Before investigating the comparative performances, the physical terrain and climactic conditions in the Peninsula must be mentioned for no cavalry unit, however proficient in other respects, can operate unless they can maintain an effective mounted strength, and the maintenance of mounts proved to be a crucial factor.

The Peninsula divided into two theatres from a cavalry point of view.

1) Eminently suitable for cavalry operation were the great plateaux of Central Spain and the broad arable plain of Old Castile and Leon. The generally unenclosed land, gently undulating, allowed cavalry to ride for up to 20 miles without meeting a major obstacle. Here, cavalry was essential for most operations.

2) But, the whole Pyrenean tract in the North, Catalonia, Aragon, Navarre, over the Asturian and Galician area and most of Portugal was generally unsuitable for large cavalry formations. These were mountainous areas, frequently cut by deep streams, criss-crossed with stone walls, and dotted with woods and thick undergrowth or strewn with rocks and stone. Here cavalry units were limited to small patrols and general outpost work, yet these operations were as essential to the outcome of a campaign as the majority of usually inconclusive cavalry combats. Apart from the campaign of 1811, 12 and early 13, Wellington conducted his campaigns in the mountain areas of Portugal and Northern Spain, hence partially accounting for the majority of Franco-British cavalry combats occurring in 1811 and 12. Also, until mid- 1811, Wellington was short of cavalry; between 1809-11 only two British heavy dragoon regiments and five light regiments, approximately 2,000 sabres, were available, so for example, in the 1809 Talavera campaign he had only 2000 British and 2000 Spanish cavalry to face over 7000 French cavalry.

Even a handful of light cavalry could play a vital role in a campaign, regardless of terrain, due to their scouting, screening and intelligence gathering etc. But the lack of outpost training and campaign experience was clearly shown in the first Peninsula campaign, when during Moore's retreat, the mountainous terrain speedily ruined some of Britain's best regiments, and was to provide an introduction to the long protracted Peninsula War.

The almost non-existent forage proved not to be the major problem; the simple, prosaic horseshoe was. The appalling rock strewn roads and tracks quickly destroyed shoes, and with no spares, only one farrier per regiment (quite adequate in a home garrison) and no mobile forges, losses were appalling. Captain Verner of the 7th Hussars relates the result: 'The horses not only became jaded and unable to carry their rider, but for want of shoeing we lost numbers. One morning there were no fewer than 60 left behind from this cause, the greater number of which were shot. Our loss may be well imagined when I mention that we embarked 640 horses and brought home 60!' (30)

Fortunately, lessons could be learned and acted upon, as Verner adds: 'Ever since this fatal retreat each man is provid­ed with a set of spare shoes and a supply of nails and a cer­tain number of men, per troop are or were practiced in putting on shoes'.(31)

By comparison, the campaign experienced French had four extra shoes plus nails per trooper, and each troop had a corporal-farrier. Unfortunately, other lessons were not absorbed, despite the clear lesson of this first campaign as summed up by the adjutant of the 15th Hussars: 'The outposts were in general harassed by their want of knowledge in taking up proper positions'.(32) Apart from extra horseshoes, the cav­alry about to embark upon the Peninsula campaign under Wellington were not better prepared in 1809, despite the clear lessons of Moore's short campaign.

Comparative Performance of Horse Care in the Field

The loss of mounts by both sides was dreadful; the rigorous Spanish climate and terrain only seemed to exaggerate the neglect of horses by both French and British troopers. Only regular drafts of remounts from Britain saved the British cavalry from the pitiful state many French regiments ended up in.

The British cavalry arrived in the Peninsula with some of the most magnificent mounts in Europe, but years of comfortable stables, good forage, and careful grooming had left them soft and the rigours of the long sea voyage and hardships of the Peninsula plus poor field care, ruined and killed thousands. Also while they were in magnificent condition, they were near cart horse in size due to the emphasis on the charge and resulting emphasis on large men on large horses. Unlike lighter mounts that would have been suitable for outpost work, these large beasts suffered quickly when forage was short and conditions hard.(33) An example of typical wastage were the 14th Light Dragoons, who spent five and a half years in the Peninsula, maintaining an average mounted strength of 340 and losing over 1,504 horses.(34) In 1808 it embarked 720 horses; it received while in Spain: 664 remounts, 381 mounts transferred from other units 63 captured mounts, 13 locally procured Spanish mounts

Only 278 remained in 1814 to return home! Yet French losses were even worse; in Massena's 1810-11 campaign in Portugal, most regiments were reduced to single mounted squadrons. For example, on May Ist 1811, the 3rd Dragoons had only 139 horses left of an original 563, and the 10th Dragoons only 233 out of 535. On Ist May 1811, Lamotte Brigade had only 319 mounts out of 800 in March, a loss of 481 in two months. (35) While admittedly extreme cases, they give a good indication of general losses).

