Part 1 [AoN 11]

Various aspects with specific reference to their respective development prior to 1808, and how this related to their performance in the Peninsula.

Barring a few exceptions, the abilities of the opposing commanders were about equal. British generals come in for a lot of unfair criticisms, for while some were abysmal such as Erskine, who was mentally unstable, most were proficient at their job. It is only fair to say that Wellington actively discouraged much of the panache and daring so associated with the French "beau sabres". Wellington did not trust his cavalry after their early examples of uncontrollability, and later, when veteran units had become skilled in field work, he still held them back, fearing to trust them.

As Oman makes clear when referring to the conduct of the British and K.G.L. cavalry generals at the battle of Vittoria, Wellington's attitude actively discouraged independent initiative taking: 'one cannot but suspect that Wellington's thunderings in previous years, against reckless cavalry action, were always present in the minds of colonels and brigadiers who had a chance before them. [1]

It is a pity this caution did not extend to the actual conduct of combats when entered upon although the tendency towards uncontrollability and indiscipline were failings of regimental officers rather than generals who often found themselves ignored when they tried to halt or rally after action.

The French generals in Spain were not generally the great "sabres" who served in Central Europe under Napoleon. With few exceptions, second rate French cavalry generals served in Spain. For example, Curto and Boyer are spoken of by Foy as especially poor. Curto was "insertie coupable" and "faute de decision" and Boyer was "bon manoeuvier, mais n'ayant pas la reputation que attire la confiance aveugle du soldat". [2]

Napoleon said to Foy in 1811 that all the cavalry generals of the Army of Portugal, excepting Montbrun, Fournier and Lamotte were "mauvais ou mediorcres"; [3] these being Curto, Boyer, Carrois, Lorcet and Carrie. The Army of the South under Marshal Soult had generally better cavalry generals, such as Latour- Maubourg, Lallemande, Bormemain and Vinot, although Pierre Soult, the Marshal's younger brother, owed far more to this brother's influence for his rank than innate ability. [4] (The armies of Portugal and the South were Wellington's main opponents.)

Basically, due to the nature of the Peninsula, the French generals' past experiences of Central Europe often left them as illprepared as their generally inexperience British counterparts, although French generals did tend to display more confidence in field operations. However, given time and experience, British generals also became more confident.

Comparative performance of outpost duties, i.e. patrols, screening, rearguards, advance guards, mounting picquets etc:

In the conduct of outpost work, the lack of training and experience clearly demonstrated itself in the British cavalry, although units were able to acquire the necessary knowledge, skill and competence with experience.

For British troopers, officers and mounts, outpost duty was a decidedly novel experience, as Private Fuller of the 11th Light Dragoons points out: 'It was new to us to go on picket, and to sit on horses as videttes, for two hours on a stretch. It was equally new to our horses to have their saddle and housings fastened on for twenty-four hours together, and to receive their food with the bit at their chest, and everything prepared for action at a moment's notice. [5]

This lack of preparation was clearly illustrated, when in 1811, on two separate occasions, entire squadrons of Light Dragoons were captured. On both occasions the squadron officers failed to exercise even basic outpost procedure. The first was on 7th April 1811, when a Major misunderstood his order and placed his squadron far too forward, and as General Long (the brigade commander on both occasions) relates: 'Major Morris seems not to have paid that attention to the nature of the ground he occupied which it deserved, and besides to have suffered his men to dismount and even unbridle at the very time they should have been prepared for such a rencontre as shortly afterwards took place.' [6]

The French surrounded and captured the entire squadron of two officers and fifty-five men. Secondly, on 22nd June, a squadron of the 11th Light Dragoons of 134 men were taken while on picquet in similar circumstances. Wellington makes it clear that this disaster was due to the 11th being newly arrived and hence knowing little of outpost duty: 'This disagreeable circumstance tends to show the difference between old and new troops. The old regiments of cavalry throughout all their service with all their losses put together, have not lost so many men as ... the 11th Light Dragoon in a few days.' [7]

Yet, given time and experience, the British became highly proficient at outpost work, and real lessons were absorbed. The new 1810 Instruction for Light Cavalry reflected the lessons being learned, its introduction stressed; 'They are universally allowed to combine powerful means of seconding both offensive and defensive operations in the field; of misleading, harassing, and annoying an enemy in a multiplicity of ways; of gaining information upon which the movements of an army may be grounded; and of giving security to these movements whilst making.' [8]

But it was experience in the field and the example of others that effectively remedied the defects. The superb 1st K.G.L. Hussars gave an invaluable example, and Colonel Owen admits: 'They were our first masters in outpost duties.' [9]

The 14th and 16th Light Dragoons, kept for four months the line of the Agueda and Azana, 40 miles long, against a fourfold strength of French cavalry, without once letting a hostile reconnaissance through, losing a picket or even a vedette (four men), or sending a piece of false information back to General Crawford, whose front they were covering." [10]

The French were generally efficient at outpost duty from the beginning, but despite their long experience of war, they too could make basic mistakes. Two examples of this illustrate that their generals were not all of the high standard often associated with the French officer corps.

(1) On March 11th 1811, at Foz d'Arouce, General Lamotte failed to post picquets on the approach roads, resulting in one of Marshal Ney's divisions being surprised and badly cut up.

(2) Far worse was Arroyo dos Molinos' on 28th October 1811, when a brigade of infantry under General Girard, accompanied by three cavalry regiments was almost annihilated. Here, both cavalry Generals, Bron and Briche failed to take any precautions to place outposts, and the cavalry were surprised, unsaddled and at rest with the infantry by General Hill's allied force. (Much of the cavalry managed to cut its way out).