Concluding Comments

Once both sides had been in the Peninsula for a year or two, and the British had learned the techniques of outpost duty, there was little difference in performance between the two sides off the field of battle. But the tendency with the British for headlong, reckless charges was never overcome, the doctrines and myths being too deeply ingrained. The Waterloo Campaign had many instances of veteran Peninsula units repeating the same mistakes; the 7th Hussars at Genappe's on the 17th June and the 1st Royal Dragoons at Waterloo being two clear examples.

Wellington, writing to Lord Russell in 1826 summed up the part played by British cavalry in the Peninsula, on the plus side:

first ... upon advanced guards, flanks etc. as the quickest movers and to enable me to know and see as much as possible in the shortest space of time; secondly to use them in small bodies to attack small bodies of the enemy's cavalry.

But because they 'would gallop and could not preserve their order' he found them: so inferior ... to the French ... that although I consider one squadron a match for two French squadrons, I should not have liked to see four British squadrons opposed to four French squadrons; and as numbers increased, and order became more necessary, I was more unwilling to risk our cavalry without having a greater superiority of numbers. [31]

Wellington's lack of trust in the cavalry helps explain why he was unable to use it after such great victories as Salamanca, Vittoria and Orthez to pursue and disperse the retreating French. The type of devastating pursuit available to a French commander, such as that after Jena in 1806 or the Meddellin in 1809, was denied Wellington, hence his inability to destroy French armies he defeated on the battlefield.

The most damning example was Vittoria, where the British cavalry dispersed to plunder the French baggage, hence allowing the entire French army to escape and forced Wellington to fight his way into Southern France. That it was the officers at fault is supported by the opinions of the highly experienced French General, Comte Remy Exelman:

Your horses are the finest in the world, and your men ride better than any continental soldier; with such materials the English cavalry ought to have done more than has ever been accomplished by them on the field of battle. The great deficiency is in your officers, who have nothing to recommend them but their dash and sitting well in their saddles; indeed, as far as my experience goes .... The British cavalry officer seems to be impressed with the conviction that he can dash and ride over everything as if the art of war were precisely the same as that of fox-hunting. [32]

That British officers learned little in the long term is illustrated by Tomkinson's comment, written in 1819, 'On our return to English duty we continued the old system, each regiment estimating its merits by the celerity of movements. I do not think one idea has been suggested since our return from service by the experience we there gained, and in five years we shall have all to commence again on going abroad.' [33]

Post 1815, the only real innovation was the conversion of three light dragoon regiments in 1816 to lancers, a weapon solely designed for impact in a charge!

While British cavalry learned their trade in Spain, the French found it a poor follow-up to the glories of the 1805-7 campaign in Central Europe. The Peninsula presented them with a hostile theatre in terms of terrain and climate. Marshal Bessieres wrote when Governor of Northern Spain in 1811 to the newly arrived Marshal Marmont: 'after eight days you will have lost a third of your cavalry. Such is the terrain my dear Marshal, on which you march.' [34]

For the French, their weakness in horsecare proved crippling. In Central Europe, till 1813, there were enough suitable remounts to replace losses, but in Spain, the poor local bloodstock and few drafts of remounts from France could leave a veteran unit with up to 50% dismounted. Even when mounted, the poor conditions of mounts left French units at a serious disadvantage against the British, whose equally poor horse care was balanced by regular drafts of remounts from Britain and imports of high quality forage.

Hence, thanks to the Royal Navy and its command of the sea, Wellington's partially successful doctrine of avoiding living off the land proved in Spain to be far superior to the French doctrine and practice of living off the land. While it limited Wellington's scope for operations, it gave Wellington a healthier army, an advantage exemplified in the cavalry.

The French system worked in fertile Central Europe and Italy, but in harsh theatres such as Spain and Russia, it was crippling. Yet despite this serious disadvantage, the semi- professional officer and battle hardened troops were able to hold their own in outpost duty against even experienced British and German units; and even if ridden down in a charge, their superior tactical handling of reserves etc. meant they usually won most combats at the end of the day.

Finally, while the wealth of experience gained in the Peninsula went to waste in post 1815 Britain, especially as most of the training establishments were either closed down or turned into parade ground training establishments, [35] in France, despite the return of the Bourbons and a degree of anti-professionalism, Marshal St.- Cyr was able to maintain some of the military schools and colleges and a degree of promotion by merit. [36]

The benefits of the Revolution and Napoleonic wars in organisations and doctrines were still visible during the Crimean War, [37] where despite poor generals, the regimental officers displayed far more confidence and professionalism than their British counterparts.

NOTES