British cavalry were fortunate in having a consistent supply of remounts each year from Britain, although the sea voyage caused significant wastage. Cooped up for weeks on a transport, in December 1812 for example, 9 out of 40 died on one ship. (36) But the standard of most native Peninsula mounts was abysmal. Spanish horses were high blooded, too long in the neck, back and legs, and lacked the strength or stamina to carry for long distances a trooper and his equipment weighing up to 350 lbs.(37)

B<>Suffering

The heat and dirt of Spain caused terrible suffering to the horses. For example, the glossy black coats of the Royal Dragoons degenerated to a dingy brown or bay, and furrows appeared down their hind quarters.(38) . Leach wrote: 'Chopped straw and stagnant water, with constant exposure to a boiling sun and being picketed under a shadeless tree, reduced them to a pitiable state'. (39) Basically prolonged, arduous spells of duty, exposure to heat and disease like farcy, glanders, mange, plus poor forage, polluted water often carrying worms, also poor roads, all combined to soon impair the efficiency of the best of regiments. An extreme case was the 4th Dragoon Guards, who having arrived in the Peninsula in late 1811, had to be sent home in early 1812, never having taken to the field, due to the loss of mounts and ill health of the troopers. Wellington commented when inspecting them a month after their arrival: ,of 470 men, they could produce only 230 mounted, and these looked more like men out of the hospitals than troopers just arrived from England .... All the newly arrived regiments of cavalry are in the same state'. (40)

Yet, with experience, the regiments that had arrived in 1809 had by 1811 learned many lessons and could maintain an average strength of 350 mounted troopers (regulation strength was 670). But regular periods of rest and recuperation were vital to maintain even this. Corn imported from Britain and until 1812, America, was used to improve conditions, but this was expensive and bulky to transport. Tomkinson relates while in winter quarters after the hard autumn 1811 campaign: 'The regiment in these quarters received its full allowance of corn; the horses in better spirits, and will do well till the grass comes; but after the starvation they have endured they will never thoroughly come about before spring'.(41) General Long sums it up: 'The mortality rate of the horse in this country is incredible'. (42)

But despite experience, and the addition in 1811 of a second reserve farrier per troop, British regiments remained generally poor at horsecare on campaign. According to A. Brett-James, 'The officers were a major factor, many being from the big landed families, were too often impatient, dashing and fond of fun, but not so ready to supervise stable duties. Many felt too grand to look after the veterinary side because they usually had a good stud groom on the estate. Few officers knew much about their horses' feet, and the troopers were hard to discipline in painstaking, fiddling jobs'.(43) Yet the "professional" French were even worse.

The French were severely handicapped by a shortage of suitable remounts to replace the appalling rate of loss. Unlike the British, few remounts arrived from the depot in France. So desperate was the situation, that in 1812, Marshal Marmont, commander of the Army of Portugal, had to order all infantry officers to turn their horses over to the Dragoons in order to produce even one weak Dragoon Division. (44) The poor performance of the French cavalry at Salamanca can be in part attributed to these horses, untrained to manoeuvre in mass formation.

Poor Horse Care

Despite years of previous campaign experience, the standard of horse care, even for veteran units, was poor. This is partly explained by the lack of training at the depot and a lack of attention by 'dashing beau sabres' to horsecare. But lack of training and emphasis was not the only cause; Captain Dupuy believed that many sore backs and sores were caused by drunken veterans rolling about in the saddle. (45) In the Peninsula, many claim they could smell a French unit from half a mile, due to the sorebacked mounts! (46) Yet, while poor at horsecare, the average trooper seems to have been extremely fond of his horse, which seems to have returned this fondness; dor de Brack, a junior officer, often saw a tired horse leaning to one side as it walked, so as to keep its drunken or sleeping master in the saddle.(47) When forage was short, de Brack's men would give their last piece of bread to their horses and go hungry themselves, a characteristic shared by their German troopers but not their British counterparts, as made clear earlier by Verner and Mercer.

On the question of foraging, the British were again aided with the supplies of high quality imported corn, for 10 pounds of imported hay was equivalent to 14 pounds of locally produced hay. (48) To this, if available, was added 12 pounds of oats, or 10 pounds of barley or corn. But often, on campaign, the British had, like the French, to rely on requisitioning from the locality. The British soon had learned the trick of this ruthless system, and could match the French in stripping a locality; Tomkinson gives an excellent account of such an operation, differing little from the French.(49) The one difference was that the British "paid", usually with a paper Treasury Bill, (50) usually utterly irredeemable and worthless, while the French never dreamed of "paying".

