The British Cavalry in 1809 was a product of l8th century warfare; the new forms of warfare and organisation emerging on the Continent had left it largely untouched. While the British infantry benefited from a large intake of well-trained, disciplined militia, (4) the cavalry gained most of its recruits via the traditional system of a recruiting party, offering large financial bounties. Most of the working class population considered it a disgrace to enter- the army. Pay was miserably low at I/­per day compared to an average weekly wage in 1809 of 18/- per week.(5) From this the soldier had to buy his own food! Recruits usually had to be gulled into joining by drink, the tales of the recruiting sergeant and the prospect of a bounty. Many, particularly the Irish, enlisted to evade poverty; criminals joined to escape the law as the courts allowed enlistment as an alternative to imprisonment. Yet, despite this very unpromising material, strict discipline, flogging and the very efficient N.C.O.'s produced generally efficient parade ground troopers, although discipline often collapsed in time of stress on the battlefield, e.g. the pillage of the French baggage after Vittoria in 1813. Basically for the troopers, there was a marked lack of enthusiasm about their "career", and training was weak in many practical aspects, especially as regards outpost work.

For officers, promotion was mainly by purchase and influence, the handful of rankers promoted to officers tended to drift into positions of paymaster, recruiting officers and barrack masters, and most remained junior sublaterns.(6) The cost of even a junior cornetsy was high, for example £ 650 in 1806 for the 8th Dragoons. A private income was essential; in 1805, a newly joined cornet in the 15th Hussars had a minimum yearly outlay of £ 510. 1s. 2d, and pay was only £ 129 per annum.(7)

One important control on the purchase system was that in 1795, the Duke of York, Commander in Chief of the Army, had introduced a rule that required officers to serve a minimum of three years as a junior subaltern before he could purchase a captaincy, and a further two years before purchasing field rank.(8) But there were still many young captains, majors and lieutenant-colonels who had spent little of the stipulated period with the regiment. When the army left for the Peninsula in 1808/09, many officers, some quite senior, "turned up" for the first time to accompany their units to war. (9)

Until 1801, professional training was non-existent, and military knowledge had to be acquired by rule of thumb and divine inspiration. There was a deep seated opposition to any form of training for officers. The gentleman amateur was viewed as the safeguard to prevent Cromwellian type political soldiers. In December 1801, the former Lieutenant-Colonel G. Le Marchant, despite great opposition, established the "Royal Military College" at High Wycombe for the 'use of young officers', followed by the 'Junior Department' in May 1802, 'for instruction of those who from early life are intended for the military profession'. But practically all its limited intake entered the staff, few if any entered the cavalry. The average officer's 'training' is well illustrated by an extract from a letter by a new Cornet in the Royal Dragoons to his mother in 1806, describing an average day.

At about nine o'clock the trumpets sound for foot parade when the different troops formed...then the sergeant's guard mounts, and the officers leave the regiment; their business being done; then the sergeant-major exercises the regiment, with which we have nothing to do. At ten o'clock I breakfast...At eleven all the subaltern officers are to go to the riding school but, if you don't go, no notice is taken of it, except perhaps if you were to away for weeks together. At twelve the subal­tern officers have to attend the foot drill, and then your business is done for the day...Our officers are not teased with the petty minutiae of the service. They are, and live like gentlemen...Regimental duty does not take up above two hours when there is a field day, and half an hour when there is a foot parade. The rest of the time we have quite to ourselves occupied in read­ing, drawing, music, etc. (10)

In an another letter he writes:

Our sergeants drill the men, etc., etc., and do the greater part of the duty of a German officer (it will be seen how vital this difference is later.) We only attend on parades, they last about a quarter of an hour. (11)

Heathercote adds a postscript, that will emerge as another major problem for the British cavalry when they actually reached the Peninsula:

But every officer amongst us allows that our men are too well fed, clothed, etc. to accustom themselves easily to a campaign abroad; our horses are in the same predicament.

Captain Tomkinson proves that the Light Dragoons were no better:

In England I never saw or heard of cavalry taught to charge, disperse and form, which if I taught a regiment one thing it should be that. (12)

The lack of officer training was compounded by the erroneous belief that the charge was the sole function of the cavalry. To a degree, this was true for the heavy dragoons, but was dreadfully mistaken for the light dragoons, for whom it should have a faint possibility in exceptional circumstances. This situation was due to a series of reasons that had led to the light dragoons forgetting its original function of outpost work.

