assessment made by the distinguished historian Martin van Creveld may be the best. He describes Napoleon as "history most capable human being." Certainly, Napoleon's talents for organization and leading men will forever place in the forefront of great captains. However, it is fashionable for some historians - as well as wargamers - to concentrate on Napoleon's flaws and his defeats. Regardless of whether you believe Napoleon was either an overrated general who blundered his way to glory, or that he was indeed history's greatest soldier, there is one undeniable fact that all historians and wargamers should remember: Napoleon Bonaparte fought and won more pitched battles under varying climatic conditions than any other general in modern history.

Napoleon was well served by his officers. As a whole, the officer corps of the Grande Armée was intelligent and aggressive. The spirit of carrière ouverte aux talents (careers open to talents) inspired marshals and generals as well as the regimental colonels and chefs de bataillon. It must be remembered that in 1806, most of these officers had been working with the same fellow officers as well as the same rank and file for over two years. This working relationship, forged in the Camp of Boulogne and in the bivouaques along the Rhine and the Low Countries, steeled in the Ulm-Austerlitz campaign of 1805, rested and fine-tuned through the spring and summer months of 1806, came to full fruitination during the Jena-Auerstädt campaign. The Emperor's Grande Armée which faced the Prussian was a close-knit family and an efficient killing machine.

The French line and light infantry battalions were organized on a 9 company establishment of 7 companies of fusiliers (chasseurs in the light infantry), one was grenadier (carabinier in the light infantry) and one was voltigeur. The average strength of the line and light infantry battalions during the 1806 campaign was 946 combatants present and under arms. Invariably, the line battalions were slightly stronger than the light battalions. Two, or sometimes three, battalions comprised a regiment. When only two battalions of a regiment were present, the elite companies (grenadier/carabinier and voltigeurs) from the third battalion were also in the field.

There are seemingly endless examples of the Grande Armée of 1806 performing brigade-level drill evolutions with rapidity. If for just a moment, you take your thoughts forward to 1813 and recall the extraordinary difficulties experienced by Napoleon and his lieutenants in forming and training the new army following the Russian debâcle, one can begin to see how the combat efficiency and effectiveness of the 1806 army stands head and shoulders above the Grande Armée of 1813.

Although their skills at scouting were never equal to most of their adversaries, the French cavalry's coordination and achievements on the battlefield were impressive. The cavalry commanders' ability to coordinate multi-regiment evolutions was a distinct advantage compared to the Prussians. Though Napoleon had called for the fourth squadrons of the line cavalry to take the field for the 1806 campaign, the overwhelming majority of French cavalry regiments outside the Imperial guard fielded only 3 squadrons. It is interesting to note the average squadron strengths of these regiments: light cavalry - 170, dragoons - 145, and heavy cavalry - 120.

The artillery arm of the Grande Armée was the single branch of service overwhelmingly superior to that of the army's opponent. The guns were organized along the "divisional" system whereby one "division of artillery) two 12-pdrs., six 8-pdrs., two 4-pdrs., and two howitzers - total of 12 pieces of ordnance per artillery "division" would be allocated to a corps for each infantry division present in the same corps. This organization allowed the French corps commanders to exercise complete flexibility in assigning the guns to specific crews. The manned pieces would then be assigned to the various elements of the corps. For example, a corps commander with three infantry divisions would be allocated three artillery "divisions." The corps commander would habitually take the six 12-pdr. guns (three infantry divisions would yield three artillery "divisions" which would total six 12-pdr guns) and group these into a corps reserve manned by a company of foot artillerists. The remaining 30 pieces of ordnance would be assigned to other foot and horse artillery personnel (horse artillerists almost always received 8-pdrs and howitzers) who in turn would be assigned for duty with a specific division or advance guard detachment. Even though there were not nearly as many guns in the 1806 Grande Armée as compared to the later Imperial armies, the artillery officers were especially aggressive and utilized their elite personnel and flexibility of command organization to maximized the mobility and coordination between units.

To summarize, the Grande Armée of 1805-1807 was history's first modern army, efficiently organized along corps lines which had fully matured by 1806. This maturity resulted in "superior command and control through strategic levels." Also, the tactical units and leadership were extremely flexible compared to their stubborn opponents, giving the French "a particular resiliency and cohesion in battle that its opponent lacked."

Saalfeld Area


War Against Prussia, 1806 Myths and Reality of Jena-Auerstadt

Related

War Against Prussia, 1806 Comparison of French and Prussian Tactics During the Campaign of 1806-1807 by Jean Lochet

Back to Empire, Eagles, & Lions Table of Contents Vol. 2 No. 1
Back to EEL List of Issues
Back to MagWeb Master Magazine List
© Copyright 1993 by Emperor's Headquarters
This article appears in MagWeb (Magazine Web) on the Internet World Wide Web.
Other articles from military history and related magazines are available at http://www.magweb.com