One major French superiority did remain though when it came to foraging, for both French and German troopers could generally be trusted to collect forage for all, for the British, only great exertion by officers achieved this. (51) Finally when occasionally forage was unobtainable, the situation became chronic, as shown by Captain Bowles: 'The worst part of our misery is the seeing our horses and mules actually dying of starvation, no forage can be procured .... they must eat flint stones'. (52)

Basically, on the question of maintaining an effective mounted strength, the ability, thanks to naval supremacy, to bring in regular drafts of remounts and corn, allowed the British to maintain a supremacy in size and condition over the French, despite their low standard of horsecare. To complete this section, the German units, especially.the K.G.L. regiments, give an excellent example of what was possible, even in the Peninsula's harsh environment. Their losses were half that of the British, and the condition of their mounts was far superior.(53) Gleig felt: 'an Englishman .... never acquires that attachment for his horse which a German trooper experiences'. (54) Attachment and attentiveness were the key words in their superiority. The previously quoted evidence of Mercer is supported by Burgoyne to point out that if a horse known to be in good condition deteriorated, the trooper was punished, ' ...with respect to their horses, they steal for them and not from them, and take great pains to provide them with some sort of litter to lie down in'. (55) Unlike many British troopers, the French and Germans did not cheat their horses by selling their forage. (56) 

NOTES

1. T. Simes, Military Guide for Young Officers quoted in J. Pimlott, British Light Cavalry p.8
2. David Johnson, Napoleon's Cavalry and its Leaders p.35
3. W. Muller, The Elements of the Science of War quoted in J. Pimlott, British Light Cavalry p. 17
4. The British infantry was not composed entirely of "the scum of the earth" as claimed by Wellington. In 1807 alone, over 27,000 militia volunteered for the regular army, and the ballot drafted militia represented a fairly wide cross-section of the working and peasant classes. C. Emsley, British Society and the French Wars 1793-1815, p. 132
5. C. Emsley, British Society and the French Wars 1793-1815, p.1 11
6. In the period 1793-1815 there was only one ex-sergeant who reached the rank of colonel, and two who reached major! Charles Oman, Wellington's Army, p.207
7. Robert Ballard Long, Peninsula Cavalry General (1811-13), p.35
8. A.E. Clark-Kennedy, Attack the Colour! p. 19
9. G.E. Rothenberg, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon, p. 176
10. Ralph Heathercote, Letters of a young diplomatic and soldier during the time of Napoleon by Countess, Gunther Groben. Quoted in A.E. Clark-Kennedy, Attack the Colour! p.20-21
11. A major problem in organising Brigade or even regimental drills was that the British army had a major role to play in policing Britain. The cavalry especially found itself broken up into small platoon and company units to police Ireland. Scotland and the Midlands, and to control smuggling, Due to Napoleon's success in stabilizing France after 1800, the French army was able to collect together in large camps up and down the coast e.g. the Camp de Bologne, 1803-05, and carry out complex divisional and even corps manoeuvres.
12. W. Tomkinson, The Diary of a Cavalry Officer in the Peninsula and Waterloo Campaign, 1809-15, p. 135
13. R. H. Thoumine, Scientific Soldier (Le Marchant), p41
14. He was the senior cavalry general in Spain, 1809-14.
15. W. Tomkinson, The Diary of a Cavalry Officer in the Peninsula and Waterloo Campaign 1809-15, p. 135
16. Between 1800 and 1815, the number of men actually conscripted was not excessive. Some 2,543,357 men were mustered, but only some 1,500,000 were enlisted. This came to less than 7% of France's population, and with the Empire steadily expanding, and new areas becoming subject to conscription, the percentage fell to 5%. Re-enlistment was encouraged with service stripes and better pay. In 1804, the army still had over 170,000 men conscripted between 1792-1799 in its ranks out of a total of 300,000. Up until 1812 the average yearly intake was 85,000 men, but even including the total levies of 1813-14, the number of men actually serving did not exceed 41 % of the eligible 20-25 year old male population. G. Lefebvre, Napoleon from 18th Brumaire to Tilsit, p.214-18 and G.E. Rothenberg, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon, p. 134
17. G. Lefebvre, Napoleon from l8th Brumaire to Tilsit quoted in G.E. Rothenberg, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon, p. 134
18. Charles Oman, A History of the Peninsula War, VoI.VI, p.244-246 and F. Lorraine Petre, Napoleon at Bay 1814, p.21 1
19. David Chandler, The Campaign of Napoleon, p.335
20. David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, p.335 and G.E. Rothenberg, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon, p. 133 and Henry Lachouque, The Anatomy of Glory, Napoleon and his Guard, pXII of Introduction, English reprint of 1978.
21. David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, p.335 and G.E. Rothenberg, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon, p. 133
22. G.E. Rothenberg, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon, p. 142-143
23. Pierre Chalmin, L'Officier Francais de 1815 a 1870, p.297 Also discussion with David Chandler about a new book by Rothenberg to be published soon on Napoleonic staff matters. Also my own research in George Six, Dictionnaire Biographique des Generaux et Amiraux Francais de la Revolution et de I'Empire (1792-1814). 2 vols.
24. The outstanding German cavalry of the period, does I feel, indicate the artificiality of dating the growth of "professionalism" from the Prussian army reform of 1807-13. In most German armies of the late l8th century, early 19th century, most prospective officers served one to two years as officer cadets in the ranks. The lack of any military colleges signified little, for the education they received whilst cadets was quite comprehensive. The diary of Lieutenant Vossler (Heinrich Vossler, With Napoleon in Russia 1812, p. 19) illustrates that by 1809 the small German states were admitting non-nobles (a practice dating back at least to 1800; Captain Roeder's memoirs (Franz Roeder, The Ordeal of Captain Roeder, p. 15) are of a non-noble who entered the Hessian army as a cadet in 1799). The Prussian reforms of 1807-13 were largely predated by the practice of the smaller German states, and it was many decades before Prussia admitted non-nobles to the officer corps. Apart from the institution of a staff college and administration, I feel that France and the German states pre-date Prussia as the first primitive "professional" armies. S.F. Scott in his excellent book The Response of the Royal army to the French Revolution, 1978, illustrates the first clear steps by any army towards professionalism.