1) Despite detailed instruction from the Adjutant General Office central control over training was weak. Unlike the French army where there was one exercise manual, drills and tactical exercises, despite Dundas' drill of 1795, were left to individual colonels to organise. By the early 1800's the average colonel instilled but one aim: the charge.

2) A major contribution to this situation had been made by the original light cavalry regiment, the 15th Light Dragoons. On 16th July 1760, a year after their formation, they made a brilliant debut by charging and routing formed French infantry at Emsdorf. They soon had EMSDORF emblazoned on their helmets, and all other light dragoons sought to emulate it. The practical lessons learned by the 16th and 17th Light Dragoons in the American War of Independence were forgotten or deemed inapplicable to Europe. The next experience of war, the 1793-5 Flanders Campaign had the 15th repeating Emsdorf at Villers-en-Cauchies this being the only major British cavalry action of note in the campaign. Also, the deficiencies of the British light cavalry were largely covered by the superior Austrian light cavalry present with the British Army. To complete the bad example, the 15th in 1808 yet again managed a successful charge, when at Sahagun, they routed two French cavalry regiments having broken them in a classic headlong charge. Hence, by 1809, all light cavalry regiments burned to repeat the 15th's exploit, oblivious to the 15th's amazing luck.

3) To complete the picture, the only two major reforms instituted in the cavalry between 1795-1809 had the unfortunate effect of emphasising the charge.

A: In 1795, Major-General Dundas, viewing the debacle in Flanders, brought out a drill manual, aimed at unifying the varied regimental drill and tactical manoeuvres. By July 1795 copies of his "Rules and Regulations" were issued by the Adjutant-General to every cavalry regiment. While it was the first attempt to impose a uniform drill upon all regiments, it had a major flaw, in that it was applied equally to all regiments, regardless of type, i.e. heavy or light. While it stressed and outlined the charge as central to the heavy cavalry function, it devoted little space to skirmishing or outpost work, which were therefore largely ignored by light cavalry colonels. Dundas unwittingly further emphasised the charge, giving it seeming official sanction, while removing further emphasis from the light cavalry's true function.

B: Le Marchant further compounded this. He had served in Flanders with the 2nd Dragoon Guards, and had been shocked by the appallingly bad sword and horsemanship displayed. Weapons were poorly designed, horses unused to gunfire, drills differed, and army troopers managed to wound themselves or their mounts in melees!(13) Having worked out the problem and gone to great lengths to become an extremely skilled swordsman and rider, he wrote "Rules and Regulations". It was mainly aimed at the light cavalry, for whom he also designed a new sabre, broad-bladed, markedly curved and designed for cutting rather than thrusting. With Royal patronage, both sword and drill were adopted by the light cavalry by 1800. This improved both swordsmanship and the trooper's seat on horseback. But the cuts and parries of Le Marchant's drill, and its emphasis on a firm seat, all further emphasised the charge, for one would not normally expect to engage the enemy, except in a melee following a charge; the charge being performed in accordance to Dundas' manual.

Thanks to Dundas, the Duke of York and Le Marchant, although by 1802 training depots had been established at Ipswich and Woodbridge, the training was for a firm seat from which to wield a sword, and for straight ranks and general parade ground precision so as to deliver a decisive charge. With all this training, it is little wonder the British always managed to break their French opponents in a straight headlong charge. The almost total lack of emphasis given to outpost work is made clear by Captain Tomkinson:

To attempt giving senior officers any idea in England of outpost duty was considered absurd, and when they came abroad, they had all this to learn. The fact was, there was no one to teach them. Sir Stapleton Cotton tried (14) at Woodbridge in Suffolk, with the l4th and 16th Light Dragoons, and got the enemy's Vedettes and his own looking the same way. There is much to be learnt in service which cannot be done at home, though I do not mean to say nothing can be taught in England.(15)

Hence, by 1809, myth, doctrine and training emphasised the charge. Yet even so, it was a parade ground charge, for there was little consideration given to rallying, maintaining a reserve or even basic discipline after breaking the enemy. As for outpost work, for which there would be a premium in the Peninsula, the preparation was nothing short of a joke. Reality had little relevance to the British Cavalry.

More British and French Cavalry

Introduction
General Background
Recruitment, Officers, and Training: British
Recruitment, Officers, and Training: French
Comparative Performance

More British and French Cavalry Part 2

Comparative Performance
The Charge
Comparison of Swords and Swordsmanship
Conclusion, Notes, and Bibliography

Letter to Editor (AoN13)