It was in actual combats that a persisting French superiority remained, and even veteran British units, despite repeated experience of the consequences, failed to learn the tactics and discipline vital for a successful charge and combat. The persistent failure to learn cannot be blamed on the generals, for even the highly acclaimed Le Merchant was unable to hold back and rally his brigade at Salamanca after their devastating charge, [11] and it dispersed in small groups to pursue fleeing French infantry, heedless of danger or order. [12]

Three examples of this indiscipline and stupidity stand out; on all three occasions the regimental officer gave the example to their men for reckless stupidity.

(1) The 23rd Light Dragoons at Talavera were veritable forbears of the Light Brigade at Balaclava 45 years later. Wellington ordered General Anson's Brigade, of the 23rd and 1st K.G.L. Hussars to attack French infantry advancing across a seemingly flat plain. [13]

Having trotted to within a few hundred yards of the French, the 23rd began to quicken its pace, yet the officers made no attempt to stop this. The Germans continued to trot forward, whilst the 23rd went to almost a full gallop, at which point it came across an unseen ravine, 10 feet deep and 15 broad. At a trot it was easy to negotiate, which the Germans did, but the 23rd was at the charge, hence many horses fell in and were crushed by those behind falling on them. The 23rd had been formed in two lines of two squadrons each, hence the second line had enough warning to halt and cross the ravine at a walk.

But with two leading squadrons in total disorder, and the French now formed in square and supported by four regiments of cavalry, to proceed with the attack and suicide, yet they did! The K.G.L. advanced towards a square, but realising it was useless, fell back, losing only 37 out of 451 men. The 23rd though showed no judgement. Two squadrons charged a square and having been repulsed, retreated. But the other two squadrons rode between the square, and having been racked by gunfire, were encircled by five times their number of French cavalry and annihilated.

Of the 170 men of these two squadrons, only eight officers escaped. In all, the 23rd lost 207 out of 459. The survivors were sent back to England to reform the regiment. Clearly the officers were to blame; they failed to maintain a steady trot, essential till the last 100 yards, when it could be seen if there were any obstacles in the way. To have continued the attack when disorganised and unsupported was pure folly and bravado.

(2) The 13th Light Dragoons at Campo Mayor demonstrated similar tendencies; though with less tragic results, a magnificent opportunity to capture an entire French siege train was lost.

On 25th March 1811, General Long, commanding a strong brigade of 2,000 sabres, i.e. the 3rd Dragoon Guards, 4th Dragoons, 13th Light Dragoons and five weak Portuguese squadrons faced General Latour-Maubourg who had only 900 French dragoons and Hussars to protect a slow moving siege train and a battalion of infantry. Leaving the two heavy dragoon regiments as a reserve, Long advanced with the 13th and Portuguese in order to capture the siege train. Colonel Head led the 13th against the 26th Dragoons easily breaking them.

But instead of halting to reform, the 13th continued to pursue, led by their colonel. Long sent two squadrons of the 7th Portuguese Dragoons to act as support to the dispersed 13th, but Colonel Otway (most Portuguese regiments were led by and contained many British officers) led the 7th off in a wild pursuit with the l3th. Long comments: 'The whole of the 13th having dispersed in pursuit of the flying cavalry, and every effort of mine to stop them proving useless.'14 For the 7th, 'instead of obeying my orders broke also away in pursuit and continued unsupported.' This pursuit lasted six miles!

Meanwhile General Beresford (who commanded all British forces in this area), fearing the destruction of the 13th and 7th, refused to allow the to heavy dragoon regiments kept by Long as the reserve, to engage. Long's remaining three Portuguese squadrons were easily defeated by the 2nd Hussar's, and the siege train escaped. While the 13th and 7th later returned with a loss of only 60 men, having inflicted over 100 upon the 26th Dragoons, the three Portuguese squadrons, broken by the 2nd Hussars, had suffered over 100 casualties. Again, the root failure was due to the British officers of the 13th and 7th.

Wellington wrote of it: 'The undisciplined ardour of the 13th and 7th is not of the description of the determined bravery of soldiers confident in their discipline and their officers. Their conduct was that of a rabble galloping as fast as their horses could carry them, after an enemy to whom they could do no further mischief when they were broken; the pursuit was continued for an unlimited distance, and sacrificed substantial advantages, and all the objects of the operation, by want of discipline.' [15]

(3) Maguilla, on 11th June 1812 (?) is perhaps the most damning example. General Slade (a very mediocre general) was at the time, to a degree, unfairly blamed for what was largely a failure by the regimental officers to maintain control and discipline. Slade's Brigade of the 1st Royal Dragoons and 3rd Dragoons Guard, both veteran Peninsula regiments, faced General Lallemand's Brigade of the 17th and 27th Dragoons; each side had approximately 700 sabres.

Lallemand placed one squadron in reserve, with the remaining five formed in two lines. Slade also formed his Brigade in two lines, placing a squadron of the 3rd Dragoon Guards in reserve. In the initial impact, the French were broken by the superior weight of the British mounts. Then, despite Slade's attempt to rally them, both regiments went off in a wild pursuit, including the reserve squadrons. Hence, when the French reserve squadron came up, the tired and dispersed British were easily repulsed, the rest of the French troops rallied, and then pursued the unsupported British. Slade's Brigade lost 48 killed and wounded plus 118 prisoners, while Lallemand's lost only 51 men, being able to free several hundred prisoners previously taken. Long makes two revealing comments on the affair:

The failure is, in my opinion decidedly to be attributed to the indiscreet manner in which the reserve or supporting body was conducted, for they ceased to fulfil that character the moment they join in the attack of pursuit .... and in doing so advance so far and with such speed, as to destroy all order, slow their horses and necessarily become the pray of fresh troops. [16]

I know from experience how difficult it is to contain a British victorious cavalry in sight of a fugitive enemy, and I know equally well how much better the enemy has his men under his hand than we. [17]

Wellington's comment on the affair sums up the weak spot in British cavalry:

It is occasioned entirely by the trick our officers of cavalry have acquired of galloping at everything - and then galloping back as fast as they galloped on the enemy. They never consider their situation, never think of manoeuvring before an enemy - so little that one would think they cannot manoeuvre except on Wimbledon Common; and when they use their arm as it ought to be used, viz offensively, they never keep nor provide for a reserve. All cavalry should charge in two lines, and at least one-third should be ordered beforehand to pull up and reform, as soon as the charge has been delivered, and the enemy been broken. [18] .