Even British officers recognised the advantages of the German system, as shown by Heathcote's. comment: 'I am perfectly persuaded that the German method of teaching an officer the duty of a private, before he learns that of an officer, is far better than our way'. (Cornet Heathercote, quoted in A.E. ClarkKennedy, Attack the Colour! p.2 1).
25. John Mollo, Waterloo Uniform 1. British Cavalry, p.39
26. John Kincaid, Adventures in the Rifle Brigade, p.162
27. David Johnson, Napoleon's Cavalry and its Leaders, p.111 and 121 and G.E. Rothenberg, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon, p. 162
28. Chevalier Mercer, Journal of the Waterloo Campaign, p.42
29. D.A. Thiebault, Memoires of Baron Thiebault, Vol.2, p.270
30. William Verner, Reminiscences of William Verner (1782 -1871, 7th Hussars, p. 15
31. Ibid p. 15
32. John Pimlott, British Light Cavalry, p.33
33. James Lunt, Scarlet Lancer, p.40-41
34. A. Brett-James, Life in Wellington's Army, p. 180
35. Charles Oman, A History of the Peninsula War, Vol. 4., p. 188 and 301
36. A. Brett-James, Life in Wellington's Army, p. 180
37. A. Brett-James, Life in Wellington's Army, p. 181. Colonel M.C.B. Rogers, Wellington's Army, p.52
38. A. Brett-James, Life in Wellington's Army, p.183-4
39. J. Leach, Rough Sketches of the Life of an Old Soldier (95th Rifles), p.244. Quoted in A. Brett-James, Life in Wellington's Army, p. 184
40. R.H. Thoumine, Scientific Soldier (Le Marchant), p.152
41. W. Tomkinson, The Diary ofa Cavalry Officer in the Peninsula and Waterloo Campaign, 1809-15 p. 126
42. Robert Ballard Long, Peninsula Cavalry General (1811-13), p.232
43. A. Brett-James, Life in Wellington's Army, p.187
44. Charles Oman, A History of the Peninsula War, VoI.V, p.391-2 45. Victor Dupuy, Souvenir Militaires, 1794-1816, quoted in David Johnson's Napoleon's Cavalry and its Leaders, p.159
46. David Johnson, Napoleon's Cavalry and its Leaders, p.159 47. Antoine Fortune de Brack, Avant-postes de Cavalerie Legere. Quoted in David Johnson's Napoleon's Cavalry and its Leaders p. 159
48. A. Brett-James, Life in Wellington's Army, p.189 49. W. Tomkinson, The Diary of a Cavalry Officer in the Peninsula and Waterloo Campaign, 1809-15, p. 128-129 50. S.G.P. Ward, Wellington's Headquarters, p.42-44
51. W. Tomkinson, The Diary ofa Cavalry Officer in the Peninsula and Waterloo Campaign, 1809-15, p 129 52. A. Brett­James, Life in Wellington's Army, p.179 53. A. Brett-James, Life in Wellington's Army, p.188
54. G.R. Gleig, The Subaltern, p.199 as quoted in A. Brett-James, Life in Wellington's Army, p. 188
55. A. Brett-James, Life in Wellington's Army, p.188
56. lbid,p.188

More British and French Cavalry

Introduction
General Background
Recruitment, Officers, and Training: British
Recruitment, Officers, and Training: French
Comparative Performance

More British and French Cavalry Part 2

Comparative Performance
The Charge
Comparison of Swords and Swordsmanship
Conclusion, Notes, and Bibliography

Letter to Editor (AoN13)